Responsa for Bava Batra 299:8
א"ל רבינא לרב אשי תא שמע הכותב (לעבדו כל נכסיו) יצא בן חורין שייר קרקע כל שהוא לא יצא בן חורין ר' שמעון אומר לעולם הוא בן חורין עד שיאמר כל נכסי נתונין לפלוני עבדי חוץ מאחד מרבוא שבהן
if, however, it is assumed [that] they are like real estate, why are they not included in the sale? — What, then, [is it suggested, that] they are like movables? Why 'even'?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' 'Even', suggests that they are not in fact like 'movables'. ');"><sup>34</sup></span> All, however, that can be said in reply<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lit., 'but what have you to say'. ');"><sup>35</sup></span> [is that] movables which [can] move [of themselves]<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.c., 'slaves'. ');"><sup>36</sup></span> are different from movables that [can] not move;<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' And this is the reason why 'even' was used. ');"><sup>37</sup></span> so also it may be said<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lit., 'you may even say'. in relation to the first case. ');"><sup>38</sup></span>
Teshuvot Maharam
Rabbi Perez took issue with Rabbi Meir quoting Alfasi's decision that the ordinance of Usha — which ruled that a person who divided all of his property among his children may derive his sustenance as well as that of his wife's from such property — was not accepted.
Rabbi Meir reproved Rabbi Perez for resorting to Alfasi when the Talmud specifically decided that the ordinance of Usha was not accepted. R. Meir contended, however, that only that part of the ordinance was not accepted which gave the right to the donor, and to his wife while he was alive, to derive their sustenance from the property he had given away; while the rule that the widow may collect her sustenance or her ketubah from such property after the donor's death, was accepted before the ordinance of Usha was promulgated, and has remained in force independently of such ordinance.
Meanwhile L's relatives have written to Rabbi Meir asking for his decsion in this matter. R. Meir answered that he usually refrained from sending legal opinions to litigants, or to their relatives, and confined his responses to judges. But, when Rabbi Perez, in his second letter, gave the names of the litigants, R. Meir realized that the letters from L's relatives dealt with the same case. R. Meir recalled that among these letters was found a letter from Rabbi Asher which explained the circumstances of the gift mentioned above. Therefore, R. Meir added (in his second letter to Rabbi Perez) that since according to Rabbi Asher's letter, the donor mentioned the contingency of death when he summoned Rabbi Asher, he therefore made the gift to his son causa mortis (cf. B. B. 151a), and a widow is undoubtedly entitled to collect her ketubah from causa mortis gifts.
SOURCES: Cr. 192; Am II, 46–7; cf. Hag. Maim. to Ishut 16, 4; Mord. Ket. 161. Cf. Agudah B.M. 29; Moses Minz, Responsa 66.