י דתניא מנין היוצא ליהרג ואמר ערכי עלי שלא אמר כלום ת"ל (ויקרא כז, כח) כל חרם לא יפדה יכול אפילו קודם שנגמר דינו תלמוד לומר (ויקרא כז, כט) מן האדם ולא כל האדם
10 Rather, there is no dispute whatsoever that he may vow another's worth, evaluate and consecrate, the dispute touches only the case of his having caused damage,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Since he has a mind, he obviously is fit to do things which one possessed of mentality is fit to do. This obligation would, of course, descend upon his heirs, hence the principle involved.');"><sup>13</sup></span> the first Tanna holding that if he had caused damage he is not obliged to make compensation, whereas R'Jose holds he is obliged to make compensation when he has caused damage. What principle are they disputing? - R'Joseph said: They are disputing whether an oral<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' An obligation arising from the law of the Torah has the character of an orally admitted debt. Hence, even if no definite decision had been made by the court on the question of his damage, a delay in his execution would be considered unnecessary, hence prohibited. Nevertheless the debt arising from the law of the Torah is considered an oral debt.');"><sup>14</sup></span> debt can be collected from the heirs, the first Tanna holding an oral debt cannot be collected from the heirs, whereas R'Jose considers it can be collected. Raba<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Var. lec.: Rabbah.');"><sup>15</sup></span> said: All agree that an oral debt cannot be collected from the heirs, what they are here disputing is the [nature of a] debt arising from the law of the Torah, the first Tanna holding that a debt arising from the law of the Torah is not to be considered equal to one acknowledged in a document [of indebtedness], whilst R'Jose considers it like one acknowledged in a document [of indebtedness]. There are some who refer it<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The statements of R. Joseph and Raba.');"><sup>16</sup></span>