Responsa for Bava Batra 277:13

Q. L borrowed money from B, with a verbal promise to repay. Subsequently she married A and gave him money as her dowry. Is A obligated to pay L's debt, out of that dowry? Are we permitted to exact an oath from L in case she denies B's claim?
A. Authorities differ regarding the rights of a husband over his wife's dowry. Some authorities decide that a husband has the rights of a buyer [who is not responsible for the seller's debts] while others hold that his rights are those of an heir [who is liable for the debts of his benefactor]. Since we can not choose between these conflicting opinions, we allow the money to remain in the hands of the present possessor. And since L has no money and will have no money till she be widowed or divorced, there is no sense in exacting an oath from her. We give B a written verdict, however, to the effect that in case L be widowed or divorced she then must take an oath denying B's claim or pay that debt.
SOURCES: Am II, 25, 27, 29. Cf. Agudah B. B. 185.

When Rabbi Zamlan was ill he sent for Rabbi Asher in order that the latter help him dispose of his property in a manner that would make it impossible for his wife, L, to appropriate his possessions in payment of her ketubah or for her sustenance. Rabbi Asher refused to come, but Rabbi Zamlan implored him and pleaded with him saying: "What can I do for my only son who, after my death, will have to go begging from door to door?" Rabbi Asher then agreed to act as a witness, and Rabbi Zamlan gave away to his son and to other persons, all of his property as an outright gift effective immediately. After his death, L's relatives summoned Rabbi Zamlan's son to the court of Rabbi Perez. The latter recorded the claims of the two parties and sent the claims to Rabbi Meir without giving the names of the litigants and without expressing any opinion on the subject. Rabbi Meir ruled that L was entitled to collect her ketubah, or to draw her sustenance, from the possessions of Rabbi Zamlan which he had given to his son; his reason being that even an outright gift to an heir is considered an inheritance and that the widow's ketubah is a lien upon it.
Rabbi Perez took issue with Rabbi Meir quoting Alfasi's decision that the ordinance of Usha — which ruled that a person who divided all of his property among his children may derive his sustenance as well as that of his wife's from such property — was not accepted.
Rabbi Meir reproved Rabbi Perez for resorting to Alfasi when the Talmud specifically decided that the ordinance of Usha was not accepted. R. Meir contended, however, that only that part of the ordinance was not accepted which gave the right to the donor, and to his wife while he was alive, to derive their sustenance from the property he had given away; while the rule that the widow may collect her sustenance or her ketubah from such property after the donor's death, was accepted before the ordinance of Usha was promulgated, and has remained in force independently of such ordinance.
Meanwhile L's relatives have written to Rabbi Meir asking for his decsion in this matter. R. Meir answered that he usually refrained from sending legal opinions to litigants, or to their relatives, and confined his responses to judges. But, when Rabbi Perez, in his second letter, gave the names of the litigants, R. Meir realized that the letters from L's relatives dealt with the same case. R. Meir recalled that among these letters was found a letter from Rabbi Asher which explained the circumstances of the gift mentioned above. Therefore, R. Meir added (in his second letter to Rabbi Perez) that since according to Rabbi Asher's letter, the donor mentioned the contingency of death when he summoned Rabbi Asher, he therefore made the gift to his son causa mortis (cf. B. B. 151a), and a widow is undoubtedly entitled to collect her ketubah from causa mortis gifts.
SOURCES: Cr. 192; Am II, 46–7; cf. Hag. Maim. to Ishut 16, 4; Mord. Ket. 161. Cf. Agudah B.M. 29; Moses Minz, Responsa 66.

Q. A demands that Leah return to him the money he deposited with her. Leah claims that A deposited the money with her on condition that she do not return it to him without his wife's consent. [A's wife does not consent to the return of the deposit]. Are we to believe a trustee who was appointed by the two opposing parties regarding the terms of his trusteeship, or may we require him to take an oath? Moreover, Leah is a married woman. May her husband object to her being degraded by imposing an oath on her?
A. A trustee appointed by both parties is not required to take an oath regarding the terms of his trusteeship. But, Leah was not appointed trustee by both parties. She was only appointed by the husband, and, therefore, is required to take an oath. Leah's husband cannot object to imposing an oath on her. If the law requires that a woman take an oath, the husband has no right to protest against her being degraded in court. But, since Leah, as long as she is married, has no money of her own, and were she to claim that she had already returned the deposit, no oath would be imposed on her, we now lend credence to her words and require no oath. However, the court should give A a writ stating that after Leah will be divorced or widowed she will have to return the money to A or take an oath to the effect that A deposited the money with her on condition that she return it upon his wife's consent only.
SOURCES: L. 306–7; Mord. B. K. 89. Cf. Pr. 739; Tesh. Maim. to Mishpatim, 44.