Commentary for Bava Kamma 61:18

ממה נפשך אי נתקל פושע הוא שני נמי ליחייב אי נתקל לאו פושע הוא אפילו ראשון נמי ליפטר

Come and hear: If a number of potters or glass-carriers were walking in line and the first stumbled and fell and the second stumbled because of the first and the third because of the second, the first is liable for the damage [occasioned] to the second, and the second is liable for the damage [occasioned] to the third. Where, however, they all fell because of the first, the first is liable for the damage [sustained] by them all. If [on the other hand] they cautioned one another, there is exemption. Now, does this teaching not deal with a case where there has not yet been [any opportunity] to rise?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. p. 166, n. 7. ');">¹⁰</span> — No, [on the contrary] they [have already] had [every opportunity] to rise. But what should be the law<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' According to the view of R. Johanan. ');">⁸</span> in the case where they [have not yet] had [any opportunity] to rise? Would there then be exemption? If so, why state in the concluding clause, 'If [on the other hand] they cautioned one another, there is exemption'? Could the distinction not be made in the statement of the same case [in the following manner]: 'Provided that they have already had every opportunity to rise; but if they have not yet had any opportunity to rise, there is exemption'? — This is what it intended to let us know: That even where they [have already] had [every opportunity] to rise, if they cautioned one another, there is exemption. Raba said: The first is liable for damage [done] to the second whether directly by his person<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Being subject to the law applicable to damage done by Man. ');">¹¹</span> or by means of his chattels,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Which are subject to the law applicable to Pit. ');">¹²</span> whereas the second is liable for damage to the third only if done by his person<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. p. 167, n. 4 ');">¹³</span> but not if caused by his chattels. [Now,] in any case [how could these rulings be made consistent]? [For] if stumbling implies carelessness, why should not also the second be liable [for all kinds of damage]?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Even if caused by his chattels. ');">¹⁴</span> If [on the other hand] stumbling does not amount to carelessness, why should even the first not enjoy immunity?

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