Bava Batra 128

דרבי עקיבא סבר מוכר בעין יפה מוכר ורבנן סברי מוכר בעין רעה מוכר ודקאמר נמי בעלמא ר' עקיבא לטעמיה דאמר מוכר בעין יפה מוכר מהכא

that in the view of R. Akiba the vendor interprets the terms of sale liberally<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lit., 'sells with a bounteous eye', and therefore reserves to himself nothing. ');">¹</span>

ממאי דלמא רבי עקיבא סבר אין אדם רוצה שיתן מעותיו וידרסוהו אחרים ורבנן סברי אין אדם רוצה שיטול מעות ויפרח באויר

and in the view of the Rabbis<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., the Sages. ');">²</span>

ואלא מסיפא מכרן לאחר ר' עקיבא אומר אינו צריך ליקח לו דרך וחכמים אומרים צריך

he interprets them strictly?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lit., 'sells with an evil eye', and therefore reserves to himself a right of way. ');">³</span>

דלמא בהאי פליגי דרבי עקיבא סבר בתר דעתא דלוקח אזלינן ורבנן סברי בתר דעתא דמוכר אזלינן

And further that, wherever we find it stated that 'R. Akiba decides according to his usual maxim that the vendor interprets the terms of sale liberally,'<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. supra 37a; infra 71a. ');">⁴</span>

ואלא מהא לא את הבור ולא את הגת ולא את השובך בין חרבין בין ישובין וצריך ליקח לו דרך דברי ר' עקיבא וחכמים אומרים אינו צריך

it is in the strength of this passage [that we assign this maxim to him]? — Is this assumption justified? perhaps [the reason for their dispute is this]; R. Akiba holds that a man does not like others to walk over ground which he has paid for, and the Rabbis hold that a man does not care to receive money on condition that he has to fly through the air [to get to where he wants].<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' But in the case of trees and other things to which these reasons do not apply, we cannot assume that these are the reasons of R. Akiba and the Rabbis. ');">⁵</span>

הא תו למה לי אלא לאו הא קמ"ל דרבי עקיבא סבר מוכר בעין יפה מוכר ורבנן סברי מוכר בעין רעה מוכר

Can we then [base this assumption] on the next clause: IF HE SELLS THESE TO ANOTHER, R. AKIBA SAYS THAT THE PURCHASER NEED NOT BUY A RIGHT OF WAY TO THEM, BUT THE SAGES SAY THAT HE MUST BUY IT?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Here the reasons given above do not apply. ');">⁶</span>

ודלמא אשמועינן בית וקא משמע לן שדה וצריכא דאי אשמועינן בית משום דבעי צניעותא אבל שדה אימא לא

— No, for perhaps the reason of their difference is this, that according to R. Akiba's view we have to consult the wishes of the purchaser, and according to the view of the Rabbis we have to consult the wishes of the vendor.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' That is to say, we may suppose R. Akiba to hold that in this case the purchaser would not give his money if he had to fly through the air, and the Rabbis to hold that the seller would not take money if his ground is to be walked over; but we cannot infer anything about a 'liberal' or 'illiberal' spirit. ');">⁷</span>

ואי אשמועינן שדה משום דקשי ליה דוושא אבל בית אימא לא

Can we [base it] on this: '[The vendor does not sell with the field] either a pit or a wine-press or a dovecote, whether they are In use or not in use,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lit., 'desolate or inhabited'. ');">⁸</span>

אלא מסיפא מכרן לאחר רבי עקיבא אומר אינו צריך ליקח לו דרך וחכמים אומרים צריך

and he must buy a right of way [to them]. This is the ruling of R. Akiba, but the Sages say that he need not buy a right of way [to them]' — 9 Now why<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' If the reasons are as given above, because of the objections to treading or flying. ');">¹⁰</span>

הא תו למה לי היינו הך אלא לאו הא קמ"ל דרבי עקיבא סבר מוכר בעין יפה מוכר ורבנן סברי מוכר בעין רעה מוכר שמע מינה

should it repeat here [the rulings of R. Akiba and the Sages]? Surely it must be to show us that [in general] R. Akiba holds that the vendor interprets the terms of sale liberally and the Rabbis that he interprets them strictly?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' As otherwise the repetition of the rule would be entirely superfluous. ');">¹¹</span>

איתמר רב הונא אמר רב

— No. Perhaps the Mishnah [desires to] tell us by this that [the difference between R. Akiba and the Sages is as stated above] both in regard to a house and a field, both being necessary. For if it had stated [the difference only] in the case of a house, [I might have thought that there R. Akiba says that the vendor has to buy a right of way] because the purchaser desires privacy,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Hence his objection to treading. ');">¹²</span> but in the case of a field [where this reason does not apply] I might say he need not. And if the difference had been stated only in regard to a field, I might have thought that there [R. Akiba says that the vendor has to buy a right of way] because [the purchaser objects to his land being] trodden down,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' And so rendered less productive. ');">¹³</span> but in the case of a house [where this reason does not apply I might say] he need not. May we then [base the assumption] on the succeeding clause: 'If he sells them [the pit etc. in a field] to another, R. Akiba says that the purchaser does not need to buy a right of way, while the Sages say that he must.' Now why is [their difference stated] again? It is exactly the same here as in the previous case.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Viz., where these things are bought and sold with a house. ');">¹⁴</span> We must therefore say that this shows that in the view of R. Akiba the vendor interprets the terms of sale liberally, and in the view of the Rabbis he interprets them strictly.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' As otherwise the statement would be entirely superfluous. ');">¹⁵</span> It has been stated: R. Huna said in the name of Rab: