Talmud Bavli
Talmud Bavli

Musar for Bava Kamma 48:15

אמר להם אף אני

Does this not mean that the inciter is free, but the owner of the dog is liable? — No, read: '… the inciter too is free.'<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Meaning thus that both inciter and owner are free. ');"><sup>12</sup></span> Raba said: Assuming that in the case of inciting a neighbour's dog against a third person, the owner of the dog is liable, if the incited dog turns upon the inciter, the owner is free on the ground that where the plaintiff himself has acted wrongly, the defendant who follows suit and equally acts wrongly [against the former] could not be made liable [to him]. R. Papa thereupon said to Raba: A statement was made in the name of Resh Lakish agreeing with yours; for Resh Lakish said:<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Supra p. 98. ');"><sup>13</sup></span> 'In the case of two cows on public ground, one lying and the other walking, if the walking cow kicks the other, there is no liability [as the plaintiff's cow had no right to be lying on the public ground], but if the lying cow kicks the other cow there will be liability.' Raba, however, said to him: In the case of the two cows I would always order payment<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Even in the case of the walking cow kicking the lying cow. ');"><sup>14</sup></span> as [on behalf of the plaintiff] we may argue against the defendant: 'Your cow may be entitled to tread upon my cow, she has however no right to kick her.' <b><i>MISHNAH</i></b> WHAT IS MEANT BY 'OX DOING DAMAGE ON THE PLAINTIFF'S PREMISES'?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Referred to supra p. 68. ');"><sup>15</sup></span> IN CASE OF GORING, PUSHING, BITING, LYING DOWN OR KICKING, IF ON PUBLIC GROUND THE PAYMENT<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' While in the state of Tam; cf. supra p. 73. ');"><sup>16</sup></span> IS HALF, BUT IF ON THE PLAINTIFF'S PREMISES R. TARFON ORDERS PAYMENT IN FULL<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. supra p. 68. ');"><sup>17</sup></span> WHEREAS THE SAGES ORDER ONLY HALF DAMAGES. R. TARFON THERE UPON SAID TO THEM: SEEING THAT, WHILE THE LAW WAS LENIENT TO TOOTH AND FOOT IN THE CASE OF PUBLIC GROUND ALLOWING TOTAL EXEMPTION,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Supra p. 17. ');"><sup>18</sup></span> IT WAS NEVERTHELESS STRICT WITH THEM REGARDING [DAMAGE DONE ON] THE PLAINTIFF'S PREMISES WHERE IT IMPOSED PAYMENT IN FULL, IN THE CASE OF HORN, WHERE THE LAW WAS STRICT REGARDING [DAMAGE DONE ON] PUBLIC GROUND IMPOSING AT LEAST THE PAYMENT OF HALF DAMAGES, DOES IT NOT STAND TO REASON THAT WE SHOULD MAKE IT EQUALLY STRICT WITH REFERENCE TO THE PLAINTIFFS PREMISES SO AS TO REQUIRE COMPENSATION IN FULL? THEIR ANSWER WAS: IT IS QUITE SUFFICIENT THAT THE LAW IN RESPECT OF THE THING INFERRED<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., Horn doing damage on the plaintiff's premises. ');"><sup>19</sup></span> SHOULD BE EQUIVALENT TO THAT FROM WHICH IT IS DERIVED:<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., Horn doing damage on public ground. ');"><sup>20</sup></span> JUST AS FOR DAMAGE DONE ON PUBLIC GROUND THE COMPENSATION [IN THE CASE OF HORN] IS HALF, SO ALSO FOR DAMAGE DONE ON THE PLAINTIFF'S PREMISES THE COMPENSATION SHOULD NOT BE MORE THAN HALF. R. TARFON, HOWEVER, REJOINED: BUT NEITHER DO I

Shemirat HaLashon

(Ibid. 17): "For I heard them [the brothers] saying: 'Let us go to Dothan [nelchah dotainah],' which Rashi interprets: 'to seek against you nichlei datoth [legal devices (suggested by 'nelchah dothainah')] to kill you with." The explanation: It was decided by them that Joseph was a man of lashon hara, who provoked their father to hate them. And who knows how much contention he would stir up among them? They, therefore, sought some pretext to rid themselves of him in a way which would not make them "murderers" legally. As far as his being killed indirectly through them, this did not concern them. And as to their saying (Ibid. 60): "Let us go and kill him," this was meant in the same indirect sense. As stated in the well known Gemara, Makkoth 23a): "If one speaks lashon hara, he is fit to be cast to the dogs, it being written (Shemoth 23:1): 'You shall not bear a false report,' preceded by (Ibid. 22:39): 'To the dog shall you cast it.'" And we find in the Gemara (Bava Kamma 24b): "If one sicked a dog against someone, he is not guilty [of murder]." And even though by the law of Heaven, he is certainly liable for "indirection," too, they thought that in this instance they would not be liable by the law of Heaven because Joseph was a man of lashon hara and contention.
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