Reference for Bava Kamma 175:21

חרש שוטה וקטן פגיעתן רעה: אימיה דרב שמואל בר אבא מהגרוניא הות נסיבא ליה לר' אבא כתבתינהו לנכסי לרב שמואל בר אבא ברה בתר דשכיבא

How then can you assert the same in the case of a slave who is subject to commandments?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' In the same way as a woman; cf. Hag. 4a. ');">²⁰</span> — The case of Woman will meet this objection, for though she is subject to commandments she is disqualified from giving evidence. The argument is thus endlessly reversible. There are features in the one instance which are not found in the other, and vice versa. The features common to both<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., in Woman and male Minor. ');">²¹</span> are that they are not subject to all the commandments<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Cf. Kid. 29a. ');">²²</span> and that they are disqualified from giving evidence. I will therefore include with them a slave who also is not subject to all the commandments and should therefore also be disqualified from giving evidence. But why [I may ask] is the feature common to them<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., in Woman and male Minor. ');">²¹</span> that they are disqualified from giving evidence if not perhaps because neither of them is a man?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' As a minor has not yet reached manhood. ');">²³</span> How then can you assert the same in the case of a slave who is a man? — You must therefore deduce the disqualification of a slave from the law applicable in the case of a robber.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Who is disqualified from giving evidence though being a 'man' and eligible to enter by marriage into the Congregation; cf. Ex. XXIII, 1. ');">²⁴</span> But why is there this disqualification in the case of a robber if not because his own deeds caused it? How then can you assert the same in the case of a slave whose own deeds could surely not cause it?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Having done nothing criminal. ');">²⁵</span> — You must therefore deduce the disqualification of a slave from both the law applicable to a robber and the law applicable to either of these [referred to above].<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., a woman or male minor, the common feature being that they do not observe all commandments — the robber on account of his criminality, the woman or male minor because neither is subject to all the commandments. ');">²⁶</span> Mar, the son of Rabina, however, said: Scripture says: <i>'The fathers shall not be put to death through<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' E.V. 'for'. ');">²⁷</span></i> the children';<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Deut. XXV, 16. ');">²⁸</span> from this it could be inferred that no sentence of capital punishment should be passed on [the evidence of] the mouth of [persons who if they were to be] fathers would have no legal paternity over their children.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Such as slaves; cf. supra p. 63. ');">²⁹</span> For if you assume that the verse is to be taken literally, 'fathers shall not be put to death through children', meaning, 'through the evidence of children', the Divine Law should have written 'Fathers shall not be put to death through their children'. Why then is it written 'children', unless to indicate that no sentence of capital punishment should be passed on [the evidence of] the mouth of [persons who if they were to be] fathers would have no legal paternity over their children? If that is so, would you also say that the concluding clause <i>'neither shall the children be put to death through the fathers'</i> similarly implies that no sentence of capital punishment should be passed on [the evidence of] the mouth of [witnesses who as] children would have no legal filiation with respect to their fathers, and therefore argue that a proselyte<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Who has no legal filiation with respect to his ancestors; cf. Yeb. 62a. ');">³⁰</span> should similarly be disqualified from giving evidence?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Which would not be in conformity with Nid. 49b. ');">³¹</span> — It may be said that there is no comparison: It is true that a proselyte has no legal relationship to his ancestors, still he has legal relationship with his descendants, [but we may therefore] exclude a slave who has relationships neither with ancestors nor with descendants. For if you should assume that a proselyte is disqualified from giving evidence, the Divine Law should surely have written: 'Fathers shall not be put to death through their children', which would mean what we stated, that they would not be put to death through the evidence of children, and after this the Divine Law should have written: <i>'Neither shall children be put to death through fathers,'</i> as from such a text you would have derived the two rules: one that children should not be put to death through the evidence of fathers and the other that no sentence of capital punishment should be passed on [the evidence of] the mouth of [witnesses who as] children have no legal filiation with respect to their fathers.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Which would have excluded also a proselyte. ');">³²</span> The disqualification in the case of a slave would surely have been derived by means of an <i>a fortiori</i> from the law applicable to a proselyte: for if a proselyte, who has no legal relationship to his ancestors but has legal relationship to his descendants, is disqualified from giving evidence, how much more must a slave who has legal relationship neither to ancestors nor to descendants be disqualified from giving evidence? But since the Divine Law has written: 'Fathers shall not be put to death through children', which implies that no sentence of capital punishment should be passed on [the evidence of] the mouth of [witnesses who as] fathers would have no legal paternity over their children, we can derive from this that it is only a [Canaanite] slave who has relationship neither to ancestors nor to descendants that will be disqualified from giving evidence, whereas a proselyte will be eligible to give evidence on account of the fact that he has legal paternity over his children. If you object, why did the Divine Law not write: 'Neither shall children be put to death through their fathers', and why did the Divine Law write 'And neither shall children be put to death through fathers', which appears to imply that no sentence of capital punishment should be passed [on the evidence of] the mouth of [witnesses who as] children would have no legal filiation with respect to fathers,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' [Excluding thus a proselyte.] ');">³³</span> [my answer is that] since it was written, 'Fathers shall not be put to death through children', it was further written, 'neither shall children be put to death through fathers.'<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' And while the phraseology of the concluding clause follows that of the commencing clause it is not usual in Scripture that the commencing clause should alter its phraseology because of the style of the concluding clause. ');">³⁴</span> A DEAF, MUTE AN IDIOT AND A MINOR ARE AWKWARD TO DEAL WITH. The mother of R. Samuel b. Abba of Hagronia<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. supra p. 27, n. 1. ');">³⁵</span> was married to R. Abba,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' He was not the father of R. Samuel as her former husband's name was also Abba. ');">³⁶</span> and bequeathed her possessions to R. Samuel b. Abba, her son. After her death

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