Commentary for Shevuot 64:15

היו שתי כיתי עדים כפרה הראשונה ואח"כ כפרה השניה: בשלמא שניה תתחייב דכפרה לה ראשונה אלא ראשונה אמאי

'All agree in [the case of] a witness of death that he is liable,' - if he told it neither to her nor to the Beth Din.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' If the wife adjures him to give evidence, and he denies having any knowledge, he is liable, for he has deprived her of the kethubah, since he did not tell even her that her husband had died, and she has therefore no information at all on the matter.');">¹⁵</span> Can we deduce from this that if one adjures witnesses in connection with land [and they deny knowledge of testimony], they are liable?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The kethubah was collected (in Talmudic times) from immovable property only; the witness of the husband's death is liable, according to R. Papa, if he is adjured and withholds information. But there is already a dispute between Tannaim on this point (v. infra 37b) . Let R. Papa then merely say he agrees with one of the Tannaim!');">¹⁶</span> - No! Perhaps she had seized movables.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The wife had in her possession during the husband's lifetime some of his movable property; and if the witness had given evidence, she would have retained it in settlement of her kethubah. R. Papa's ruling may refer to such a case, and not to a case where the kethubah has to be collected from immovable property.');">¹⁷</span> IF ONE DENIED, AND THE OTHER ADMITTED, etc. Now, if in the case of one after another where both deny, you say the first is liable,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Though be could say, 'Why should I be liable? My testimony alone is of no avail, since the other also denies', yet because when he denies, the other had not yet denied, he is liable.');">¹⁸</span> and the second exempt, in the case where one denies and the other admits, is there any question?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Surely, it is obvious that the first is liable, for the second admits knowing testimony; hence, the first, by withholding testimony, deprives the claimant of his money. Why, then, does the Mishnah mention this clause? It is superfluous!');">¹⁹</span> - It is not necessary [for the Mishnah to tell us this except in the case] where both denied, and then one of them turned and admitted within the interval of the time of an utterance; and this he teaches us, that [two statements following each other] within the interval of the time of an utterance are considered one utterance.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' And the Mishnah does not wish to teach us that the one who denies is liable (for this we know from the previous clause) , but that the one who admits is exempt, although he first denied, his admission within the brief interval being accepted, and exempting him.');">²⁰</span> Granted, according to R'Hisda who explains that [clause]<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Where both denied together.');">²¹</span> as being in accordance with the view of R'Jose the Galilean;<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. supra 32a.');">²²</span> the first clause [establishes that] it is possible to ascer simultaneity, and the second clause<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' One denied, and the other admitted.');">²³</span> is necessary in order to teach us that [two statements following each other] within the interval of the time of an utterance are considered one utterance; but, according to R'Johanan, the first clause [teaches us the law with regard to statements uttered] within the interval of the time of an utterance, and the second clause [teaches us the law with regard to statements uttered] within the interval of the time of an utterance! Why do we need both? - You might have thought that only in the case of denial and denial<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' As in the first clause.');">²⁴</span> [do we say that two statements within a brief interval are considered one],<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' And the second is liable like the first.');">²⁵</span> but in the case of denial and admission<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The second clause, where the same person first denies, and then admits.');">²⁶</span> we do not say this, therefore he teaches us [that we do]. IF THERE WERE TWO SETS OF WITNESSES, AND THE FIRST DENIED, AND THEN THE SECOND DENIED, [THEY ARE BOTH LIABLE]. Granted, the second should be liable, because the first denied;<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Hence, only the second set were left to bear testimony, and by withholding testimony, they make the claimant incur a loss.');">²⁷</span> but the first - why [should they be liable]?

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