Bava Kamma 176

אזל רב שמואל בר אבא קמיה דרבי ירמיה בר אבא אוקמיה בנכסי אזל ר' אבא אמרה למילתא קמיה דרב הושעיא אזל רב הושעיא אמרה קמיה דרב יהודה א"ל הכי אמר שמואל האשה שמכרה בנכסי מלוג בחיי בעלה ומתה הבעל מוציא מיד הלקוחות

R. Samuel b. Abba went to consult R. Jeremiah b. Abba who confirmed him in possession of her property. R. Abba thereupon went and related the case to R. Hoshaia. R. Hoshaia then went and spoke on the matter with Rab Judah who said to him that Samuel had ruled as follows: If a woman disposes of her <i>melog</i><span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lit., 'plucking', but which denotes a wife's estate in which her husband has the right of usufruct and for which he hears no responsibility regarding any loss or deterioration, v. B.B. (Sonc. ed.) p. 206, n. 7. ');">¹</span>

אמרוה קמיה דרבי ירמיה בר אבא אמר להו אנא מתניתא ידענא דתנן הכותב נכסיו לבנו לאחר מותו הבן אינו יכול למכור מפני שהן ברשות האב והאב אינו יכול למכור מפני שהן כתובין לבן מכר האב מכורים עד שימות מכר הבן אין לו ללוקח עד שימות האב

possessions during the lifetime of her husband and then dies, the husband is entitled to recover them from the hands of the purchasers.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' According to which statement R. Abba and not R. Samuel would be entitled to the possessions in direct contradiction to the judgment given by R. Jeremiah. ');">²</span>

כי מיית אב מיהא אית ליה ללוקח ואע"ג דמת הבן בחיי אב דלא אתו לידי הבן

When this statement was repeated to R. Jeremiah b. Abba, he said: I [only] know the Mishnaic ruling which we have learnt: 'If a man assigns his possessions to his son, to take effect after his death,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' [The father retaining for himself the right for life to the usufruct.] ');">³</span>

כרבי שמעון בן לקיש דאמר לא שנא מת הבן בחיי האב דלא אתו לידיה דבן לא שנא מת האב בחיי הבן דאתו לידיה דבן קנה לוקח

neither can the son alienate them [during the lifetime of the father] as they are then still in the possession of the father, nor can the father dispose of them since they are assigned to the son. Still, if the father sells them, the sale is valid until his death; if the son disposes of them the purchaser has no hold on them until the father dies.'<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' B.B. 136b. ');">⁴</span>

דאתמר מכר הבן בחיי האב ומת הבן בחיי האב רבי יוחנן אמר לא קנה לוקח ר"ל אמר קנה לוקח

This implies, does it not, that when the father dies the purchaser will have the possessions [bought by him from the son during the lifetime of the father], and this even though the son died during the lifetime of the father, in which case they had never yet entered into the possession of the son? For so it was laid down by R. Simeon b. Lakish, who said<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Ibid. ');">⁵</span>

ר"י אמר לא קנה לוקח אמר לך כי קתני מתני' מכר הבן. לא קנה לוקח עד שימות האב וכי מיית האב אית ליה ללוקח דלא מת הבן בחיי האב דאתו לידי הבן אבל מת הבן בחיי האב דלא אתו לידיה דבן כי מיית אב נמי לית ליה ללוקח

that there should be no difference whether the son died in the lifetime of the father, in which case the estate never came into the possession of the son, or whether the father died in the lifetime of the son, in which case the estate had entered into the possession of the son; the purchaser would [in either case] acquire title to the estate. (For it was stated:<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' B.B. 136a. ');">⁶</span>

אלמא קא סבר קנין פירות כקנין הגוף דמי וכי זבין לאו דידיה זבין

Where the son sold the estate<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' [Assigned to him to be his after his father's death.] ');">⁷</span>

ר' שמעון בן לקיש אומר קנה לוקח כי קתני מתני' מכר הבן אין ללוקח עד שימות האב כי מיית אב מיהת אית ליה ללוקח לא שנא לא מת הבן בחיי האב דאתו לידיה דבן ולא שנא מת הבן בחיי האב דלא אתו לידיה דבן קנה לוקח

in the lifetime of the father and it so happened that the son died during the lifetime of the father, R. Johanan said that the purchaser would not acquire title [to the estate], whereas Resh Lakish said that the purchaser would acquire title [to the estate]. R. Johanan, who held that the purchaser would not acquire title to the estate, would say to you that the Mishnaic statement, 'If the son disposed of them the purchaser would have no hold on them until the father dies, 'implying that at any rate after the death of the father the purchaser would own them, refers to the case where the son did not die during the lifetime of the father, so that the estate had actually entered into the possession of the son, whereas where the son died during the lifetime of the father, in which case the estate had never entered into the possession of the son, the purchaser would have no title to the estate even after the death of the father. This shows that in the opinion of R. Johanan a right to usufruct amounts in law to a right to the very substance [of the estate],<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' As indeed followed by him in Git. 47b and elsewhere. ');">⁸</span>

אלמא קסבר קנין פירות לאו כקנין הגוף דמי וכי קא זבין דידיה קא זבין

from which it follows that when the son sold the estate [during the lifetime of his father] he was disposing of a thing not belonging to him.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For since the father still had for life the right to usufruct he was for the time being the legal owner of the very substance of the estate, though the son had the reversionary right. ');">⁹</span>

ואנן השתא בין ר' ירמיה בר אבא ובין רב יהודה כר' שמעון בן לקיש סבירא להו וקאמר ר' ירמיה בר אבא אי סלקא דעתך קנין פירות כקנין הגוף דמי כי מיית אב ומיית הבן בחיי האב אמאי אית ליה ללוקח כי קא זבין האי לאו דידיה קא זבין

Resh Lakish on the other hand said that the purchaser would [in all cases] acquire title [to the estate after the death of the vendor's father], for the Mishnaic statement, 'If the son disposed of them the purchaser would have no hold on them until the father died,'implying that at least after the death of the father the purchaser would own them, applies equally whether the son did not die in the lifetime of the father, in which case the estate had entered into the possession of the son, or whether the son did die during the lifetime of the father, in which case the estate never did come into the possession of the son, [as in all cases] the purchaser would acquire title [to the estate as soon as the vendor's father died]. This shows that in the opinion of Resh Lakish a right to [mere] usufruct does not yet amount to a right in the very substance [of the estate], from which it follows that when the son sold the estate [during his father's lifetime] he was disposing of a thing that legally belonged to him.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Since he had the reversionary right while the father possessed merely for time being the right to usufruct. [The bracketed passage is an interpolation and not part of R. Jeremiah's argument.] ');">¹⁰</span>

אלא לאו שמע מינה קנין פירות לאו כקנין הגוף דמי

) Now both<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' [So MS.M. cur. edd. read, 'We now assume.'] ');">¹¹</span>

אהדרוה לקמיה דרב יהודה אמר להו הכי אמר שמואל זו אינה דומה למשנתנו

R. Jeremiah b. Abba and Rab Judah, concur with Resh Lakish,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' [That the sale is valid even where the son died in the lifetime of the father.] Cf. Yeb. 36b. ');">¹²</span>

מאי טעמא אמר רב יוסף בשלמא אי תני איפכא הכותב נכסיו לאביו איכא למפשט מינה דקנין פירות לאו כקנין הגוף דמי

and R. Jeremiah b. Abba accordingly argues thus: If you assume that a right to usufruct amounts [in law] to a right in the very substance, why then on the death of the father, if the son has previously died during the lifetime of his father, should the purchaser have any title to the estate, since when the son sold it he was disposing of a thing not belonging to him? Does not this show that a right to [mere] usufruct does not amount to a right to the very substance?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Hence the gift of the mother to R. Samuel her son should become valid at her death in spite of the right to usufruct vested in R. Abba her second husband during her lifetime. ');">¹³</span>

אלא השתא דקתני הכותב נכסיו לבנו משום דראוי ליורשו הוא

When, however, the argument was later repeated in the presence of Rab Judah, he said that Samuel had definitely stated: 'This case<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., the gift of the mother to R. Samuel her son. ');">¹⁴</span>

אמר ליה אביי אטו ברא ירית אבא אבא לא ירית ברא אלא לאברוחינהו לנכסי מבריה קא אתי הכא נמי לאברוחינהו לנכסי מאחוה אתי

cannot be compared to that stated in the Mishnah.' On what ground? — R. Joseph replied: We should have no difficulty if the case in the Mishnah were stated in a reversed order, i.e., 'If a son assigns his possessions to his father [to take effect after the son's death, and the father sold them during the lifetime of the son and died before the son,' and if the law would also in this case have been that the purchaser acquired title to the possessions] it would indeed have been possible to prove from it that a right to usufruct does not amount to a right to the very substance. But seeing that what it actually says is, 'If a father assigns his possessions to his son,' [the reason why the sale by the son is valid is] that [since] he was eligible to inherit him, [the father by drawing up the deed must necessarily have intended that the transfer to the son should have legal effect forthwith].<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For if otherwise why was the deed necessary at all? [Whereas in the case of Samuel b. Abba, the deed was necessary for in the absence of one the estate would be inherited by the husband. V. B.B. 111b] ');">¹⁵</span>

אלא מאי אינה דומה למשנתנו משום תקנת אושא דאמר רבי יוסי בר חנינא באושא התקינו האשה שמכרה בנכסי מלוג בחיי בעלה ומתה הבעל מוציא מיד הלקוחות

Said Abaye to him: Does only a son inherit a father, and does a father never inherit a son?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Cf. B.B. VIII, 1. The same argument if at all sound could thus accordingly be raised even in the case made out by you where a son bequeathed his possessions to his father. ');">¹⁶</span>

אמר רב אידי בר אבין אף אנן נמי תנינא מעידים אנו באיש פלוני שגירש את אשתו ונתן כתובתה

It is therefore to be assumed that such a deed was drawn up only for the purpose of keeping the possessions out of the hands of the children,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Of the son who made the bequest in favour of his father, as otherwise the sons children would have been first to inherit him in accordance with Num. XXVII, 8. ');">¹⁷</span> and similarly also here<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Where the father bequeathed his possessions to a son. ');">¹⁸</span> the deed might have been drawn up for the sole purpose of keeping the possessions out of the hands of his brothers!<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., from the brothers of the particular son in whose favour the bequest was made, as otherwise they would also have had a part in the inheritance on account of their being sons of the same father, and it was not intended that the transfer to the son should have legal effect forthwith. This being so, the case of Samuel b. Abba is on all fours with the Mishnah! ');">¹⁹</span> — The reason of [Samuel's remark that] 'This case cannot be compared to that stated in the Mishnah' is because of the [Rabbinic] enactment at Usha. For R. Jose b. Hanina said: It was enacted at Usha that if a woman disposes of her <i>melog</i> possessions during the lifetime of her husband and subsequently dies, the husband will be entitled to recover them from the hands of the purchasers.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For the right of the husband to the possessions of his wife took effect at the time of the wedding and thus preceded the act of the sale. V. B.B. (Sonc. ed.) p. 208. ');">²⁰</span> R. Idi b. Abin said that we have been taught to the same effect: [Where witnesses state,] 'We can testify against a particular person that he has divorced his wife and paid her for her kethubah',<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. Glos. ');">²¹</span>