Talmud Bavli
Talmud Bavli

Related for Bava Kamma 115:10

מי אמרינן כיון דתחלתו בפשיעה וסופו באונס פטור או דלמא הכא כולה בפשיעה הוא דכיון דקא חזי דקריבה לה למילד איבעי ליה לנטורה

If, however, it went from one bed to another bed, the payment<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For the beds except the first one. ');"><sup>8</sup></span> would be for the amount of damage done by it. R. Johanan, however, said that even where it went from one bed to another bed and did so even all day long, [the payment would be made only to the extent of the benefit], unless it left the garden and returned there again with the knowledge [of the owner]. R. Papa thereupon said: Do not imagine this to mean 'unless it left the garden to the knowledge of the owner and returned there again with the knowledge of the owner', for as soon as it left the garden to the knowledge of the owner, even though it returned again without his knowledge [there would already be liability],<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' To the full extent of the damage. ');"><sup>9</sup></span> the reason being that the plaintiff might [rightly] say: Since it had once become known [to it where it can find fruit, you should have realised that] whenever it broke loose it would run to that place. IF IT WENT DOWN THERE IN THE USUAL WAY AND DID DAMAGE, THE PAYMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE FOR THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGE DONE BY IT. R. Jeremiah raised the question: Where it had gone down there in the usual way but did damage by water resulting from giving birth,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Which was apparently an accident. ');"><sup>10</sup></span> what would be the legal position? If we accept the view that where there is negligence at the beginning but [damage actually results] in the end from sheer accident there is liability,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. Supra 21b. ');"><sup>11</sup></span> no question arises.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' That there will be liability in this case too. ');"><sup>12</sup></span> Where we have to ask is if we accept the view<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. Supra 21b. ');"><sup>11</sup></span> that where there is negligence at the beginning, but [damage actually results] in the end from sheer accident there is exemption. What [in that case is the law]? Should we say that this is a case where there was negligence at first but the final result was due to accident, and therefore there should be exemption, or should we say [on the contrary that] this case is one of negligence throughout, for since the owner could see that the animal was approaching the time to give birth, he should have watched

Tosefta Maaser Sheni

Similarly, one who comes along the road with coins in his hand, and he sees a robber coming toward him: He should not say, "Behold, these are hereby deconsecrated on account for the coins that I have inside my house." [However,] if he did so, his words stand. [If] he was laden with jugs of wine or jugs of oil and saw that they were breaking, he should not say, "Behold, these are hereby designated as terumah and tithes on behalf of the produce that I have inside my house." If he he did so, behold, that is forbidden.
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Tosefta Maaser Sheni (Lieberman)

1:8 A person carrying broken jugs of wine or oil should not attempt to tithe for produce at his house. If performed, the untithed produce remains forbidden to eat.
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