Bava Kamma 63
היה בעל חבית ראשון ובעל קורה אחרון נשברה חבית בקורה חייב ואם עמד בעל חבית פטור ואם אמר לבעל קורה עמוד חייב וכן זה בא בנרו וזה בפשתנו:
IF, HOWEVER, HE CRIED TO THE CARRIER OF THE BARREL, HALT!' HE IS EXEMPT. WHERE, HOWEVER, THE CARRIER OF THE BARREL WAS IN FRONT, AND THE CARRIER OF THE BEAM BEHIND AND THE BARREL BROKE BY [COLLISION WITH] THE BEAM, HE IS LIABLE.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For the carrier of the beam, who was in this case second, should have taken care to keep at a reasonable distance. ');"><sup>2</sup></span>
<big><strong>גמ׳</strong></big> בעא מיניה רבה בר נתן מרב הונא המזיק את אשתו בתשמיש המטה מהו כיון דברשות קעביד פטור או דלמא איבעי ליה לעיוני
IF, HOWEVER, THE CARRIER OF THE BARREL [SUDDENLY] STOPPED, HE IS EXEMPT. BUT WHERE HE CRIED TO THE CARRIER OF THE BEAM, 'HALT!' HE IS LIABLE. THE SAME APPLIES TO ONE CARRYING A [BURNING] CANDLE WHILE ANOTHER WAS PROCEEDING WITH FLAX.
א"ל תניתוה שלזה רשות להלך ולזה רשות להלך
<b><i>GEMARA</i></b>. Rabbah b. Nathan questioned R. Huna: If a man injures his wife through conjugal intercourse, what is [the legal position]? Since he performed this act with full permission is he to be exempt [for damage resulting therefrom], or should perhaps greater care have been taken by him? — He said to him. We have learnt it: … FOR THE ONE IS ENTITLED TO WALK [THERE AND CARRY BEAMS] AND THE OTHER IS ENTITLED TO WALK [THERE AND CARRY BARRELS].<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' This proves that where the act is sanctioned no liability is involved. ');"><sup>3</sup></span>
אמר רבא ק"ו ומה יער שזה לרשותו נכנס וזה לרשותו נכנס נעשה כמי שנכנס לרשות חבירו וחייב זה שלרשות חבירו נכנס לא כל שכן
Raba [however] said: There is an <i>a fortiori</i> [to the contrary]: If in the case of the Wood,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Referring to Deut. XIX, 5: As when a man goeth into the wood with his neighbour to hew wood, and his hand fetcheth a stroke with the axe to cut down the tree and the head slippeth from the helve and lighteth upon his neighbour… cf. also infra p. 175 ');"><sup>4</sup></span>
אלא הא קתני שלזה רשות להלך ולזה רשות להלך
where this one [the defendant] was entering [as if] into his own domain, and the other [the plaintiff] was [similarly] entering [as if] into his own domain, it is nevertheless considered [in the eye of the law]<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Referring to Deut. XIX, 5: As when a man goeth into the wood with his neighbour to hew wood, and his hand fetcheth a stroke with the axe to cut down the tree and the head slippeth from the helve and lighteth upon his neighbour… cf. also infra p. 175 ');"><sup>4</sup></span>
לימא מסייע ליה היה בעל קורה ראשון ובעל חבית אחרון נשברה חבית בקורה פטור ואם עמד בעל קורה חייב והא הכא דכרבוצה במהלכת דמי וקתני חייב
But surely [the Mishnah] states, … FOR THE ONE IS ENTITLED TO WALK THERE [AND CARRY BEAMS] AND THE OTHER IS ENTITLED TO WALK [THERE AND CARRY BARRELS, indicating exemption where the entry was sanctioned]! — There, both of the parties were simultaneously [active against each other], whereas here<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. p. 170 n. 6. ');"><sup>9</sup></span>
אלא סיפא דמתני' מסייע ליה לר"ל דקתני היה בעל חבית ראשון ובעל קורה אחרון נשברה חבית בקורה חייב ואם עמד בעל חבית פטור והא הכא דכמהלכת ברבוצה דמי וקתני פטור
[considered] not [to have participated in the act at all]? Is it not written, The souls that commit them shall be cut off from among their people?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lev. XVIII, 29. [The plural indicates that both are regarded as having participated in the act.] ');"><sup>12</sup></span>
<big><strong>מתני׳</strong></big> שנים שהיו מהלכין ברה"ר אחד רץ ואחד מהלך או שהיו שניהם רצין והזיקו זה את זה שניהם פטורין:
WHERE THE CARRIER OF THE BEAM WAS IN FRONT etc. Resh Lakish stated:<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Supra pp. 98 and 124. ');"><sup>13</sup></span>
<big><strong>גמ׳</strong></big> מתני' דלא כאיסי בן יהודה דתניא איסי בן יהודה אומר רץ חייב מפני שהוא משונה ומודה איסי בע"ש בין השמשות שהוא פטור מפני שרץ ברשות
In the case of two cows on public ground, one lying down [maliciously] and the other walking about, if the one that was walking kicked the one that was lying, there is exemption [since the latter too misconducted itself by laying itself down on public ground], whereas if the one that was lying kicked the one that was walking, there is liability to pay. May not [the following be cited in] support of this:<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., that misconduct involves liability for damage that may result. ');"><sup>14</sup></span>
א"ר יוחנן הלכה כאיסי בן יהודה ומי אמר רבי יוחנן הכי והאמר ר' יוחנן הלכה כסתם משנה ותנן אחד רץ ואחד מהלך או שהיו שניהם רצין פטורין
WHERE THE CARRIER OF THE BEAM WAS IN FRONT AND THE CARRIER OF THE BARREL BEHIND, AND THE BARREL BROKE BY [COLLISION WITH] THE BEAM, HE IS EXEMPT. BUT IF THE CARRIER OF THE BEAM [SUDDENLY] STOPPED HE IS LIABLE. For surely [this latter case] here is similar to that of the lying cow kicking the walking cow,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' As here, too, the offender is to blame for misconduct. ');"><sup>15</sup></span>
ממאי מדקתני או שהיו שניהם רצין פטורין הא תו ל"ל השתא אחד רץ ואחד מהלך פטור שניהם רצין מבעיא אלא הכי קאמר אחד רץ ואחד מהלך פטור בד"א בע"ש בין השמשות אבל בחול אחד רץ ואחד מהלך חייב שניהם רצין אפי' בחול פטורין
[The Mishnaic text however] not only fails to be of any support [in this respect], but affords a contradiction to Resh Lakish, [in whose view] the reason [even for the liability] is that the lying cow kicked the walking cow, thus [implying] that [the latter] sustained damage [because of the former cow] through sheer accident, and there would be exemption. Now, [the case of] the Mishnah surely deals with accidental damage, and still states liability? — The Mishnah [deals with a case] where the beam blocked the [whole] passage as if by a carcass,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Consequently the liability extends even to accidental damage. ');"><sup>16</sup></span>
אמר מר ומודה איסי בע"ש בין השמשות שהוא פטור מפני שרץ ברשות בע"ש מאי ברשות איכא
whereas here [in the case dealt with by Resh Lakish] the cow was lying on one side of the road so that the other cow should have passed on the other side.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' [There could therefore be no liability attached except where the lying cow maliciously kicked her, but not for accidental damage.] ');"><sup>17</sup></span>
כדר' חנינא דאמר ר' חנינא
But the concluding clause may [be taken to] support Resh Lakish. For it is stated, BUT IF THE CARRIER OF THE BARREL WAS IN FRONT AND THE CARRIER OF THE BEAM BEHIND, AND THE BARREL BROKE BY [COLLISION WITH] THE BEAM, HE IS LIABLE. IF, HOWEVER, THE CARRIER OF THE BARREL [SUDDENLY] STOPPED, HE IS EXEMPT. Now, surely this case resembles that of the walking cow kicking the lying cow,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' In that there was contributory misconduct on the part of the plaintiff and his cow respectively. ');"><sup>18</sup></span> and the text states exemption? — No! The Mishnah [deals with the case where the damage was done in a usual manner as] he<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The carrier of the beam. ');"><sup>19</sup></span> was passing in the ordinary way, whereas here [in the case dealt with by Resh Lakish] it may be argued for the lying cow,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lit., 'she can say to her'. ');"><sup>20</sup></span> 'Even if you are entitled to tread upon me, you have still no right to kick me.'<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' It was therefore requisite that Resh Lakish should express his rejection of this plausible argument. ');"><sup>21</sup></span> <b><i>MISHNAH</i></b>. IF TWO [PERSONS] WERE PASSING ONE ANOTHER ON PUBLIC GROUND, ONE [OF THEM] RUNNING AND THE OTHER WALKING OR BOTH OF THEM RUNNING, AND THEY WERE INJURED BY EACH OTHER, BOTH OF THEM ARE EXEMPT.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' So long as they had no intention of injuring each other. ');"><sup>22</sup></span> <b><i>GEMARA</i></b>. Our Mishnah is not in accordance with Issi b. Judah. For it has been taught: Issi b. Judah maintains that the man who had been running is liable, since his conduct was unusual. Issi, however, agrees [that if it were] on a Sabbath eve before sunset there would be exemption, for running at that time is permissible. R. Johanan stated that the <i>halachah</i> is in accordance with Issi b. Judah. But did R. Johanan [really] maintain this? Has R. Johanan not laid down the rule that the <i>halachah</i> is in accordance with [the ruling of] an anonymous Mishnah?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Cf. supra p. 158. ');"><sup>23</sup></span> Now, did we not learn … ONE [ OF THEM] RUNNING AND THE OTHER WALKING OR BOTH OF THEM RUNNING … BOTH OF THEM ARE EXEMPT? — Our Mishnah [deals with a case] of a Sabbath eve before sunset. What proof have you of that? — From the text, OR BOTH OF THEM RUNNING … BOTH OF THEM ARE EXEMPT; [for indeed] what need was there for this to be inserted? If in the case where one was running and the other walking there is exemption, could there be any doubt<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' That there should be exemption. ');"><sup>24</sup></span> where both of them were running?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Where there was contributory negligence. ');"><sup>25</sup></span> It must accordingly mean thus: 'Where one was running and the other walking there is exemption; provided, however, it was on a Sabbath eve before sunset. For if on a weekday, [in the case of] one running and the other walking there would be liability, [whereas where] both of them were running even though on a weekday they would be exempt.' The Master stated: 'Issi, however, agrees [that if it were] on a Sabbath eve before sunset there would be exemption, for running at that time is permissible.' On Sabbath eve, why is it permissible? — As [shown by] R. Hanina: for R. Hanina used to say:<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Cf. Shab. 119a. ');"><sup>26</sup></span>