Responsa for Bava Metzia 151:14
שמעת מינה אדיבורא דידיה קא סמיך דאי סלקא דעתך דאדיבורא דידה קא סמיך מכי מטי גיטא לידה מיהא תיגרש אמר רב אשי
— Come and hear: [If a woman said to a man.] 'Bring me my divorce,' and [he went and stated to her husband,] 'Your wife authorised me to accept the divorce on her behalf;' [to which] he replied. 'Take it, in accordance with her instructions,' — R. Nahman said in the name of Rabbah b. Abbuhah in Rab's name: Even when the divorce reaches her hand, she is not divorced. This proves that he [the husband] relies upon his [the agent's] statement. For should you maintain that he relies upon hers, then at least when the divorce reaches her hand, let her be divorced!<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' A woman is not divorced until the divorce actually reaches her hand or the hand of an agent appointed by her for the express purpose of accepting it on her behalf: further, an agent's powers are strictly limited to the terms of his appointment, and he may not exceed them in the least. Now, in this case, the wife merely authorised the agent to bring it to her, whereas the agent stated to the husband that he was delegated to accept it on her behalf; whilst the husband, in handing him the divorce, asserted that he was giving it in accordance with her instructions. Now, no man can take a divorce to a woman on her husband's behalf, unless her husband appoints him for that purpose; and a husband cannot authorise a man to accept a divorce on his wife's behalf, i.e., that by his acceptance she shall be divorced, for such appointment is the wife's prerogative. Hence, when the husband said, 'Take it in accordance with her instructions', he must have meant, 'I believe that she appointed you to accept it on her behalf, that by your acceptance she should become divorced'; consequently he did not appoint him as agent to take it to his wife. (For though the wife had appointed him as her agent to bring it to her, the husband too must appoint him as his agent to take it to her; otherwise the divorce is invalid. But in this case, the husband, believing that he was agent for acceptance, would naturally not instruct him to take it to her.) Therefore, she is not divorced at all, neither by his acceptance, since she did not authorise him to accept it for her, nor even by her own, since he had not been authorised by the husband to take it to her. Now, this holds good on the hypothesis that the husband relied on the agent's statement only. But, if it be assumed that he meant, 'I give it to you exactly in accordance with her instructions, and not merely in accordance with your word,' that is tantamount to saying, 'As she has instructed you to be her agent to bring it to her, so do I instruct you to be my agent to carry it to her'; and therefore, when it reaches her hand, she should certainly be divorced. This proves that the husband relied on the agent's statement only, and by analogy, the workers rely upon the employer's delegate. ');"><sup>13</sup></span> Said R. Ashi:
Teshuvot Maharam
Q. A has no legal claim against B though he does have a claim against the community. Not having been asked regarding A's case against the community, I shall refrain from passing judgment thereon. Should the discussion that follows reveal any just claims A may have against the community, I rely on you not to disclose them to A, lest the community accuse me of encouraging claimants and inciting them against the community thus damaging its interests. It seems, however, that if A could have obtained another position, had he not been engaged by the community of T, and now can no longer obtain that, or a similar, position, the community ought to pay A the wages of an "idle laborer" (i. e. the wages a cantor would be willing to accept for abstaining from practicing his profession for a given period). But, if A is able to obtain another position even now, he has no legal claim against the community, though he has cause for reproof. Should the latter position require more effort than the position with the community of T, if there be also an increase in remuneration commensurate with the increase in effort, the community of T would be free from obligation to A; otherwise, the community of T would have to compensate A for the increase in effort. In any event, A has no legal claim against B, though he has cause for reproof, and the latter may perhaps be called "wicked".
SOURCES: Cr. 292; Am II, 234; B. p. 298 no. 392.