Responsa for Bava Kamma 177:14

וכי תימא זבינא ניהליה לההוא דחבלה ביה בטובת הנאה

Raba stated: 'The law is that the purchase money for the satisfaction of the benefit belongs solely to the woman, and the husband will have no right to enjoy any profit [that may result from it], the reason being that it was only profits that the Rabbis assigned to him,13 whereas profits out of profits14 were not assigned to him by the Rabbis. When R. Papa and R. Huna the son of R. Joshua came from the College they said: We have learnt to the same effect as the enactment of Usha [in the following Mishnah]: A SLAVE AND A WOMAN ARE AWKWARD TO DEAL WITH, AS HE WHO INJURES THEM IS LIABLE [TO PAY], WHEREAS IF THEY HAVE INJURED OTHERS THEY ARE EXEMPT.15 Now, if you assume that the enactment of Usha is not effective why should she not sell her melog16 property and with the purchase money pay the compensation? — But even according to your reasoning, granted that the enactment of Usha is effective, in which case she would be powerless to alienate altogether her melog possessions, yet let her sell the melog estate for what the satisfaction of the benefit would fetch17 and with his purchase money pay the compensation? It must therefore Surely be said that the ruling applies where she had no melog property; so also [according to the other view] the ruling would apply only where she possessed no melog property. But why should she not sell her kethubah for as much as the satisfaction of the benefit will fetch17 and thus pay compensation? — The ruling is based on the view of R. Meir, who said that it is prohibited for any man to keep his wife without a kethubah even for one hour.18 But what is the reason of this? So that it should not be an easy matter in his eyes to divorce her. In this case too he will surely not divorce her, for if he were to divorce her those who purchased the kethubah would certainly come and collect the amount of the kethubah from him. [Why then should she not be compelled by law to sell her kethubah and pay her creditors?] — We must therefore say that the satisfaction of such a benefit is a value of an abstract nature19 and abstract values are not considered mortgaged [for the payment of liabilities]. But why not? Could these abstract values not be sold for actual denarii? — We must therefore [say that it would not be practical to compel her to sell her kethubah] on account of the statement of Samuel. For Samuel said:20 Where a creditor assigns a liability on a bill to another and subsequently releases the debtor from payment, the debt is considered cancelled. Moreover, the creditor's heir may cancel the liability.21 I would, however, ask: Why should she not be compelled to sell it and pay with the proceeds the compensation, though if she should subsequently release her husband from the obligation the release would be legally valid? — It may be replied that since it is quite certain that where there is an obligation on the husband the wife will release him, it would not be right to make a sale which will straight away be nullified. Should you say, why should she not assign her kethubah to the person whom she injured, thus letting him have the satisfaction of the benefit,

Teshuvot Maharam

Q. A demanded from B sixty pennies he owed him. B admitted the indebtedness, but claimed that through A's wilful neglect, he, B, was not able to collect a debt of four pounds and sixty pennies. B, therefore, demanded that A pay him four pounds. The judges ordered A to swear that he did not willfully cause any damage to B, and ordered B to swear that A did willfully cause him a loss of at least sixty pennies. After the judges rendered this decision, B put forth his claim that, in partnership with A, he, B, loaned eight and one half pounds to Gentiles, and that, without his permission or consent, A relinquished that debt to the Gentiles. A, however, claimed that B gave him permission to do with B's share whatever he would do with his own. Moreover, A claims that B informed against him; a Jewish witness, the servants of the Bishop, and the burghers, support A's claim in this respect. The judges, however, demand that their former decision be carried out and that A and B present their new claims in another suit.
A. The decision of the judges that A must take an oath to the effect that he did not cause B to lose his investment by willful neglect, is correct. But if A released B's Gentile debtors (even though B gave A a blanket permission to do with his, B's, share whatever he, A, would do with his own), A must pay B as much as B's share was worth before A released the Gentiles. B must take an oath in the presence of the Gentile witnesses that he did not inform against A, in order to counteract the testimony of the single Jewish witness.
The question is signed by R. Yedidyah b. R. Israel.
SOURCES: Cr. 52; Pr. 699; L. 373–4; Mord. B. K. 96; Rashba I, 1096; Mordecai Hagadol, p. 258a. Cf. Moses Minz, Responsa 44; Isserlein, Pesakim 209.

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