Reference for Bava Metzia 123:15

א"ל רבינא לרב אשי והרי משכנתא בלא נכייתא דבדיניהם מוציאין מלוה למלוה

opinion? If he maintains: A bond, which is destined to be exacted, is as though it were already exacted,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' So that tearing up the bond is the equivalent of returning the interest. ');">¹³</span> they have [already] committed their transgression!<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' [And if the tearing up of the bond is considered a remedial action, why should the return of the interest, where actually exacted, not be considered so?] ');">¹⁴</span> Whilst if it is not as already collected, they have committed no wrong!<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Who then can dispute that they are exempt from punishment? ');">¹⁵</span> — In truth, in his view a bond, destined to be exacted, is not as though already exacted, and what he teaches us is that the [mere] 'putting on' [of usury] is a transgression.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Cf. Ex. XXII, 24. For which, in the view of the first Tanna, punishment is incurred, whilst R. Eliezer b. Jacob and R. Nehemiah exempt them therefrom, because it may be followed by a positive action remedying it. ');">¹⁶</span> This also stands to reason. For we learnt: The following transgress the negative injunction: the lender, the borrower, the surety and the witnesses.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Infra 75b. ');">¹⁷</span> Now, with respect to all, it is well, [since] they commit an action. But what have the witnesses done? Hence it surely must be that the [mere] 'putting on' [of usury] is a substantial act [and in this case, a transgression]. This proves it. R. Safra said: Wherever by their law [i.e., non-Jewish law] exaction is made from the debtor for the creditor, restoration is made by our law from the creditor to the debtor; wherever by their law there is no exaction from the debtor to the creditor, there is no restoration by our law from the creditor to the debtor. Said Abaye to R. Joseph: Now, is this a general rule? Behold, there is the case of a <i>se'ah</i> [lent] for a <i>se'ah</i> which, by their law, the debtor is forced to repay the creditor, yet by ours it is not returnable from the creditor to the debtor!<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Jewish law prohibits the lending of a measure of wheat for the return of a similar measure, as the wheat may at the time of repayment stand at a higher price (v. infra 75a); by Gentile law, this transaction is permissible, and the debtor must repay it to the creditor. Yet though Jewish law forbids it, the debtor cannot demand its return after repayment, since it is only indirect interest. ');">¹⁸</span> He replied, They [regard it] as having come into his possession merely as a trust.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., in their view, it is not interest at all. A entrusts a se'ah to B, and then B returns it. But R. Safra referred to what the Gentiles recognised as interest, which by their code is permissible. ');">¹⁹</span> Rabina said to R. Ashi: But mortgages without deduction,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., the debtor mortgages a field of which the creditor takes possession and enjoys the usufruct without deducting its value from the principal. This is prohibited; v. 67b. ');">²⁰</span> which by their law is exacted from the debtor for the creditor,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., if the debtor retained the produce for himself the creditor can claim it from him at law. ');">²¹</span>

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