Responsa for Bava Metzia 130:13
אמר אמימר
Which Tanna holds that both are forbidden? — R. Huna the son of R. Joshua said: It does not agree with R. Judah; for were it in accordance with R. Judah — surely, he maintained that one-sided interest is permitted.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. p. 384, n. 7. Here too, should the vendor take the usufruct and the sale remain uncompleted, there is no interest, and therefore on R. Judah's view, it is permitted. ');"><sup>11</sup></span> If a man mortgages a house or a field, and he [the creditor] says to him, 'Should you wish to sell it, you must let me have it at this price [less than its value],' — that is forbidden: 'at its real value,' — that is permitted. Which Tanna maintains that [if he stipulates] 'at this price,' it is forbidden — R. Huna the son of R. Joshua said: It does not agree with R. Judah; for were it in accordance with him — surely he holds that one-sided interest is permitted.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. supra 63a. Here too, there is no certainty that the mortgagee will sell his field at all. ');"><sup>12</sup></span> If he sells a house or a field, and says to the purchaser, 'When I have money, resell it to me,' — that is forbidden. [If the buyer says], 'When you have money, I will resell it to you,' — that is permitted.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The first is forbidden, as it looks like evasion of usury: the purchaser gives a sum of money to the vendor, in return for which he uses the field until the former repays him. ');"><sup>13</sup></span> With which Tanna does this agree? — R. Huna the son of R. Joshua said: Not with R. Judah; for if it agreed with him — surely he ruled that one-sided interest is permitted.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. supra 63a. Here too, it may be that the field will not be repurchased, in which case there is no interest. ');"><sup>14</sup></span> What is the difference between the first clause and the second? — Raba answered: In the second clause, he [the buyer] stipulated that it [the re-sale] should be voluntary.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' At the option of the buyer; therefore it is purely a business deal. But when the vendor stipulates that the buyer must re-sell, it is a disguised loan. ');"><sup>15</sup></span> A man once sold an estate to his neighbour without surety.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. supra 14a. ');"><sup>16</sup></span> Seeing that he [the purchaser] was disquieted, he said to him, 'Why are you disquieted? Should it be seized from you [for a debt of mine], I will repay you out of the best of my estate, [even] for your improvements and the crops.' Said Amemar:
Teshuvot Maharam
A. Such transactions are valid if accompanied by a kinyan and concluded before an authoritative court. However, some asmakta transactions are valid even when not accompanied by a kinyan and not concluded before an authoritative court. Thus the Talmud rules that if a person lends money to another against a field, and the debtor says that in case he does not repay the debt within three years title to the field shall have vested in the creditor from now on, the transaction is valid (B.M. 65b, 66b). An earnest deposited in connection with a marriage engagement becomes forfeited upon the breaking of the engagement, even though the original transaction was not made before an authoritative court and was not accompanied by a kinyan. A mere promise to pay a fine to charity, as when a person promises to give a certain amount to charity in case he plays cards, is also binding. Regarding this law I wrote at length in a Responsum, which you will find in the possession of our friend R. Isaac of Straubing, and is too long to be repeated here. A decision by a court of arbitration is not binding unless the acceptance of the judges by the litigants was accompanied by a kinyan. Search further in the sources and you will learn the details of these laws.
SOURCES: B. p. 291, no. 364.
Teshuvot Maharam
A. If A sells his part of the house to B on condition that it be rented to A in perpetuity at one mark per annum, the sale will be legal and B will be permitted to collect the one mark per annum. If, however, B refuses to buy A's part on such terms, A may mortgage it to a Gentile.
SOURCES: Pr. 970.
Teshuvot Maharam
A. L cannot force R to come to live with her, and R can not force L to support her while L is away, for neither of them would have entered into the original agreement had they forseen such eventualities. Moreover, the contract is void since there is a possibility that the food R receives from L would constitute illegal interest on R's money. L, therefore, should deduct from the fifteen marks, the amount she expended on R's food, and return the rest to R.
Q. R drew an instrument in which she stated that from then on and after her death, her (real) estate should belong to her brother, to certain people and to charity, on condition that she retain the right to sell any part of it if hard pressed for funds with which to feed and clothe herself. R, now, desires to sell part of her property claiming that she needs the money for her sustenance. The charity-trustee refuses to grant her permission to do so, claiming that R is not hard pressed for funds since she receives her food from L and since she has sufficient clothes.
A. If it is known that R is not in dire need of money for her sustenance, she may not sell any part of her property. But if this is not a known fact, R may promise under oath that she will not sell any part of her property unless she will need the money for her sustenance. She will be permitted, then, to sell such part of her property the proceeds of which will suffice for her sustenace for a period of six months. That money should be deposited with a trustee who would pay her a monthly allowance.
SOURCES: Pr. 1006.