Responsa for Bava Kamma 224:10
אי לא אתא כתבינן פתיחא עלויה תשעין יומין תלתין קמאי לא נחתינן לנכסיה דאמר קא טרח בזוזי וניזוף מציעאי נמי לא נחתינן ליה לנכסיה דאמר דלמא לא אשכח למיזף וקא טרח ומזבין בתראי נמי לא נחתינן לנכסיה דאמר לוקח גופיה קא טרח בזוזי
If he appears [with witnesses] well and good, but if he does not appear we wait again over the following Monday and Thursday and Monday.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., three sittings of the Court; cf. supra p. 466. ');"><sup>16</sup></span> If he still does not appear we write a Pethiha<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., a warrant, containing also a writ of anathema. It was, besides, the opening of preliminary legal proceedings. ');"><sup>17</sup></span>
Teshuvot Maharam
Q. R. Moses, the plaintiff, was not present when the defendants, the Jewish inhabitants of Quedlinburg, took an oath in order to nullify the testimony of R. Moses' single supporting witness; must they take the oath again in the presence of R. Moses?
A. If the oath has been legally administered by a proper person (who is related neither to R. Moses nor to the inhabitants of Quedlinburg) there is no need for another oath.
This Responsum is addressed to R. Shemariah, and is the second communication regarding this case.
SOURCES: Pr. 231; L. 382; Tesh. Maim. to Haflaah, 1. Cf. P. 514; Mord. Ket. 296–7.
A. If the oath has been legally administered by a proper person (who is related neither to R. Moses nor to the inhabitants of Quedlinburg) there is no need for another oath.
This Responsum is addressed to R. Shemariah, and is the second communication regarding this case.
SOURCES: Pr. 231; L. 382; Tesh. Maim. to Haflaah, 1. Cf. P. 514; Mord. Ket. 296–7.
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Teshuvot Maharam
Q. In the dispute between A and B the court found that B owed A money. A demanded either immediate payment, or that B put up a bond to insure such payment. B, however, asked for the usual thirty days' interval in which to carry out the decision of the court. Are A's demands justified?
A. B is entitled to the thirty days' interval. The system of justice current in Israel is guaranty enough for A that after the thirty days will have passed the court will enforce its ruling. The reason for allowing a person only thirty days within which to comply with a court's decision, while, according to the Talmud, an adrakta is written after a ninety day interval, is this: An adrakta is written when the court finds no property from which to collect; but, if the property of the debtor is within reach, a judgment is enforced after the thirty days' interval has passed.
SOURCES: L. 267; P. 297.
A. B is entitled to the thirty days' interval. The system of justice current in Israel is guaranty enough for A that after the thirty days will have passed the court will enforce its ruling. The reason for allowing a person only thirty days within which to comply with a court's decision, while, according to the Talmud, an adrakta is written after a ninety day interval, is this: An adrakta is written when the court finds no property from which to collect; but, if the property of the debtor is within reach, a judgment is enforced after the thirty days' interval has passed.
SOURCES: L. 267; P. 297.
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Teshuvot Maharam
Q. In the dispute between A and B the court found that B owed A money. A demanded either immediate payment, or that B put up a bond to insure such payment. B, however, asked for the usual thirty days' interval in which to carry out the decision of the court. Are A's demands justified?
A. B is entitled to the thirty days' interval. The system of justice current in Israel is guaranty enough for A that after the thirty days will have passed the court will enforce its ruling. The reason for allowing a person only thirty days within which to comply with a court's decision, while, according to the Talmud, an adrakta is written after a ninety day interval, is this: An adrakta is written when the court finds no property from which to collect; but, if the property of the debtor is within reach, a judgment is enforced after the thirty days' interval has passed.
SOURCES: L. 267; P. 297.
A. B is entitled to the thirty days' interval. The system of justice current in Israel is guaranty enough for A that after the thirty days will have passed the court will enforce its ruling. The reason for allowing a person only thirty days within which to comply with a court's decision, while, according to the Talmud, an adrakta is written after a ninety day interval, is this: An adrakta is written when the court finds no property from which to collect; but, if the property of the debtor is within reach, a judgment is enforced after the thirty days' interval has passed.
SOURCES: L. 267; P. 297.
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