Responsa for Bava Batra 59:2
קשיא דרבא אדרבא קשיא דרב נחמן אדרב נחמן
There was a piece of land which was called Bar Sisin's, but the vendor said, 'This is not really the property of Bar Sisin though it is called Bar Sisin's.' The case was brought before R. Nahman, and he decided in favour of the purchaser. Said Raba to him: Is this a right decision? Does not the onus probandi always lie on the claimant? There is thus a contradiction between these two remarks of Raba, and also between the two rulings of R. Nahman.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Because in the former case Raba decides in favour of the purchaser and R. Nahman in favour of the seller, and in the latter case Raba decides in favour of the seller and R. Nahman in favour of the purchaser. ');"><sup>2</sup></span>
Teshuvot Maharam
A. The testimony of the witnesses to the effect that B provided A with a surety, is convincing proof that A had given the money to B as a loan. Although a person will sometimes buy what by law belongs to him in order to avoid litigation, this principle applies only when the rightful owner is not in possession of the disputed property, while in our case B was in possession of the money. Moreover, even if there were no such witnesses, we would have put no credence in B's assertion that he provided A with a surety only because he acted "inside the line of justice." For the principle of Miggo — that we ought to believe B's present statement since, were he inclined to lie, he could have denied altogether having provided A with a surety — does not apply to this case, since we are thoroughly convinced that had B not owed the money to A, he would not have repaid part of it.
SOURCES: Cr. 166; Am II, 164.
Teshuvot Maharam
A. Since A admits that C had the right to lease the house to anyone he pleased, A cannot evict B from the widow's house.
SOURCES: Cr. 259; Pr. 680; Mord. B. M. 357; Agudah B. M. 125. Cf. Hag. Maim. to Sekirut 5, 20; Weil, Responsa 10.