Responsa for Bava Batra 299:9
ואמר רב דימי בר יוסף אמר רבי אלעזר עשו מטלטלין שיור אצל עבד ולא עשו מטלטלין שיור אצל כתובה ואמר ליה רבא לרב נחמן מאי טעמא עבדא מטלטלא הוא ומטלטלא למטלטלא הוי שיור וכתובת אשה מקרקעא הוא ומטלטלא למקרקעא לא הוי שיור
[that slaves] are like real estate [but that] real estate that moves is different from real estate that does not move.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Hence slaves who can move about could not have been in the mind of the person who sold 'a town' that cannot move. In other cases, however. where no particular kind of real estate was mentioned, slaves also may have been included, while in the ease where only 'movables' were specified, slaves may have been excluded. ');"><sup>39</sup></span> Rabina said to R. Ashi, Come and hear:<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. supra 149b, for notes on the following citation. ');"><sup>40</sup></span> If one gave all his property to his slave, in writing, [the latter] goes forth [as] a free man. [If] he left [for himself] any land whatsoever [the slave] does not go forth [as] a free man. R. Simeon said: [The slave] is always free unless [the master] said, 'All my possessions are given to my slave X, except a ten thousandth part of them'. And R. Dimi b. Joseph said in the name of R. Eleazar: Movables in the case of a slave are regarded as a reservation,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' As the slave does not gain his freedom where his master has reserved some real estate so he does not gain his freedom when his master reserved some movables. ');"><sup>41</sup></span> but movables in the case of a <i>kethubah</i> are not regarded as a reservation.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' v. p. 647. n. 8. ');"><sup>42</sup></span> And Raba asked R. Nahman, 'What is the reason?' [To which the latter replied.] 'A slave is [regarded as] movables, and [in the case of] movables,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., when the master reserved for himself 'any movables' whatsoever. ');"><sup>43</sup></span> movables<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Slaves. ');"><sup>44</sup></span> are regarded as a reservation; the <i>kethubah</i> of a woman, however, is [payable from] real estate,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' A woman can collect her kethubah from real estate only (v. infra 150b) and not from movable objects. ');"><sup>45</sup></span> and [in the case] of real estate, movables<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Slaves. ');"><sup>44</sup></span> [are] not [regarded as] a reservation.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' It has thus been proved from R. Nahman's statement that a slave is regarded as movables; and not as real estate. ');"><sup>46</sup></span>
Teshuvot Maharam
Rabbi Perez took issue with Rabbi Meir quoting Alfasi's decision that the ordinance of Usha — which ruled that a person who divided all of his property among his children may derive his sustenance as well as that of his wife's from such property — was not accepted.
Rabbi Meir reproved Rabbi Perez for resorting to Alfasi when the Talmud specifically decided that the ordinance of Usha was not accepted. R. Meir contended, however, that only that part of the ordinance was not accepted which gave the right to the donor, and to his wife while he was alive, to derive their sustenance from the property he had given away; while the rule that the widow may collect her sustenance or her ketubah from such property after the donor's death, was accepted before the ordinance of Usha was promulgated, and has remained in force independently of such ordinance.
Meanwhile L's relatives have written to Rabbi Meir asking for his decsion in this matter. R. Meir answered that he usually refrained from sending legal opinions to litigants, or to their relatives, and confined his responses to judges. But, when Rabbi Perez, in his second letter, gave the names of the litigants, R. Meir realized that the letters from L's relatives dealt with the same case. R. Meir recalled that among these letters was found a letter from Rabbi Asher which explained the circumstances of the gift mentioned above. Therefore, R. Meir added (in his second letter to Rabbi Perez) that since according to Rabbi Asher's letter, the donor mentioned the contingency of death when he summoned Rabbi Asher, he therefore made the gift to his son causa mortis (cf. B. B. 151a), and a widow is undoubtedly entitled to collect her ketubah from causa mortis gifts.
SOURCES: Cr. 192; Am II, 46–7; cf. Hag. Maim. to Ishut 16, 4; Mord. Ket. 161. Cf. Agudah B.M. 29; Moses Minz, Responsa 66.