Bava Kamma 136

תדע שסתם גניבה יאוש בעלים הוא

'You can take it for granted that in the ordinary run of thefts there is Renunciation on the part of the owner; since the Torah has laid down that where the thief slaughtered or sold [the stolen sheep or ox] he should pay fourfold or five-fold payments [respectively]. For is there not a possibility that the owner had not abandoned hope? We must therefore say that in the ordinary run of thefts there is Renunciation on the part of the owner.'<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' [Since he conditions the liability of the fourfold and five-fold by the fact that the owner had despaired of the stolen article, it is evident that he agrees with R. Shesheth.] ');">¹</span>

שהרי אמרה תורה טבח ומכר משלם תשלומי ארבעה וחמשה ודלמא לא אייאש אלא לאו משום דאמרי' סתם גניבה יאוש בעלים היא

But why should the liability not hold good even where hope was not abandoned?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' [Even where the sale is of no legal avail.] ');">²</span>

ודלמא אף על גב דלא אייאש

— I would say, let not this enter your mind. For selling is placed on a par with slaughter: just as in the case of slaughter his act is of practical avail, so also in the case of selling his act should be of practical validity; and if it takes place before Renunciation, what would be the legal validity?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' [Since he conditions the liability of the fourfold and five-fold by the fact that the owner had despaired of the stolen article, it is evident that he agrees with R. Shesheth.] ');">¹</span>

אמרי לא סלקא דעתך דומיא דטביחה מה טביחה דאהנו מעשיו אף מכירה דאהנו מעשיו ואי לפני יאוש מאי אהנו

But again can it not be [that the liability is confined to cases] where we actually heard the owner abandoning hope? — I would reply, let not this enter your mind. For selling is put on a par with slaughter, and just as slaughter involves liability [if carried out] immediately [after the theft], so would selling similarly involve liability soon after the theft.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' R. Eleazar thus inferred from this that in ordinary thefts there is immediate Renunciation on the part of the owner. ');">³</span>

ודלמא דשמעיניה דאייאש אמרי לא סלקא דעתך דומיא דטביחה מה טביחה לאלתר אף מכירה לאלתר

R. Johanan said to him:<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., R. Eleazar. ');">⁴</span>

א"ל ר' יוחנן גניבה בנפש תוכיח שאין יאוש בעלים וחייב מכלל דסבר רבי יוחנן לפני יאוש חייב

The law in the case of stealing a man<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Ex. XXI, 16. ');">⁵</span>

לאחר יאוש מאי ר' יוחנן אמר חייב וריש לקיש אמר פטור

could prove that even where there is no Renunciation on the part of the owner<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For surely no human being will abandon himself. ');">⁶</span>

רבי יוחנן אמר חייב חיוביה בין לפני יאוש בין לאחר יאוש ריש לקיש אמר פטור חיוביה לפני יאוש הוא אבל לאחר יאוש קנה ושלו הוא טובח ושלו הוא מוכר

there will be liability. This statement seems to show that R. Johanan held that selling before Renunciation involves liability.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' As also maintained by R. Nahman. ');">⁷</span>

איתיביה ר' יוחנן לריש לקיש גנב והקדיש ואחר כך טבח משלם תשלומי כפל ואינו משלם תשלומי ארבעה וחמשה

What then about selling after Renunciation?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Does he agree in this with Rab, supra p. 390? ');">⁸</span>

אימת אלימא לפני יאוש מי קדוש (ויקרא כז, יד) איש כי יקדיש את ביתו קדש אמר רחמנא מה ביתו שלו אף כל שלו

— R. Johanan said that the thief is liable, but Resh Lakish said he is exempt. R. Johanan who said that he would be liable held that the liability was both before Renunciation and after Renunciation. But Resh Lakish, who said that he would be exempt,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. p. 390, n. 5. ');">⁹</span>

אלא פשיטא לאחר יאוש וטעמא דהקדיש הוא דאינו משלם תשלומי ארבעה וחמשה דכי קא טבח דהקדש קא טבח אבל לא הקדיש טבח משל תשלומי ארבעה וחמשה ואי סלקא דעתך יאוש קונה אמאי משלם שלו הוא טובח שלו הוא מוכר

maintained that the liability was only before Renunciation, whereas after Renunciation he would have already acquired title to the animal, and it was his that he slaughtered and his that he sold.

א"ל הכא במאי עסקינן כגון שהקדישוהו בעלים ביד גנב

R. Johanan objected to Resh Lakish's view [from the following:] If he stole [a sheep or an ox] and after consecrating it slaughtered it, he should make double payment<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For the theft. ');">¹⁰</span>

ומי קדוש והאמר ר' יוחנן גזל ולא נתייאשו הבעלים שניהן אינן יכולין להקדיש זה לפי שאינו שלו וזה לפי שאינו ברשותו אמרי הוא דאמר כצנועין

but would not make four-fold and five-fold payments.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For the slaughter as it was a consecrated animal that he slaughtered, and there is no liability for stealing and selling and slaughtering consecrated animals (infra p. 427; Git. 55b). ');">¹¹</span>

דתנן הצנועין מניחין את המעות ואומרים כל הנלקט מזה יהא מחולל על המעות האלו

Now, when could this be? If before Renunciation, how does the animal become consecrated? Does not the Divine Law say 'And when a man shall sanctify his house to be holy',<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lev. XXVII, 14. ');">¹²</span>

והרי חזרה קרן לבעלים

[implying that] just as his house is his,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For immovables even when misappropriated always remain in the possession of the owner ');">¹³</span>

כשעמד בדין

so also anything he consecrates must be his?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Excluding thus a thief consecrating misappropriated property. ');">¹⁴</span>

היכי דמי אי דאמרי צא תן לו מאי איריא הקדיש אפילו לא הקדיש נמי לא ליחייביה

It must therefore apply to the time after Renunciation.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' In which case the article could become consecrated, as a transfer of possession following Renunciation transfers ownership. ');">¹⁵</span>

דאמר רבא צא תן לו טבח ומכר פטור מ"ט

Now the reason is that he consecrated it: he has not to make four-fold and five-fold payments because when he slaughtered the animal it was a consecrated animal that he slaughtered; had he not, however, consecrated it he would have had to make four-fold and five-fold payments if he would have slaughtered it. Now, if you assume that Renunciation transfers ownership why should he<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. p. 390, n. 2. ');">¹⁶</span>

כיון דפסקוה למילתיה וטבח ומכר הוה ליה גזלן וגזלן אינו משלם תשלומי ארבעה וחמשה

pay since it was his that he slaughtered and his that he sold? — He replied:<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., Resh Lakish to R. Johanan. ');">¹⁷</span> We are dealing here with a case where, for instance, the owner<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Not the thief. ');">¹⁸</span> consecrated the animal while it was in the possession of the thief.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' [Before Renunciation.] ');">¹⁹</span> But will it in that case become consecrated? Did not R. Johanan say<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Infra p. 397; B.M. 7a. ');">²⁰</span> that where a robber misappropriated an article and the owner has not abandoned hope of recovering it, neither of them is able to consecrate it: the one<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The robber. ');">²¹</span> because it is not his, the other<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The owner. ');">²²</span> because it is not in his possession? — We might reply that he<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., Resh Lakish. ');">²³</span> had in mind the practice of the virtuous, as we have learnt: The virtuous<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' [ [H] (plur. [H]) 'denotes a positive quality, probably nothing else but discretion or modesty', Buchler, Types (contra Kohler, who identifies the Zenu'im with Essenes) pp. 59 ff.] ');">²⁴</span> used to set aside money and to declare that whatever has been gleaned [by passers-by] from this [vineyard]<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' In its fourth year, the fruit of which is prohibited unless redeemed, cf. Lev. XIX, 24. ');">²⁵</span> shall be redeemed by this money.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Which seems to show that fruits already misappropriated could also be redeemed by the owner and thus also consecrated. (M.Sh. V, 1). ');">²⁶</span> But [if the owner consecrated the animal], has not the principal thus been restored to the owner? [Why then should a thief pay double on it? — We assume a case where the consecration took place] after the case came into court [and evidence had already been given against the thief]. What were the circumstances? If the judges had already ordered him to go and pay the owner, why should exemption be only where he consecrated the animal? Why even where the owner did not consecrate it should the thief be liable? For did Raba not say that if [after the judges said], 'Go forth and pay him,' the thief slaughtered or sold the animal, he would be exempt, the reason being that since the judges had given their final sentence on the matter, when he sold or slaughtered the animal, he became [in the eye of the law] a 'robber', and a 'robber' has not to pay four-fold and five-fold payments,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For the distinction between robber and thief in this respect cf. infra p. 452. ');">²⁷</span>