Bava Kamma 45

בנזקי ממונו וסיים בנזקי גופו לומר לך אשו משום חציו

done by property,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., by fire breaking out of itself. ');">¹</span>

אמר רבא קשיא ליה לאביי למ"ד אשו משום חציו טמון באש דפטר רחמנא היכי משכחת לה

concludes with damage done by the person<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' As implied in the clause, He that kindled the fire. ');">²</span>

וניחא ליה כגון שנפלה דליקה לאותו חצר ונפלה גדר שלא מחמת דליקה והלכה והדליקה והזיקה בחצר אחרת דהתם כלו ליה חציו

[in order] to declare that Fire implies human agency.

אי הכי לענין גלוי נמי כלו ליה חציו

Raba said: The following difficulty confronted Abaye: According to the view maintaining that Fire implies human agency, how [and when] was it possible for the Divine law to make exemption<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Since in the case of Man doing damage such an exemption does not exist. ');">³</span>

אלא למאן דאית ליה משום חציו אית ליה נמי משום ממונו וכגון שהיה לו לגודרה ולא גדרה דהתם שורו הוא ולא טפח באפיה

for damage done by Fire to hidden things?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. supra pp. 18 and 39 and infra 61b. ');">⁴</span>

וכי מאחר דמאן דאית ליה משום חציו אית ליה נמי משום ממונו מאי בינייהו

He solved it thus: Its application is in the case of a fire which would ordinarily not have spread beyond a certain point, but owing to the accident of a fence collapsing not on account of the fire, the conflagration continued setting alight and doing damage in other premises where the original human agency is at an end.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' It is in this case (where the human agency is at an end) that there is exemption for hidden goods but liability for unconcealed articles. ');">⁵</span>

איכא בינייהו לחייבו בארבעה דברים:

If so, even regarding unconcealed goods is not the human agency at an end?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' And there should therefore be exemption for damage done to all kinds of property. ');">⁶</span>

על החררה משלם כו': מאן חייב בעל כלב וליחייב נמי בעל גחלת בששימר גחלתו

— Hence the one maintaining that Fire implies human agency also holds that Fire is chattel,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' So that whenever the human agency is at an end, there would still be a possibility of liability being incurred. ');">⁷</span>

אי כששימר גחלתו מאי בעי כלב התם בשחתר אמר רב מרי בריה דרב כהנא זאת אומרת סתם דלתות חתורות הן אצל כלב

so that liability for unconcealed goods would arise in the case where the falling fence could have been, but was not, repaired in time [to prevent the further spread of the fire], since it would equal chattel<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lit., 'his ox'. ');">⁸</span>

דאכלה היכא אילימא דאכלה בגדיש דעלמא הא בעינן (שמות כב, ד) וביער בשדה אחר וליכא לא צריכא דאכלה בגדיש דבעל חררה

left unguarded by the owner.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Cf. infra 55b. ');">⁹</span>

תפשוט דפי פרה

But if the one who holds that fire implies human agency also maintains that Fire is chattel,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' So that whenever the human agency is at an end, there would still be a possibility of liability being incurred. ');">⁷</span> what then is the practical point at issue?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., what is the difference in law whether the liability for Fire is for the principles of human agency and chattel combined, or only on account of the principle of chattel? The difference could of course be only in the case where the human agency involved in Fire was not yet brought to an end. For otherwise the liability according to both views would only be possible on account of the principle of chattel, a principle which is according to the latest conclusion maintained by all. ');">¹⁰</span> — The point at issue is whether Fire<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' In cases where the human agency was not yet at an end. ');">¹¹</span> will involve the [additional] Four Items.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., Pain, Healing, Loss of Time and Degradation, which in the case of Man, but not Ox, injuring men are paid in addition to Depreciation which is a liability common in all cases; v. supra p. 12. According to R. Johanan who considers Fire a human agency, the liability will be not only for Depreciation but also for the additional Four Items: whereas Resh Lakish maintains that only Depreciation will be paid, as in the case of damage done by Cattle. ');">¹²</span> [THE OWNER OF THE DOG] PAYS FULL COMPENSATION FOR THE CAKE WHEREAS FOR THE BARN [HE] PAYS [ONLY] HALF DAMAGES. Who is liable [for the barn]? — The owner of the dog. But why should not the owner of the coal also be made liable?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Since it was his coal that did the damage. ');">¹³</span> — His [burning] coal was [well] guarded by him.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' He is therefore not to blame. ');">¹⁴</span> If the [burning] coal was well guarded by him, how then did the dog come to it? — By breaking in. R. Mari the son of R. Kahana thereupon said: This ruling implies that the average door is not beyond being broken in by a dog.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For if otherwise the breaking in should be an act of unusual occurrence that should be subject to the law applicable to Horn, involving only the compensation of half damages for the consumption of the cake. ');">¹⁵</span> Now in whose premises was the cake devoured? It could hardly be suggested that it was devoured in the barn of another party,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., a barn not belonging to the owner of the cake. ');">¹⁶</span> for do we not require <i>And shall feed in the field of another</i><span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Ex. XXII, 4. ');">¹⁷</span> [the plaintiff], which is not the case here? — No, it applies where it was devoured in the barn of the owner of the cake. You can thus conclude that [the plaintiff's food carried in] the mouth of [the defendant's] cattle