Talmud Bavli
Talmud Bavli

Responsa for Bava Batra 60:9

וה"מ דאכלה שבע דקדים חזקה דהאי לשטרא דהך

A certain man said to his neighbour, 'What right have you on this land?' He replied, 'I bought it from so-and-so and have had the use of it for the period of <i>hazakah</i>.'<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Meaning thereby presumably 'three years'. ');"><sup>8</sup></span> Said the other, 'But I have a title deed to prove that I bought it from him four years ago.' Said the other; 'Do you think that when I say the period of <i>hazakah</i> I mean only three years? I mean a lot of years.'<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' And the reason why I said merely 'period of hazakah' was because I did not know you had a deed going back further than three years. ');"><sup>9</sup></span> Said Raba: It is not unusual to refer to a long period of years as 'the period of hazakah'. This [maxim] would apply [to the present case] only if the occupier has had the use of the land for seven years, so that his presumptive right came before the deed;<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Since he had already had the use of the land for three years after his alleged purchase of it, and his title was therefore unassailable. ');"><sup>10</sup></span>

Teshuvot Maharam

Q. When A demanded of B the return of the money he had given him, B repaid part of it and provided A with a surety for the rest. The fact that B provided A with a surety is attested to by witnesses. Now, however, B claims that this money was originally given to him by A not as a loan but as an outright gift, that consequently he owes nothing to A, and that when he provided A with a surety he acted "inside the line of justice."
A. The testimony of the witnesses to the effect that B provided A with a surety, is convincing proof that A had given the money to B as a loan. Although a person will sometimes buy what by law belongs to him in order to avoid litigation, this principle applies only when the rightful owner is not in possession of the disputed property, while in our case B was in possession of the money. Moreover, even if there were no such witnesses, we would have put no credence in B's assertion that he provided A with a surety only because he acted "inside the line of justice." For the principle of Miggo — that we ought to believe B's present statement since, were he inclined to lie, he could have denied altogether having provided A with a surety — does not apply to this case, since we are thoroughly convinced that had B not owed the money to A, he would not have repaid part of it.
SOURCES: Cr. 166; Am II, 164.
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