Talmud Bavli
Talmud Bavli

Bava Kamma 43

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1

והתניא הכלב והגדי שדלגו בין מלמעלה למטה בין מלמטה למעלה פטורין תרגמא רב פפא דאפיך מיפך כלבא בזקירא וגדיא בסריכא אי הכי אמאי פטורים פטור מנזק שלם וחייבין בחצי נזק:

But was it not [elsewhere] taught: 'In the case of a dog or goat jumping [and doing damage], whether in a downward or upward direction, there is exemption'?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Because the act is considered unusual with them. ');"><sup>1</sup></span> — R. Papa thereupon interpreted the latter ruling<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' That exempts in acts towards all directions. ');"><sup>2</sup></span>

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2

הכלב שנטל:

to refer to cases where the acts done by the animals were the reverse of their respective natural tendencies: e.g, the dog [jumped] by leaping and the goat by climbing. If so, why [complete] exemption?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For though the acts are unusual, they should be subject to the law of Horn imposing payment of half damages for unusual occurrences. ');"><sup>3</sup></span> — The exemption indeed is only from full compensation while there still remains liability for half damages.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For though the acts are unusual, they should be subject to the law of Horn imposing payment of half damages for unusual occurrences. ');"><sup>3</sup></span>

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3

אתמר ר' יוחנן אמר אשו משום חציו וריש לקיש אמר אשו משום ממונו

IF A DOG TAKES HOLD etc. It was stated: R. Johanan said: Fire [involves liability] on account of the human agency that brings it about.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lit., 'his fire is due to his arrows'. Damage done by Fire equals thus damage done by Man himself. ');"><sup>4</sup></span> Resh Lakish, however, maintained that Fire is chattel.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lit., 'his property'. ');"><sup>5</sup></span>

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4

וריש לקיש מאי טעמא לא אמר כרבי יוחנן אמר לך חציו מכחו קאזלי האי לא מכחו קאזיל ורבי יוחנן מאי טעמא לא אמר כריש לקיש אמר לך ממונא אית ביה ממשא הא לית ביה ממשא

Why did Resh Lakish differ from R. Johanan? — His contention is: Human agency must emerge directly from human force whereas Fire does not emerge from human force.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Since it travels and spreads of itself. ');"><sup>6</sup></span> Why, on the other hand, did not R. Johanan agree with Resh Lakish?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' That Fire is chattel. ');"><sup>7</sup></span>

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5

תנן הכלב שנטל חררה כו' בשלמא למ"ד אשו משום חציו חציו דכלב הוא

— He may say: Chattel contains tangible properties, whereas Fire<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., the flame; cf. Bez. 39a. ');"><sup>8</sup></span> has no tangible properties.

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6

אלא למ"ד אשו משום ממונו האי אש לאו ממונו דבעל כלב הוא

We have learnt:<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Supra p. 109. ');"><sup>9</sup></span> IF A DOG TAKES HOLD OF A CAKE [TO WHICH LIVE COALS WERE STUCK] AND GOES [WITH IT] TO A BARN, CONSUMES THE CAKE AND SETS THE BARN ALIGHT, [THE OWNER] PAYS FULL COMPENSATION FOR THE CAKE, WHEREAS FOR THE BARN [HE] PAYS [ONLY] HALF DAMAGES. This decision accords well with the view that the liability for Fire is on account of the human agency that caused it; in the case of the dog, there is thus some liability upon the owner of the dog as the fire there was caused by the action of the dog.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' All the damage to the barn that resulted from the fire is thus considered as if done altogether by the dog that caused the live coals to start burning the barn. ');"><sup>10</sup></span>

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7

אמר לך ריש לקיש הכא במאי עסקינן דאדייה אדויי דעל חררה משלם נזק שלם ועל מקום גחלת משלם חצי נזק ועל גדיש כולה פטור

But according to the principle that Fire is chattel, [why indeed should the owner of the dog be liable?] Could the fire be said to be the chattel of the owner of the dog? — Resh Lakish may reply: The Mishnaic ruling deals with a case where the burning coal was thrown by the dog [upon the barn]: full compensation must of course be made for the cake,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' On account of the law applicable to Tooth. ');"><sup>11</sup></span> but only half will be paid for the damage done to the actual spot upon which the coal had originally been thrown,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For the damage to this spot is solely imputed to the action of the dog throwing there the burning coal. The liability, however, is only for half damages on account of the law of Pebbles to which there is subject any damage resulting from objects thrown by cattle: cf. supra P. 79. ');"><sup>12</sup></span>

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8

ורבי יוחנן דאנחה אנוחי על חררה ועל מקום גחלת משלם נ"ש ועל הגדיש משלם חצי נזק

whereas for the barn as a whole there is exemption altogether.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Since the fire in this case could not be said to have been the obnoxious chattel of the owner of the dog [Nor could it be treated as Pebbles, since it spread of itself.] ');"><sup>13</sup></span> R. Johanan, however, maintains that the ruling refers to a dog actually placing the coal upon the barn: For the cake<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' On account of the law applicable to Tooth. ');"><sup>11</sup></span>

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9

תא שמע גמל טעון פשתן ועבר ברשות הרבים נכנסה פשתנו לתוך החנות ודלקו בנרו של חנווני והדליק את הבירה בעל גמל חייב הניח חנווני נרו מבחוץ חנווני חייב רבי יהודה אומר בנר חנוכה פטור

as well as for the damage done to the spot upon which the coal had originally been placed the compensation must be in full,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' As the damage to this spot is directly attributed to the action of the dog. ');"><sup>14</sup></span> whereas for the barn as a whole only half damages will be paid.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For any damage that results not from the direct act, but from a mere agency of chattels, is subject to the law of Pebbles ordering only half damages to be paid. ');"><sup>15</sup></span>

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10

בשלמא למ"ד אשו משום חציו חציו דגמל הוא אלא למ"ד משום ממונו האי אש לאו ממונא דבעל גמל הוא אמר לך ריש לקיש הכא במאי עסקינן במסכסכת כל הבירה כולה

Come and hear: A camel laden with flax passes through a public thoroughfare. The flax enters a shop, catches fire by coming in contact with the shopkeeper's candle and sets alight the whole building. The owner of the camel is then liable. If, however, the shopkeeper left his candle outside [his shop], he is liable. R. Judah says: In the case of a Chanucah candle<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Which has to be kept in the open thoroughfare; see infra p. 361. ');"><sup>16</sup></span> the shopkeeper would always be quit.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Ibid. ');"><sup>17</sup></span>

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11

אי הכי אימא סיפא אם הניח חנווני נרו מבחוץ חנווני חייב ואי במסכסכת אמאי חייב בשעמדה

Now this accords well with the view that Fire implies human agency: the agency of the camel could thus be traced in the setting alight of the whole building. But according to the view that Fire is chattel, [why should the owner of the camel be liable?] Was the fire in this case the chattel of the owner of the camel? — Resh Lakish may reply that the camel in this case [passed along the entire building and] set every bit of it on fire.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The damage done to every bit of the building is thus directly attributed to the action of the camel. ');"><sup>18</sup></span> If so, read the concluding clause: If, however, the shopkeeper left his candle outside [his shop] he is liable. Now, if the camel set the whole of the building on fire, why indeed should the shopkeeper be liable? — The camel in this case stood still [all of a sudden].<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. n. 4. ');"><sup>19</sup></span>

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12

עמדה וסכסכה כ"ש דחנווני פטור ובעל גמל חייב אמר רב הונא בר מנוח משמיה דרב איקא הכא במאי עסקינן כגון שעמדה להטיל מימיה

But [it is immediately objected] if the camel stood still and yet managed to set fire to every bit of the building, is it not still more fitting that the shopkeeper should be free but the owner of the camel fully liable?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For not having instantly driven away the camel from such a dangerous spot. ');"><sup>20</sup></span> — R. Huna b. Manoah in the name of R. Ika [thereupon] said: The rulings apply to [a case where the camel] stood still to pass water;<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' And while it was impossible to drive it away quickly from that spot, the camel meanwhile managed to set every bit of the building on fire. ');"><sup>21</sup></span>

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