Commentary for Avodah Zarah 125:13

If he gives her the animal and then has sex with her, this is payment for the sex. Why should the animal not be considered her wages and therefore prohibited? R. Elazar answers that first the man gives her the animal, then she offers it as a sacrifice and then he has sex with her. At the time when she offered it, it was permitted.

The Talmud now analyzes the case described above. If he told the prostitute that the animal belongs to her immediately, even before having sex with her, then the animal was a gift and of course she can sacrifice it.

If he does not tell her that the animal is hers immediately, then it is not hers and she can’t sacrifice it. A person can never sacrifice something that is not his or hers.

The language he uses is sort of ambiguous. He is clearly not giving her a gift, on the other hand he does say that if she needs to use it, it is hers.

On the previous page R. Elazar said the offering is permitted if she first offered it. By implication it is not permitted if she only dedicated it. So this should solve our question. For the animal to be permitted as a sacrifice she must first offer it, not merely dedicate it.

On the previous page R. Elazar said the offering is permitted if she first offered it. By implication it is not permitted if she only dedicated it. So this should solve our question. For the animal to be permitted as a sacrifice she must first offer it, not merely dedicate it.

The Talmud says that really the question was asked about R. Elazar’s statement itself. Was R. Elazar being specific—the animal is a valid sacrifice only if it was actually sacrificed. Or perhaps he only said “offered” because he was sure that in that case it was valid. But in the case where it was only dedicated he was not so sure. No answer to this one—sorry folks. I know you really wanted to know.

According to the first baraita, if he has sex with her and then gives her the animal, the animal is permitted, whereas the second baraita says that it is prohibited. R. Nahman b. Yitzchak resolves them by saying it depends on how he makes his statement to her. If he specifies beforehand that this lamb will be her payment, then it is prohibited. But if he does not specify which lamb then when he had sex with her, that lamb was not designated as payment. The lamb can therefore be used as a sacrifice.

For an object to be acquired, the person acquiring it must draw it towards themselves. A declaration is not sufficient to transfer ownership. So just because he says “for this lamb” does not mean that the lamb belongs to her, in which case it should be permitted.
The answer is that this prostitute was not a Jew. Jews, according to the Talmud, acquire by taking physical possession. Gentiles can, according to this passage, acquire even through a verbal transaction.

One can acquire objects by their being on one’s property. Therefore, if he says “this lamb” and they are on her property, it is hers and it will be forbidden.

If the lamb is already on her property, then he gave it to her before intercourse and it should be prohibited in any case. This is not a case of giving after intercourse which is what we were discussing.
The Talmud adjusts the situation. He gave it to her only as a pledge if he were not to bring payment. If he brings payment, then the lamb will never have lest his possession. But if he does not bring payment, then it will turn out that the lamb becomes hers, but only after intercourse.
Tomorrow’s passage will continue to discuss this case. Again, the main interest seems to be laws of transactions, not the particular case of the prostitute.

The employer here is not paying his employees; he is feeding them while they are working for him. Nevertheless, he does not need to be concerned that they will use this money to buy prohibited food or drink. Once they buy food products, the products are theirs, not his, and they are transgressing, not he.