Bava Kamma 115

לא מבעיא קאמר לא מבעיא אכלה דמשלמת מה שנהנית אבל נחבטה אימא מבריח ארי מנכסי חבירו הוא ומה שנהנית נמי לא משלם קמ"ל

Rab took a particularly strong instance.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lit., 'he says there can be no question'. ');">¹</span>

ואימא ה"נ

There can be no doubt that where the benefit was derived from the animal having consumed the fruits payment would have to be made to the extent of the benefit. Regarding, however, [the benefit derived by the animal from the lessening of] the impact, it might have been thought that the fruits served only the purpose of 'preventing a lion from [damaging] a neighbour's property',<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For which no payment could be demanded, this being merely an act of goodwill and kindness, v. B.B. 52a. ');">²</span>

מבריח ארי מנכסי חבירו מדעתו הוא האי לאו מדעתו אי נמי מבריח ארי מנכסי חבירו לית ליה פסידא האי אית ליה פסידא

so that no payment should be made even to the extent of the benefit. It is therefore indicated to us [here that even this benefit has to be paid for]. But why not say that this is so?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' That he is 'preventing a lion' etc. ');">³</span>

היכי נפל רב כהנא אמר שהוחלקה במימי רגליה רבא אמר שדחפתה חברתה

— [No payment it is true could be claimed] in the case of preventing a lion from [damaging] a neighbour's property as [the act of driving the lion away] is voluntary, but in this case the act was not voluntary.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The owner of the fruit should thus be entitled to compensation. ');">⁴</span>

מ"ד שדחפתה חברתה כל שכן שהוחלקה במימי רגליה ומאן דאמר שהוחלקה במימי רגליה אבל דחפתה חברתה פשעה ומשלמת מה שהזיקה דא"ל איבעי לך עבורי חדא חדא

Or again, in the case of preventing the lion from [damaging] a neighbour's property, no expenses were incurred [by the act of driving away the lion], but in this case here there was [pecuniary] loss attached to it.

אמר רב כהנא לא שנו אלא באותה ערוגה אבל מערוגה לערוגה משלמת מה שהזיקה ורבי יוחנן אמר אפי' מערוגה לערוגה ואפילו כל היום כולו עד שתצא ותחזור לדעת

[How did the animal fall]?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' That it should be considered a mere accident and the payment should only be to the extent of the benefit. ');">⁵</span>

א"ר פפא לא תימא עד שתצא לדעת ותחזור לדעת אלא כיון שיצתה לדעת אע"פ שחזרה שלא לדעת מ"ט דא"ל כיון דילפא כל אימת דמשתמטא להתם רהטא:

— R. Kahana said: It slipped in its own water. Raba, however, said: [The rule would hold good even] where another animal pushed it down. The one who explains the ruling to apply where another animal pushed it down, would certainly apply it where it slipped in its own water.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' As this is certainly a matter of accident. ');">⁶</span>

ירדה כדרכה והזיקה משלמת מה שהזיקה: בעי רבי ירמיה ירדה כדרכה והזיקה במי לידה מהו

But the one who explains the ruling to apply where it slipped in its own water [might maintain that] where another animal pushed it down there was negligence, and the payment should be for the amount of damage done by it, as the plaintiff would be entitled to say, 'You should have made them go past one by one.'

אליבא דמאן דאמר תחלתו בפשיעה וסופו באונס חייב לא תיבעי לך כי תיבעי לך אליבא דמאן דאמר תחלתו בפשיעה וסופו באונס פטור מאי

R. Kahana said: The Mishnaic ruling applies only to the bed [into which it fell].<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Regarding which the whole act is considered an accident. ');">⁷</span>

מי אמרינן כיון דתחלתו בפשיעה וסופו באונס פטור או דלמא הכא כולה בפשיעה הוא דכיון דקא חזי דקריבה לה למילד איבעי ליה לנטורה

If, however, it went from one bed to another bed, the payment<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For the beds except the first one. ');">⁸</span> would be for the amount of damage done by it. R. Johanan, however, said that even where it went from one bed to another bed and did so even all day long, [the payment would be made only to the extent of the benefit], unless it left the garden and returned there again with the knowledge [of the owner]. R. Papa thereupon said: Do not imagine this to mean 'unless it left the garden to the knowledge of the owner and returned there again with the knowledge of the owner', for as soon as it left the garden to the knowledge of the owner, even though it returned again without his knowledge [there would already be liability],<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' To the full extent of the damage. ');">⁹</span> the reason being that the plaintiff might [rightly] say: Since it had once become known [to it where it can find fruit, you should have realised that] whenever it broke loose it would run to that place. IF IT WENT DOWN THERE IN THE USUAL WAY AND DID DAMAGE, THE PAYMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE FOR THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGE DONE BY IT. R. Jeremiah raised the question: Where it had gone down there in the usual way but did damage by water resulting from giving birth,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Which was apparently an accident. ');">¹⁰</span> what would be the legal position? If we accept the view that where there is negligence at the beginning but [damage actually results] in the end from sheer accident there is liability,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. Supra 21b. ');">¹¹</span> no question arises.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' That there will be liability in this case too. ');">¹²</span> Where we have to ask is if we accept the view<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. Supra 21b. ');">¹¹</span> that where there is negligence at the beginning, but [damage actually results] in the end from sheer accident there is exemption. What [in that case is the law]? Should we say that this is a case where there was negligence at first but the final result was due to accident, and therefore there should be exemption, or should we say [on the contrary that] this case is one of negligence throughout, for since the owner could see that the animal was approaching the time to give birth, he should have watched