Commentary for Bava Kamma 56:19

וכי תימא ה"מ לענין קטלא אבל לענין נזקין חייב והתניא נשברה כדו ולא סלקו נפל גמלו ולא העמידו ר"מ מחייב בהזיקן וחכמים אומרים

opposes that of Samuel?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' According to whom it should be subject to the law applicable to Pit imposing no liability for damage done to inanimate objects. ');">¹⁶</span> — But [even] on your view, does not the text contradict itself, stating exemption in the commencing clause<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Making a stone, a knife and luggage subject to the law applicable to Pit. ');">¹³</span> and liability in the concluding clause!<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Imposing liability in the case of a bottle having been smashed against the stone. ');">¹⁵</span> Rab therefore interprets it so as to accord with his reasoning, whereas Samuel [on the other hand] expounds it so as to reconcile it with his view. Rab in accordance with his reasoning interprets it thus: The [above] statement<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Making a stone, a knife and luggage subject to the law applicable to Pit. ');">¹³</span> was made only regarding nuisances that have been abandoned, whereas where they have not been abandoned there is liability.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Even for damage done to inanimate objects, as they are subject not to the law of Pit but to that applicable to Ox. ');">¹⁷</span> It therefore follows that where a bottle broke against the stone there is liability. Samuel [on the other hand] in reconciling it with his view expounds it thus: Since you have now decided that a stone, a knife and luggage [constitute nuisances that] are equivalent [in law] to Pit, it follows that, according to R. Judah who orders compensation for inanimate objects damaged by Pit,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Supra p. 18. ');">¹⁸</span> where a bottle smashed against the stone there is liability. R. Eleazar said: This ruling<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Imposing liability in the case of a bottle having been smashed against the stone. ');">¹⁵</span> refers only to a case where the person stumbled over the stone and the bottle broke against the stone. For if the person stumbled because of the public ground, though the bottle broke against the stone, there is exemption.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Since it was ownerless ground that was the primary cause of the accident. ');">¹⁹</span> Whose view is here followed? — Of course not that of R. Nathan.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Who holds that where no payment can be exacted from one defendant, the co-defendant, if any, will himself bear the whole liability; cf supra p. 54 and infra 53a ');">²⁰</span> There are, however, some who [on the other hand] read: R. Eleazar said: Do not suggest that it is only where the person stumbled upon the stone and the bottle broke against the stone that there is liability, so that where the person stumbled because of the public ground, though the bottle broke against the stone, there would be exemption. For even in the case where the person stumbled because of the public ground, provided the bottle broke against the stone there is liability. Whose view is here followed? — Of course that of Nathan.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Who holds that where no payment can be exacted from one defendant, the co-defendant, if any, will himself bear the whole liability; cf supra p. 54 and infra 53a ');">²⁰</span> R. JUDAH SAYS: IF IT WAS DONE INTENTIONALLY HE IS LIABLE, BUT IF UNINTENTIONALLY HE IS EXEMPT. What does INTENTIONALLY denote? — Rabbah said: [It is sufficient<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' To constitute liability. ');">²¹</span> if there was] an intention to bring the pitcher below the shoulder.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Though there was no intention whatever to break it. ');">²²</span> Said Abaye to him: Does this imply that R. Meir<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Who is usually taken to have been the author of anonymous Mishnaic statements, especially when contradicting those of R. Judah b. Il'ai, his colleague. ');">²³</span> imposes liability even when the pitcher slipped down [by sheer accident]? — He answered him:<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., Rabbah to Abaye. ');">²⁴</span> 'Yes, R. Meir imposes liability even where the handle remained in the carrier's hand.' But why? Is it not sheer accident, and has not the Divine Law prescribed exemption in cases of accident as recorded,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Deut. XXII, 26. ');">²⁵</span> But unto the damsel thou shalt do nothing?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For so far as she is concerned it was a mishap. ');">²⁶</span> You can hardly suggest this ruling to apply only to capital punishment, whereas regarding damages there should [always] be liability, for it was taught:<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Infra 55a. ');">²⁷</span> If his pitcher broke and he did not remove the potsherds, [or] his camel fell down and he did not raise it, R. Meir orders payment for any damage resulting therefrom, whereas the Sages maintain

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