Bava Kamma 70

שניהם פטורים אם היו שניהם של איש אחד שניהם חייבים

NEITHER OF THE DEFENDANTS WILL BE LIABLE. BUT WHERE BOTH OF THE [PURSUING] OXEN BELONGED TO THE SAME OWNER,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' And were in the state of Tam, in which case the half-damages are paid only out of the body of the ox that did the damage, as supra p. 73. ');">¹</span>

היה אחד גדול ואחד קטן הניזק אומר גדול הזיק והמזיק אומר לא כי אלא קטן הזיק אחד תם ואחד מועד הניזק אומר מועד הזיק והמזיק אומר לא כי אלא תם הזיק המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה

LIABILITY WILL ATTACH TO BOTH OF THEM. WHERE, HOWEVER, ONE [OF THE OXEN] WAS BIG AND THE OTHER LITTLE<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' And were in the state of Tam, in which case the half-damages are paid only out of the body of the ox that did the damage, as supra p. 73. ');">¹</span>

היו הניזקין שנים אחד גדול ואחד קטן והמזיקין שנים אחד גדול ואחד קטן הניזק אומר גדול הזיק את הגדול וקטן את הקטן והמזיק אומר לא כי אלא קטן את הגדול וגדול את הקטן אחד תם ואחד מועד הניזק אומר מועד הזיק את הגדול ותם את הקטן והמזיק אומר לא כי אלא תם את הגדול ומועד את הקטן המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה:

AND THE CLAIMANT MAINTAINS THAT THE BIG ONE DID THE DAMAGE,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' And the body of the big one should secure the payment of the half damages. ');">²</span>

<big><strong>גמ׳</strong></big> אמר רבי חייא בר אבא [זאת אומרת] חלוקים עליו חביריו על סומכוס דאמר ממון המוטל בספק חולקין

WHILE THE DEFENDANT PLEADS, 'NOT SO, FOR IT WAS THE LITTLE ONE THAT DID THE DAMAGE', OR AGAIN WHERE ONE [OX] WAS <i>TAM</i> AND THE OTHER <i>MU'AD</i> AND THE CLAIMANT MAINTAINS THAT THE <i>MU'AD</i> DID THE DAMAGE<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' And the compensation should thus be made in full. ');">³</span>

א"ל ר' אבא בר ממל לר' חייא בר אבא אמר סומכוס אפילו ברי וברי א"ל אין אמר סומכוס אפילו ברי וברי

WHILE THE DEFENDANT ASSERTS, 'NOT SO, FOR IT WAS THE <i>TAM</i> THAT DID THE DAMAGE,' THE BURDEN OF PROOF LIES ON THE CLAIMANT. [SO ALSO] WHERE THERE WERE TWO INJURED OXEN, ONE BIG AND ONE LITTLE, SIMILARLY TWO PURSUERS, ONE BIG AND ONE LITTLE, AND THE PLAINTIFF ASSERTS THAT THE BIG ONE INJURED THE BIG ONE AND THE LITTLE ONE THE LITTLE ONE, WHILE THE DEFENDANT CONTENDS, 'NOT SO, FOR [IT WAS] THE LITTLE ONE [THAT INJURED] THE BIG ONE AND THE BIG ONE [THAT INJURED] THE LITTLE ONE'; OR AGAIN WHERE ONE WAS <i>TAM</i> AND THE OTHER <i>MU'AD</i>, AND THE PLAINTIFF MAINTAINS THAT THE <i>MU'AD</i> INJURED THE BIG ONE AND THE <i>TAM</i> THE LITTLE ONE, WHILE THE DEFENDANT PLEADS, 'NOT SO, FOR [IT WAS THE] <i>TAM</i> [THAT INJURED] THE BIG ONE AND THE <i>MU'AD</i> [THAT INJURED] THE LITTLE ONE,' THE BURDEN OF PROOF FALLS ON THE CLAIMANT.

וממאי דמתני' בברי וברי הוא דקתני זה אומר שורך הזיק וזה אומר לא כי

<b><i>GEMARA</i></b>. R. Hiyya b. Abba stated: This [Mishnaic ruling]<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' That it is the claimant on whom falls the onus probandi. ');">⁴</span>

מתקיף לה רב פפא מדרישא ברי וברי סיפא נמי ברי וברי

shows that [in this respect] the colleagues differed from Symmachus who maintained<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Infra p. 262 and B.M. 2b, 6a, 98b, 100a; B.B. 141a. ');">⁵</span>

אימא סיפא היה אחד גדול ואחד קטן ניזק אומר גדול הזיק ומזיק אומר לא כי אלא קטן הזיק אחד תם ואחד מועד ניזק אומר מועד הזיק והמזיק אומר לא כי אלא תם הזיק המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה

that money of which the ownership cannot be decided has to be equally divided [between the two parties]. Said R. Abba b. Memel to R. Hiyya b. Abba: Did Symmachus maintain his view even where the defendant was as positive as the claimant?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' In which case not the defendant but only the Court is in doubt. ');">⁶</span>

הא לא מייתי ראיה שקיל כדאמר מזיק נימא תהוי תיובתא דרבה בר נתן דאמר טענו חטים והודה לו בשעורים פטור

— He replied: Yes, Symmachus maintained his view even where the defendant was as positive as the claimant. But [even if you assume otherwise],<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' And suggest that where the defendant has been positive even Symmachus admits that the claimant will get nothing unless by proving his case. ');">⁷</span>

אלא בברי ושמא

how do you know that the Mishnah is here dealing with a case where the defendant was as positive as the claimant?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For in the cases dealt with in the Mishnah the defendant is usually unable to speak positively, as in most cases he was not present at the place when the alleged damage was done; cf. also Tosaf. a.l. ');">⁸</span>

דקאמר ברי מאן דקאמר שמא מאן אי נימא דקאמר ניזק ברי וקאמר מזיק שמא אכתי לימא תהוי תיובתא דרבה בר נתן

— Because it says, THE PLAINTIFF STATES 'IT WAS YOUR OX THAT DID THE DAMAGE', WHILE THE DEFENDANT PLEADS 'NOT SO…'<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Which is apparently a definite defence. ');">⁹</span>

אלא דקאמר ניזק שמא וקאמר מזיק ברי

R. Papa, however, demurred to this, saying: If in the case presented in the opening clause the defendant was as positive as the claimant, we must suppose that in the case presented in the concluding clause the defendant was similarly as positive as the claimant. [Now,] read the concluding clause; WHERE, HOWEVER, ONE OX WAS BIG AND THE OTHER LITTLE, AND THE PLAINTIFF ASSERTS THAT THE BIG ONE DID THE DAMAGE WHILE THE DEFENDANT PLEADS 'NOT SO, FOR IT WAS THE LITTLE ONE THAT DID THE DAMAGE'; OR AGAIN WHERE ONE OX WAS <i>TAM</i> AND THE OTHER <i>MU'AD</i>, AND THE CLAIMANT MAINTAINS THAT THE <i>MU'AD</i> DID THE DAMAGE, WHILE THE DEFENDANT PLEADS, 'NOT SO, FOR IT WAS THE <i>TAM</i> THAT DID THE DAMAGE', THE BURDEN OF PROOF IS ON THE CLAIMANT. [Now this implies, does it not, that] where he does not produce evidence he will get paid in accordance with the pleading of the defendant. May it now not be argued that this [ruling] is contrary to the view of Rabbah b. Nathan, who said that where the plaintiff claims wheat and the defendant admits barley, he is not liable [for either of them]?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For the claim of wheat has been repudiated by the defendant while the claim for barley admitted by him has tacitly been dispensed with by the plaintiff. The very same thing could be argued in the case of the Mishnah quoted above, where the claim was made in respect of the big one or the Mu'ad, and the defence admitted the little one or the Tam respectively. ');">¹⁰</span>

ומדסיפא ניזק שמא ומזיק ברי רישא נמי ניזק שמא ומזיק ברי

— You conclude then that the Mishnah deals with a case where one party was certain and the other doubtful.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' In which case the argument contained in the preceding note could no more be maintained. ');">¹¹</span>

ואמר סומכוס אפי' בהא דאיצטריך לאשמועינן דלא

Which then was certain and which doubtful? It could hardly be suggested that it was the plaintiff who was certain, and the defendant who was doubtful, for would this still not be contrary to the view of Rabbah b. Nathan?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For surely the plaintiff, by his definite claim in respect of the big one or the Mu'ad, has tacitly waived his claim in respect of the little one or the Tam respectively. ');">¹²</span>

לא סיפא ניזק שמא ומזיק ברי רישא ניזק ברי ומזיק שמא

It would therefore seem that it was the plaintiff who was doubtful<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' In which case the argument contained in the preceding note could no more be maintained. ');">¹¹</span>

והא לא דמיא רישא לסיפא

and the defendant certain. And if the concluding clause deals with a case where the plaintiff was doubtful and the defendant certain, we should suppose that the opening clause<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Where the defendant pleads that 'the pursued ox was injured by a rock…'. ');">¹³</span>

אמרי ברי ושמא שמא וברי חד מילתא היא ברי וברי שמא וברי תרי מילי נינהו:

likewise deals with a case where the plaintiff was doubtful and the defendant certain. But could Symmachus indeed have applied his principle even to such a case,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Which is really an absurdity, to maintain that a plaintiff pleading mere supposition against a defendant submitting a definite denial should in the absence of any evidence be entitled to any payment whatsoever. ');">¹⁴</span>

גופא אמר רבה בר נתן טענו חטין והודה לו בשעורין פטור מאי קמ"ל תנינא טענו חטין והודה לו בשעורין פטור

that the Mishnah thought fit to let us know that this view ought not to be accepted? — [Hence it must be said:] No; but that the concluding clause [deals with a case where] the plaintiff was doubtful and the defendant certain, and the opening clause<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Where the defendant pleads that 'the pursued ox was injured by a rock…'. ');">¹³</span>

אי מהתם הוה אמינא פטור מדמי חטין וחייב בדמי שעורין קמ"ל דפטור לגמרי

[presents a case where it was] the plaintiff who was certain and the defendant doubtful.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' [How then could R. Hiyya maintain that our Mishnah deals with a case where both were certain in their pleas.] ');">¹⁵</span>

תנן היו הניזקין שנים אחד גדול ואחד קטן וכו' הא לא מייתי ראיה שקיל כדקאמר מזיק אמאי חטים ושעורים נינהו

But [even in that case] the opening clause is not co-ordinate with the concluding clause?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' [If so, what is the objection of R. Papa to R. Hiyya's statement, since even on his view there is a lack of co-ordination between these two clauses in the Mishnah.] ');">¹⁶</span>

ראוי ליטול ואין לו

— I can reply that [a case where the plaintiff is] certain and [the defendant] doubtful<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' As in the case dealt with in the commencing clause. ');">¹⁷</span>

והתניא הרי זה משתלם על הקטן מן הגדול ולגדול מן הקטן

and [a case where the claimant is] doubtful and [the defendant] certain<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Which is the case in the concluding clause. ');">¹⁸</span>

דתפס

are co-ordinate<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lit., 'are one thing'. ');">¹⁹</span>

תנן היה אחד תם ואחד מועד הניזק אומר מועד הזיק את הגדול ותם את הקטן והמזיק אומר לא כי אלא תם את הגדול ומועד את הקטן המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה הא לא מייתי ראיה שקיל כדקאמר מזיק ואמאי חטין ושעורין נינהו

whereas [a case where the claimant is] certain and [the defendant also] certain is not co-ordinate with [a case where the claimant is] doubtful and [the defendant] certain.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' R. Papa was therefore loth to explain the commencing clause as dealing with a case where the defence as well as the claim was put forward on a certainty, but preferred to explain it as presenting a law-suit where, though the claim had been put forward positively, the defence was urged tentatively. ');">²⁰</span> The above text states: 'Rabbah b. Nathan said: Where the plaintiff claimed wheat and the defendant admitted barley, he is not liable [for either of them].'<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. p. 197. n. 2. ');">²¹</span> What does this tell us? Have we not already learnt [in a Mishnah]: where the plaintiff claimed wheat and the defendant admitted barley he is not liable?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Shebu. 38b. ');">²²</span> If we had only [the Mishnah] there<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Shebu. 38b. ');">²²</span> to go by, I might have argued that the exemption was only from the value of the wheat,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Which was denied by the defendant. ');">²³</span> while there would still be liability for the value of barley;<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Admitted by the defendant. ');">²⁴</span> we are therefore told by Rabbah b. Nathan that the exemption is complete. We have learnt: WHERE THERE WERE TWO INJURED OXEN, ONE BIG AND THE OTHER LITTLE etc. [Now this implies that] where he does not produce evidence he will get paid in accordance with the pleading of the defendant. But why not apply here [the principle of complete exemption laid down in the case of] wheat and barley? — The plaintiff<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' In the case of the oxen. ');">²⁵</span> is entitled to get paid [only where he produces evidence to substantiate the claim], but will have nothing at all [where he fails to do so]. But has it not been taught; He will be paid for [the injury done to] the little one out of the body of the big and for [the injury done to] the big one out of the body of the little one? — Only where he had already seized them.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' In which case the principle of complete exemption maintained by Rabbah b. Nathan apparently does not apply. ');">²⁶</span> We have learnt: IF ONE WAS <i>TAM</i> AND THE OTHER <i>MU'AD</i>, AND THE PLAINTIFF CLAIMS THAT THE <i>MU'AD</i> INJURED THE BIG ONE<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. p. 196. n. 1. ');">²⁷</span> AND THE <i>TAM</i> THE LITTLE ONE WHILE THE DEFENDANT PLEADS, 'NOT SO, FOR [IT WAS THE] <i>TAM</i> [THAT INJURED] THE BIG ONE AND THE <i>MU'AD</i> [THAT INJURED] THE LITTLE ONE', THE BURDEN OF PROOF FALLS ON THE CLAIMANT. [Now this implies that] where he does not produce evidence he will get paid in accordance with the pleading of the plaintiff. But why should [the principle of complete exemption laid down in the case of] wheat and barley not be applied here? —