Mesorat%20hashas for Bava Kamma 166:22

אמרי מאי קושיא דלמא נהורא שקיל מיניה נהורא אמר רחמנא נישקול מיניה דאי לא תימא הכי

thus proving that it means pecuniary compensation. But what is meant by the statement, 'if this reason does not satisfy you'? [Why should it not satisfy you?] — The difficulty which further occurred to the Tanna was as follows: What is your reason for deriving the law of man injuring man from the law of smiting a beast and not from the law governing the case of killing a man [where Retaliation is the rule]? I would answer: It is proper to derive [the law of] injury<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lev. XXIV, 19. ');">¹⁸</span> from [the law governing another case of] injury,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., where Man injured beast. ');">¹⁹</span> and not to derive [the law of] injury<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lev. XXIV, 19. ');">¹⁸</span> from [the law governing the case of] murder. It could, however, be argued to the contrary; [that it is proper] to derive [the law of injury inflicted upon] man from [another case of] man but not to derive [the law of injury inflicted upon] man from [the case of] beast. This was the point of the statement 'If, however, this reason does not satisfy you.' [The answer is as follows:] 'It is stated: <i>Moreover ye shall take no ransom for the life of a murderer that is guilty of death; but he shall surely be put to death</i>, implying that it was only <i>'for the life of a murderer'</i> that you may not take<i> ransom</i> whereas you may take <i>ransom</i> [even] for principal limbs though these cannot be restored.' But was the purpose of this [verse], Moreover ye shall take no ransom for the life of a murderer, to exclude the case of principal limbs? Was it not requisite that the Divine Law should state that you should not make him<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The murderer. ');">²⁰</span> subject to two punishments, i.e. that you should not take from him pecuniary compensation as well as kill him? — This, however, could be derived from the verse, According to his crime,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Deut. XXV, 2. ');">²¹</span> [which implies that] you can make him liable for one crime but cannot make him liable for two crimes.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Cf. Mak. 4b and 13b. ');">²²</span> But still was it not requisite that the Divine Law should state that you should not take pecuniary compensation from him and release him from the capital punishment? — If so the Divine Law would have written, 'Moreover ye shall take no satisfaction for him who is guilty [and deserving] of death'; why then write 'for the life of a murderer' unless to prove from it that it is only 'for the life of a murderer' that you may not take ransom, whereas you may take ransom [even] for principal limbs though these could not be restored? But since it was written, Moreover ye shall take no ransom [implying the law of pecuniary compensation in the case of mere injury], why do I require [the analogy made between] 'smiting' [in the case of injuring man and] 'smiting' [in the case of injuring beast]? — It may be answered that if [the law would have had to be derived only] from the former text, I might have said that the offender has the option, so that if he wishes he may pay with the loss of his eye or if he desires otherwise he may pay the value of the eye; we are therefore told [that the inference is] from smiting a beast: just as in the case of smiting a beast the offender is liable for pecuniary compensation so also in the case of injuring a man he is liable for pecuniary compensation. It was taught: R. Dosthai b. Judah says: Eye for eye means pecuniary compensation. You say pecuniary compensation, but perhaps it is not so, but actual retaliation [by putting out an eye] is meant? What then will you say where the eye of one was big and the eye of the other little, for how can I in this case apply the principle of eye for eye? If, however, you say that in such a case pecuniary compensation will have to be taken, did not the Torah state, Ye shall have one manner of law,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lev. XXIV, 22. ');">²³</span> implying that the manner of law should be the same in all cases? I might rejoin: What is the difficulty even in that case? Why not perhaps say that for eyesight taken away the Divine Law ordered eyesight to be taken away from the offender?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Without taking into consideration the sizes of the respective eyes. ');">²⁴</span> For if you will not say this,

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