Commentary for Avodah Zarah 102:2

The Talmud brings up the problem that Leviticus 17:7 is already used in a different midrash. To understand this midrash I think it is important to see the full verses:
(3) If anyone of the house of Israel slaughters an ox or sheep or goat in the camp, or does so outside the camp,
(4) And does not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting to present it as an offering to the LORD, before the LORD’s Tabernacle, bloodguilt shall be imputed to that man: he has shed blood; that man shall be cut off from among his people.
(5) This is in order that the Israelites may bring the sacrifices which they have been making in the open field—that they may bring them before the LORD, to the priest, at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, and offer them as sacrifices of well-being to the LORD.”
There is some repetition here, particularly between verses four and five. To solve this, the midrash suggests that they refer to different historical settings. The first two verses deal with a period in Jewish history where private altars were prohibited, once the Tabernacle was set up. Thus verse four says that he must bring his offerings to the Tent of Meeting. The verse establishes the punishment for not doing so and a verse in Deuteronomy states the warning. These verses deal with a period in which the animal was dedicated and actually sacrificed when it was prohibited to offer outside of the central sanctuary, after the Tabernacle was erected.

The verses that follow, from verse 5 and onwards, refer to a case where the person dedicated the animal when it was still permitted to offer animals on private altars, but then sacrificed it after the Tabernacle had already been erected, when private altars were prohibited. Although the animal was permitted as a sacrifice when it was dedicated, it was forbidden to sacrifice it. And even though he offered it on an altar, Scripture treats this as if the altar was irrelevant. It is like sacrificing in an open field.

This is the end of the midrashic baraita. Leviticus 17:7 is the negative commandment against sacrificing on a private altar. There is a lighter penalty in the case where he dedicated before it was prohibited to sacrifice on private altars—it is only a negative commandment. This is unlike dedicating and sacrificing when private altars are prohibited which is punishable by karet, as the verse explicitly states.
In any case, this concludes the long difficulty. This verse is used here as the negative commandment for slaughtering on a private altar. So how can R. Elazar use it to prove that one who worships an idol in a way not usual to that idol is liable?

Rava says that since the verse uses the word “anymore” we can read it as alluding to two prohibitions. The first is to sacrifice on private altars and the second is to worship an idol in an unusual manner.

The first mishnah of this chapter taught that one typical way of worshipping the Mercurius idol was to lay stones next to it. In the second mishnah we see ways in which Mercurius was not worshipped. It was not worshipped by having money, clothes or other vessels laid next to it. Since this is not typical Mercurius worship, it is permitted for Jews to use these items.
However, if anything that is normally sacrificed is found next to a Mercurius, these items are forbidden to Jews. Since these items are generally used in idol worship, and evidently also in the worship of Mercurius, they are forbidden if they are found in proximity to the idol.

Oshaia’s midrash is based on two verses which seem to contradict each other, for one mentions wood and stone and silver and gold whereas the second one mentions only silver and gold. The answer is that the verse teaches that for the items found “with them” to be prohibited they must be like the items found on them—decorative. Silver and gold are obviously decorative, but for the wood and stone to be prohibited they too must be decorative.
Below the Talmud will ask how this proves the halakhah in the mishnah. After all, the list of items in the first half could also be decorative. It seems to me that R. Oshaia’s midrash here originally proved a halakhah that was different from that found in the mishnah.

The Talmud asks why we can’t run the analogy in the opposite direction. The verse that says “with them” implies that anything that is with them is prohibited, so too anything that is “on them” should also be prohibited, even if it is not decorative. In other words, why use the analogy to create a leniency, why not use the opposite analogy to create a stringency?
The answer is that if that was the case, we would not even need the verse “on them.” We could derive the full halakhah from the other verse. The mere existence of a second verse implies that one must be a limitation on the other.

The problem with R. Oshaia’s statement is that it does not really explain the mishnah. The mishnah said that a coin, garment or vessel found near the idol are permitted. But surely these all can be decorative! The Talmud answers that these are permitted if they are not placed in a decorative fashion on or near the idol. But, by implication, if they were placed in a decorative fashion, they would be prohibited.
The need to limit the mishnah shows that R. Oshaia was probably not explaining the mishnah. The mishnah prohibits items that might have been offered to the idol and permits those that are not considered offerings. In contrast, R. Oshaia prohibits decorative items and permits non-decorative ones. It seems that the Talmudic editors used a statement with one concern to explain a statement that had a different concern.

Assi b. Hiyya refers to an idol partitioned off. The word for partitions here is probably a play on the Hebrew “קלעים” which are found in the Temple. To distinguish the holy curtains from the idolatrous partitions, the Talmud uses a different word, one that sounds like קלקל which means spoiled.

Yose b. Hanina says that the distinction between inside and outside the partition does not apply to the Peor idol or the Mercurius. Both of these idols are, according to the rabbis, worshipped in an unusual way. Peor is worshipped by people defecating on it, and Mercurius by people throwing stones at it.
The Talmud clarifies that what this means is that for these two idols there is no distinction between inside and outside the partitions. If the item is either used in the worship of the idol or is decorative it is always prohibited.

If an idolatrous shrine has a garden or bathhouse in its courtyard, there are certain circumstances in which the garden or bathhouse may nevertheless be used. First of all one may always use them as long as one doesn’t give any advantage to the idolaters. This means that one could use the garden or bathhouse as long as he does not pay the idolatrous priests for such use. Secondly, if the garden or bathhouse was jointly owned by the shrine a private individual, one could always use them, and even pay for their use. Even though some of the money may go to the shrine, the Jew can consider the payment as going to the individual partner.
We should note that Maimonides explains that “to the advantage of” does not mean paying money as we explained above, but rather giving verbal recognition to the owners. If the bathhouse or garden is jointly owned, one may give verbal advantage to the owners, and even to the idolatrous priests, however, according to Maimonides, one may not pay for the use.

As soon as an idol is made by a non-Jew it is prohibited, even before it is worshipped. The reason is that we can safely assume that the non-Jew will worship the idol, and it was certainly made for idolatrous purposes. However, an idol made by a Jew is only forbidden for Jewish use once it has been worshipped. The reason is that we cannot be sure that the Jew will worship the idol. It potentially could be used for decorative, non-idolatrous purposes.

According to Abaye, when the mishnah says that one may use the garden or bathhouse as long as it is not to the “advantage” it means to the advantage of the priests who run it. A Jew may pay other idolaters for its use.

Some teach Abaye’s statement in reference to the second clause—one can use a garden if it is jointly owned by an idolatrous temple and by others. He can pay the other owners, but he cannot pay the priests who own it.

If one teaches Abaye’s statement in reference to the second clause, then he could also teach it in reference to the first clause. In neither case can one make payment directly to the priests.
But if one teaches the statement in reference to the first clause, then when it comes to the second clause, where the bathhouse or garden is jointly owned, he can even make payment to the priests. Since the whole bathhouse or garden does not belong to the idolatrous temple, we can say he is using the part owned by others.

The mishnah accords with the opinion of R. Akiva—an idol made by an idolater is prohibited immediately. In contrast, R. Yishmael says that such an idol is not prohibited to a Jew until it has actually been worshipped. He derives this from the words of the verse “where the nations worshipped.”

The midrash above says that Deuteronomy 12:2 is referring to vessels—human-made objects. The problem is that the verse explicitly says “places” not “vessels.” The Talmud explains that we cannot take this word “places” at face value for we have another midrash on the same verse (one we saw above) that says that places (“mountains”) cannot be prohibited. Since it cannot mean that Jews must destroy places where idolatry took place, it must mean that Jews cannot use “vessels” that were used in idolatrous worship.