Bava Kamma 57

פטור מדיני אדם וחייב בדיני שמים

that no action can be instituted against him in civil courts though there is liability<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For not having removed the potsherds or the camel that fell down. ');">¹</span>

ומודים חכמים לר"מ באבנו סכינו ומשאו שהניחן בראש גגו ונפלו ברוח מצויה והזיקו שהוא חייב ומודה ר"מ לרבנן במעלה קנקנין על הגג ע"מ לנגבן ונפלו ברוח שאינה מצויה והזיקו שהוא פטור

according to divine justice. The Sages agree however, with R. Meir that, in the case of a stone, a knife and luggage which were left on the top of the roof and fell down because of a wind of usual occurrence<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Which the defendant should have anticipated. ');">²</span>

אלא אמר אביי בתרתי פליגי פליגי בשעת נפילה ופליגי לאחר נפילה

and did damage, there will be liability.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For carelessness. ');">³</span>

פליגי בשעת נפילה בנתקל פושע מר סבר נתקל פושע הוא ומ"ס נתקל לאו פושע הוא

R. Meir [on the other hand] agrees with the Sages that, regarding bottles that were placed upon the top of the roof for the purpose of getting dry and fell down because of a wind of unusual occurrence<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Which could hardly have been anticipated. ');">⁴</span>

פליגי לאחר נפילה במפקיר נזקיו מר סבר מפקיר נזקיו חייב ומר סבר פטור

and did damage, there is exemption.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For in this case the defendant is not to blame for carelessness. ');">⁵</span>

וממאי מדקתני תרתי הוחלק אחד במים או שלקה בחרסית היינו הך אלא לאו ה"ק הוחלק אחד במים בשעת נפילה או שלקה בחרסית לאחר נפילה

[Does not this prove that even regarding damages all agree that there is exemption in cases of sheer accident?] — Abaye therefore said: It is on two points that they<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., R. Judah and the anonymous view which is that of R. Meir. ');">⁶</span>

ומדמתניתין בתרתי ברייתא נמי בתרתי

differ [in the Mishnah]; they differ regarding damage done at the time of the fall [of the pitcher] and they again differ regarding damage occasioned [by the potsherds] subsequently to the fall. The difference of opinion regarding damage done at the time of the fall of the pitcher arises on the question whether stumbling implies negligence [or not];<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' As it was owing to the defendant having stumbled that his pitcher gave way. ');">⁷</span>

בשלמא כדו משכחת לה או בשעת נפילה או לאחר נפילה אלא גמלו בשלמא לאחר נפילה משכחת לה במפקיר נבלתו אלא בשעת נפילה היכי משכחת לה

one Master<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., R. Meir. ');">⁸</span>

אמר רב אחא כגון דעברה במיא דרך שרעתא דנהרא

maintaining that stumbling does imply negligence, whereas the other Master<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., R. Judah. ');">⁹</span>

ה"ד אי דאיכא דרכא אחרינא פושע הוא ואי דליכא דרכא אחרינא אנוס הוא

is of the opinion that stumbling does not [necessarily] imply negligence.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' 'INTENTIONALLY' stated in the Mishnah would thus mean where there was intention actually to break the pitcher, for if the intention was merely to bring the pitcher below the shoulder it would come under the term 'UNINTENTIONALLY', the ground advanced by R. Judah is that in the case of stumbling and breaking a pitcher and doing thereby damage, no negligence was necessarily involved. ');">¹⁰</span>

אלא משכחת לה דאתקיל ואתקילה ביה גמלא

The point at issue in the case of damage occasioned [by the potsherds] subsequently to the fall, is the law as applicable to abandoned nuisances;<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Of which the defendant is no longer the owner. ');">¹¹</span>

מפקיר נזקיו מאי מתכוין איכא

one Master<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., R. Meir. ');">⁸</span>

אמר רב יוסף במתכוין לזכות בחרסיה וכן אמר רב אשי במתכוין לזכות בחרסיה

maintaining that for damage occasioned by abandoned nuisances there is liability,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For the liability in the case of Pit is also where it has been dug in public ground and is thus ownerless. ');">¹²</span>

רבי אלעזר אמר בשעת נפילה מחלוקת

whereas the other Master<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., R. Judah. ');">⁹</span>

אבל לאחר נפילה מאי דברי הכל פטור והא איכא ר"מ דמחייב אלא מאי דברי הכל חייב והא איכא רבנן דפטרי

maintains exemption.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For he holds that the liability in the case of Pit is only where the defendant had dug it in his own ground and though he subsequently abandoned it he retained the ownership of the pit itself; cf. supra p. 107; and infra 50a. ');">¹³</span>

אלא מאי בשעת נפילה אף בשעת נפילה וקמשמע לן כדאביי

But how can you prove this?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' That the points at issue are twofold. ');">¹⁴</span> — From the text which presents two [independent] cases [as follows]; SOMEONE SLIPPED IN THE WATER OR WAS INJURED BY THE POTSHERD; for indeed is not one case the same as the other,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Why then would one case not have sufficed? ');">¹⁵</span> unless it was intended to convey, 'Someone slipped in the water while the pitcher had been falling<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' And the water was still in the process of being poured out. ');">¹⁶</span> or was injured by the potsherd subsequently to the fall.' Now that the Mishnah presents two independent cases, it is only reasonable to assume that the Baraitha<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Supra p. 152. ');">¹⁷</span> similarly deals with the same two problems. That is all very well as regards the 'pitcher' where the two [problems] have application [in the case of damage done] at the time of the fall or subsequently to the fall [respectively]. But how in the case of the 'camel'? For though concerning damage occasioned subsequently to the fall, it may well have application where the carcass has been abandoned,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The point at issue thus consisting in the law applicable to abandoned nuisances. ');">¹⁸</span> yet in the case of damage done at the time of the fall, what point of difference can be found?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For the problem whether 'stumbling' implies negligence or not has surely no application where it was not the driver but the camel that stumbled. ');">¹⁹</span> — R. Aha thereupon said: [It deals with a case] where the camel was led in water along the slippery shore of a river.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The stumbling of the camel is thus imputed to the driver. ');">²⁰</span> But under what circumstances? If where there was another [better] way, is it not a case of culpa lata?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., grave fault, which has nothing to do with the problem of stumbling. ');">²¹</span> If on the other hand there was no other way [to pass through], is it not a case of no alternative? — The point at issue can therefore only be where the driver stumbled and together with him the camel also stumbled. But in the case of abandoning nuisances,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Which is the second point at issue between R. Judah and R. Meir. ');">²²</span> where could [the condition of] intention [laid down by R. Judah] come in? — Said R. Joseph: The intention [in this case] refers to the retaining of the ownership of the potsherd.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' [R. Judah therefore means this: If he had the intention of retaining the shards he is liable; if he had no intention to do so but abandoned them, he is exempt.] ');">²³</span> So also said R. Ashi, that the intention [in this case] refers to the retaining of the ownership of the potsherd. R. Eleazar said: 'It is regarding damage done at the time of the fall that there is a difference of opinion.' But how in the case of damage done subsequently to the fall? Would there be unanimity that there is exemption? Surely there is R. Meir who expressed [his opinion]<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Supra p. 152. ');">²⁴</span> that there is liability! What else [would you suggest? That in this case] there is unanimity [imposing] liability? Surely there are the Rabbis who stated [their view] that there is exemption! — Hence, what he means [to convey by his statement] 'damage done at the time of the fall', is that there is difference of opinion 'even regarding damage done at the time of the fall', making thus known to us [the conclusions arrived at] by Abaye.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Supra p. 153. ');">²⁵</span>