Bava Kamma 56

אבל הוא עצמו פטור קרקע עולם הזיקתו

For regarding injury to the person there is exemption, since it was public ground<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lit., 'ground of the world'. ');">¹</span>

כי אמריתה קמיה דשמואל אמר לי מכדי אבנו וסכינו ומשאו מבורו למדנו וכולן אני קורא בהן שור ולא אדם חמור ולא כלים

that hurt him.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Whereas the water was only the remote cause of it. ');">²</span>

והני מילי לענין קטלא אבל לענין נזקין אדם חייב וכלים פטורין

When repeating this statement in the presence of Samuel he said to me: 'Well, is not [the liability for damage occasioned by] a stone, a knife or luggage<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Even when not abandoned; cf. supra p. 7. ');">³</span>

ורב הני מילי היכא דאפקרינהו אבל היכא דלא אפקרינהו ממונו הוא

derived from Pit?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Ex. XXI, 33. ');">⁴</span>

מתיב רב אושעיא (שמות כא, לג) ונפל שמה שור או חמור שור ולא אדם חמור ולא כלים מכאן אמרו נפל לתוכו שור וכליו ונשתברו חמור וכליו ונתקרעו חייב על הבהמה ופטור על הכלים הא למה זה דומה לאבנו וסכינו ומשאו שהניחן ברה"ר והזיקו

So that I adopt regarding them all [the interpretation]: An ox<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Ex. XXI, 33. ');">⁴</span>

אדרבה מה דומה לזה מבעי ליה אלא מאי דומה לזה אבנו וסכינו ומשאו שהניחן ברה"ר והזיקו

excluding man, An ass<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Ex. XXI, 33. ');">⁴</span>

לפיכך אם הטיח צלוחיתו באבן חייב

excluding inanimate objects! This qualification<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Excluding man. ');">⁵</span>

רישא קשיא לרב וסיפא קשיא לשמואל

however applies only to cases of killing, whereas as regards [mere] injury, in the case of man there is liability, though with respect to inanimate objects there is [always] exemption?'<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For killing and injury could not be distinguished in the case of inanimate objects. How then could Rab make him liable for soiled garments (and exempt for injury to the person)? ');">⁶</span>

ולטעמיך תיקשי לך היא גופא (קשיא) רישא פטור וסיפא חייב

— Rab [however, maintains<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The difference in principle between Samuel and Rab is that the former maintains that nuisances of all kinds, whether abandoned by their owners or not, are subject to the law applicable to Pit, in which case there is no liability either for damage done to inanimate objects or death caused to human beings, whereas the view of Rab is that only abandoned nuisances are subject to these laws of Pit, but nuisances that have not been abandoned by their owners are still his chattels, and as such have to be subject to the law applicable to ox doing damage, in which case no discrimination is made as to the nature of the damaged objects, be they men, beasts or inanimate articles; cf. also supra p. 38. ');">⁷</span>

אלא רב מתרץ לטעמיה ושמואל מתרץ לטעמיה

that] these statements apply only to nuisances abandoned [by their owners],<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' In which case they are equal (in law) to Pits dug on public ground. ');">⁸</span>

רב מתרץ לטעמיה במה דברים אמורים כשהפקירן אבל לא הפקירן חייב לפיכך הטיח צלוחיתו באבן חייב

whereas in cases where they are not abandoned they still remain [their owner's] chattel.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' They are thus subject to the law applicable to ox; v. supra p. 18. ');">⁹</span>

ושמואל מתרץ לטעמיה השתא דאמרת אבנו סכינו ומשאו כבורו דמי לר' יהודה דמחייב על נזקי כלים בבור לפיכך הטיח צלוחיתו באבן חייב

R. Oshaia however raised an objection: <i>'And an ox or an ass fall therein'</i>:<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Ex. XXI, 33. ');">⁴</span>

א"ר אלעזר לא שנו אלא שנתקל באבן ונשוף באבן אבל נתקל בקרקע ונשוף באבן פטור

<i> 'An ox'</i> excluding man; <i>'an ass'</i> excluding inanimate objects. Hence the Rabbis stated: If there fell into it an ox together with its tools and they thereby broke, [or] an ass together with its equipment which rent, there is liability for the beast but exemption as regards the inanimate objects.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. infra 52a. ');">¹⁰</span>

כמאן דלא כר' נתן

To what may the ruling in this case be compared? To that applicable in the case of a stone, a knife and luggage<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Even when not abandoned; cf. supra p. 7. ');">¹¹</span>

איכא דאמרי א"ר אלעזר לא תימא בנתקל באבן ונשוף באבן הוא דמחייב אבל נתקל בקרקע ונשוף באבן פטור אלא אפילו נתקל בקרקע ונשוף באבן חייב כמאן כר' נתן:

that had been left on public ground and did damage. (Should it not on the contrary read, 'What case may be compared to this ruling?'<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Since the case of stone, knife and luggage is far less obvious than this case which is explicitly dealt with in Scripture. ');">¹²</span>

ר' יהודה אומר במתכוין חייב [וכו']: ה"ד מתכוין

— It must therefore indeed mean thus: 'What may [be said to] be similar to this ruling? The case of a stone, a knife and luggage that had been left on public ground and did damage'.) 'It thus follows that where a bottle broke against the stone there is liability.' Now, does not the commencing clause<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Making a stone, a knife and luggage subject to the law applicable to Pit. ');">¹³</span>

אמר רבה במתכוין להורידה למטה מכתיפו א"ל אביי מכלל דמחייב ר"מ אפילו נפשרה א"ל אין מחייב היה ר"מ אפי' אזנה בידו

contradict the view of Rab,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Who maintains that unless they have been abandoned they are subject to the law of Ox. ');">¹⁴</span>

אמאי אנוס הוא ואונס רחמנא פטריה דכתיב (דברים כב, כו) ולנערה לא תעשה דבר

whereas the concluding clause<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Imposing liability in the case of a bottle having been smashed against the stone. ');">¹⁵</span>

וכי תימא ה"מ לענין קטלא אבל לענין נזקין חייב והתניא נשברה כדו ולא סלקו נפל גמלו ולא העמידו ר"מ מחייב בהזיקן וחכמים אומרים

opposes that of Samuel?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' According to whom it should be subject to the law applicable to Pit imposing no liability for damage done to inanimate objects. ');">¹⁶</span> — But [even] on your view, does not the text contradict itself, stating exemption in the commencing clause<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Making a stone, a knife and luggage subject to the law applicable to Pit. ');">¹³</span> and liability in the concluding clause!<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Imposing liability in the case of a bottle having been smashed against the stone. ');">¹⁵</span> Rab therefore interprets it so as to accord with his reasoning, whereas Samuel [on the other hand] expounds it so as to reconcile it with his view. Rab in accordance with his reasoning interprets it thus: The [above] statement<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Making a stone, a knife and luggage subject to the law applicable to Pit. ');">¹³</span> was made only regarding nuisances that have been abandoned, whereas where they have not been abandoned there is liability.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Even for damage done to inanimate objects, as they are subject not to the law of Pit but to that applicable to Ox. ');">¹⁷</span> It therefore follows that where a bottle broke against the stone there is liability. Samuel [on the other hand] in reconciling it with his view expounds it thus: Since you have now decided that a stone, a knife and luggage [constitute nuisances that] are equivalent [in law] to Pit, it follows that, according to R. Judah who orders compensation for inanimate objects damaged by Pit,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Supra p. 18. ');">¹⁸</span> where a bottle smashed against the stone there is liability. R. Eleazar said: This ruling<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Imposing liability in the case of a bottle having been smashed against the stone. ');">¹⁵</span> refers only to a case where the person stumbled over the stone and the bottle broke against the stone. For if the person stumbled because of the public ground, though the bottle broke against the stone, there is exemption.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Since it was ownerless ground that was the primary cause of the accident. ');">¹⁹</span> Whose view is here followed? — Of course not that of R. Nathan.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Who holds that where no payment can be exacted from one defendant, the co-defendant, if any, will himself bear the whole liability; cf supra p. 54 and infra 53a ');">²⁰</span> There are, however, some who [on the other hand] read: R. Eleazar said: Do not suggest that it is only where the person stumbled upon the stone and the bottle broke against the stone that there is liability, so that where the person stumbled because of the public ground, though the bottle broke against the stone, there would be exemption. For even in the case where the person stumbled because of the public ground, provided the bottle broke against the stone there is liability. Whose view is here followed? — Of course that of Nathan.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Who holds that where no payment can be exacted from one defendant, the co-defendant, if any, will himself bear the whole liability; cf supra p. 54 and infra 53a ');">²⁰</span> R. JUDAH SAYS: IF IT WAS DONE INTENTIONALLY HE IS LIABLE, BUT IF UNINTENTIONALLY HE IS EXEMPT. What does INTENTIONALLY denote? — Rabbah said: [It is sufficient<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' To constitute liability. ');">²¹</span> if there was] an intention to bring the pitcher below the shoulder.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Though there was no intention whatever to break it. ');">²²</span> Said Abaye to him: Does this imply that R. Meir<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Who is usually taken to have been the author of anonymous Mishnaic statements, especially when contradicting those of R. Judah b. Il'ai, his colleague. ');">²³</span> imposes liability even when the pitcher slipped down [by sheer accident]? — He answered him:<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., Rabbah to Abaye. ');">²⁴</span> 'Yes, R. Meir imposes liability even where the handle remained in the carrier's hand.' But why? Is it not sheer accident, and has not the Divine Law prescribed exemption in cases of accident as recorded,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Deut. XXII, 26. ');">²⁵</span> But unto the damsel thou shalt do nothing?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For so far as she is concerned it was a mishap. ');">²⁶</span> You can hardly suggest this ruling to apply only to capital punishment, whereas regarding damages there should [always] be liability, for it was taught:<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Infra 55a. ');">²⁷</span> If his pitcher broke and he did not remove the potsherds, [or] his camel fell down and he did not raise it, R. Meir orders payment for any damage resulting therefrom, whereas the Sages maintain