Responsa for Bava Batra 335:10

I ruled that Shimon must give him a copy, and my colleagues agreed. They later showed me a responsum of Rosh (Responsa Rosh 68:24) stating that, indeed, a copy of all documents must be submitted for scrutiny. I read this carefully, and it implies that [the litigant] does not concede that there is a contract, but says that he can ascertain from the writing that it is forged or has already been paid. However, if one concedes that there is a contract but wants to undermine it, it seems that he should not be given a copy. For it is stated in the chapter “[Get] Pashut” (Bava Batra 168a): “It is unpleasant for me for my claims to be in your hands.” And Rosh explained this that specifically in the case of a contract, a copy must be submitted, for if it is forged, then all is well, and if it is not, he will not be able to discredit it as a forgery and ruin it. So what harm is there? On the contrary, justice will come to light. Statements of claim, on the other hand, should not be given to the other litigant.

Q - A made an agreement to sell a parcel of land to B, before Hanukkah, and gave the latter a book as security, that the former would fulfill the agreement. A said to B, before an authoritative court, "If I do not carry out the terms of the agreement. This book shall be yours as of now." A failed to sell B the land before Hanukkah. Can A still sell the land to B, without incurring the penalty, although the designated time had elapsed?
A - In reality, both A and B were not sincerely interested about consummating the agreement before Hannukah. This deadline was intended to merely serve as a stimulus to complete the deal. The transaction can therefore be completed after the designated time had elapsed, and A need incur no penalty, whatsoever.

Q. It is the custom of judges to consider as valid conditional transactions classified as asmakhta, and even to enforce the collection of the money-fines stipulated in such transactions, when they were accompanied by a kinyan made before an authoritative court. How can the judges enforce the collection of such money when R. Hai Gaon and R. Hananel ruled that these transactions were invalid? Moreover, occasionally the conditional transaction is not concluded before an authoritative court, but the scribe inserts the phrases: "accompanied by a kinyan, made before an authoritative court", as a mere formality. Why should the signature of two witnesses to such writ suffice? Why not require the signatures of three persons, those of the prominent men of the community?
A. The ruling that a conditional transaction accompanied by a kinyan made before an authoritative court is valid, is based on the weighty opinions of R. Zemah Gaon, Rashi, Rashbam, R. Tam, and Ri, while the opinion of R. Hai Gaon is untenable. As to your second objection, if the scribe was instructed by the contracting party (or parties) to draw up the contract, we assume that he was thus instructed to draw up a valid contract in accordance with accepted custom. Since it is customary to insert the phrase cited above in a conditional contract, the scribe was thus instructed to insert it in the contract, and we interpret such instruction as an admission by the defendant that the transaction had taken place before an authoritative court. Were two other witnesses to testify before us that the writ was drawn up by the undersigned witnesses who recorded an ordinary kinyan made in their presence, as a kinyan made before an authoritative court without their (the latter witnesses) having been instructed to draw up a valid contract, the contract would be void. Lacking such testimony we must rely on the signatures of the two witnesses as proof that the transaction was concluded before an authoritative court; the responsibility for any irregularity must rest upon such witnesses.
This responsum is addressed to "my teacher and relative Rabbi Asher".
SOURCES: Pr. 976; Am II, 107; Tesh. Maim. to kinyan, 4. Cf. Moses Minz, Responsa 11.