Bava Kamma 79
דתניא ר"א בן יעקב אומר אחד תם ואחד מועד ששמרן שמירה פחותה פטורין והא קמ"ל ר' יעקב דמעמידין להן אפוטרופין לתם לגבות מגופו
follows the view of R. Judah,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' That an inferior degree of precaution is not sufficient in the case of Tam; v. infra p. 259. ');"><sup>2</sup></span>
א"ל הכי קאמר חדא דאית ביה תרתי טעמא
in a case where the precautions taken to control the ox were of an inferior kind and not really adequate,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Hence the liability to pay half-damages, a guardian being appointed to collect payment out of the body of the Tam. ');"><sup>3</sup></span>
א"ר חסדא ר' ישמעאל בנו של ר' יוחנן בן ברוקה היא דתניא (שמות כא, ל) ונתן פדיון נפשו דמי ניזק ר' ישמעאל בנו של רבי יוחנן בן ברוקה אומר דמי מזיק
as it has been taught: R. Eliezer b. Jacob says: Whether in the case of <i>Tam</i> or in the case of <i>Mu'ad</i>, if precautions of [at least] some inferior sort have been taken to control the ox, there would be no liability. The new point made known to us by R. Jacob would thus have been that guardians should be appointed even in the case of <i>Tam</i> to collect payment out of its body. [Why then did Raba explain the former statement of R. Jacob to refer only to <i>Mu'ad</i>? Why did he not explain it to refer to <i>Tam</i> also?] — [In answer] he<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., Rabina. ');"><sup>6</sup></span>
א"ר פפא לא דכ"ע כופרא כפרה הוא והכא בהא קמיפלגי רבנן סברי בדניזק שיימינן ורבי ישמעאל בנו של רבי יוחנן בן ברוקה סבר בדמזיק שיימינן
one statement express two principles [in which R. Jacob is in agreement with R. Judah].<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' [By explaining R. Jacob's earlier statement as referring to Mu'ad, he informs us that he shares the views of R. Judah both in regard to the question of precaution and that of the part due from Tam in case of a Mu'ad ox, whilst incidentally we also learn that guardians are appointed in case of Tam etc.] ');"><sup>8</sup></span>
מ"ט דרבנן נאמרה שיתה למטה ונאמרה שיתה למעלה מה להלן בדניזק אף כאן בדניזק
Rabina stated that [the question whether or not a change of] control should cause a change [in the state of the ox] might have been the point at issue between them,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Between R. Jacob and R. Judah in the second cited Baraitha. ');"><sup>9</sup></span>
ור' ישמעאל בנו של רבי יוחנן בן ברוקה סבר ונתן פדיון נפשו כתיב
e.g., where after the ox had been declared <i>Mu'ad</i>, the deaf-mute recovered his faculty, or the idiot became sane, or the minor came of age, [in which case] R. Judah would maintain that the ox should remain in its status quo whereas R. Jacob would hold that [a change of] control should cause a change [in the state of the ox].
ורבנן אין פדיון נפשו כתיב מיהו כי שיימינן בדניזק שיימינן
Our Rabbis taught: In the case of guardians, the payment [for damages] will be out of the best of the general estate, though no <i>kofer</i><span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lit., 'atonement', or 'a sum of money', i.e., compensation paid for manslaughter committed by a beast in lieu of the life of the owner of the beast, as appears from Ex. XXI, 29-30; v. Glos. ');"><sup>10</sup></span>
משבח ליה רבא לר"נ בדרב אחא בר יעקב דאדם גדול הוא א"ל לכשיבא לידך הביאהו לידי
will be paid by them. Who is the Tanna who holds that [the payment of] <i>kofer</i> is but an act of atonement<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' And not an ordinary civil obligation like damages. ');"><sup>11</sup></span>
כי אתא לגביה א"ל בעי מינאי מילתא בעא מיניה שור של שני שותפין כיצד משלמין כופר
[which would justify the exemption in this case], as [minor] orphans are not subject to the law of atonement? — R. Hisda said: It is R. Ishmael the son of R. Johanan b. Beroka. For it was taught: [The words,] Then he shall give for the ransom of his life<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Ex. XXI, 30 ');"><sup>12</sup></span>
משלם האי כופר והאי כופר כופר אחד אמר רחמנא ולא שני כופרין האי חצי כופר והאי חצי כופר כופר שלם אמר רחמנא ולא חצי כופר
[indicate] the value [of the life] of the person killed. But R. Ishmael the son of R. Johanan b. Beroka interprets it to refer to the value [of the life] of the defendant. Now, is this not the point at issue between them,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., between R. Ishmael and the other Rabbis his opponents. ');"><sup>13</sup></span>
אדיתיב וקא מעיין בה א"ל תנן חייבי ערכין ממשכנין אותן חייבי חטאות ואשמות אין ממשכנין אותן חייבי כופרין מאי
that the Rabbis consider <i>kofer</i> to constitute a civil liability<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The payment must therefore correspond to the value of the loss sustained through the death of the person killed. ');"><sup>14</sup></span>
כיון דכפרה הוא כחטאת ואשם דמי מחמר חמיר עילויה ולא בעי משכוניה או דלמא כיון דלחבריה הוא דבעי מיתבא ליה ממונא הוא ולא לגבוה הוא ולא חמיר עליה ובעי משכוניה
whereas R. Ishmael the son of R. Johanan b. Beroka holds <i>kofer</i> to be of the nature of propitiation?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For since it was the life of the owner of the beast that should be redeemed the payment must surely correspond to the value of his life. ');"><sup>15</sup></span>
אי נמי כיון דהוא לא חטא וממוניה הוא דאזיק לא חמיר מילתא עילויה ובעי משכוניה
— R. Papa said that this was not the case. For we may suppose all to agree that <i>kofer</i> is a kind of propitiation, and the point at issue between them here is merely that the Rabbis hold that this propitiatory payment should be fixed by estimating the value [of the life] of the person killed, whereas R. Ishmael the son of R. Johanan b. Beroka maintains that it should be fixed by estimating the value of [the life of] the defendant. What reason have the Rabbis for their view? — The expression 'laying upon' is used in the later context<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Ex. XXI, 30. ');"><sup>16</sup></span>
ת"ר שאלו בחזקת תם ונמצא מועד בעלים משלמין חצי נזק ושואל משלם חצי נזק
just as there it refers to the plaintiff, so does it here also refer to the plaintiff. But R. Ishmael the son of R. Johanan b. Beroka argued that it is written, 'Then he shall give for the ransom of his life' [referring of course to the defendant]. And the Rabbis? — [They reply,] Yes, it does say 'The ransom of his life', but the amount must be fixed by valuing [the life of] the person killed.
אמר מר שאלו בחזקת תם ונמצא מועד בעלים משלמין חצי נזק ושואל חצי נזק ואמאי לימא ליה תורא שאילי אריא לא שאילי
therefore said to him: 'When you come across him, bring him to me.' When he<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' R. Aha b. Jacob. ');"><sup>19</sup></span>
משום דא"ל סוף סוף אי תם הוה פלגא נזקא בעית שלומי השתא נמי זיל שלים פלגא נזקא
asked him: 'If an ox of two partners [kill a person] how is the payment of <i>kofer</i> to be made? Shall this one pay <i>kofer</i> and the other one <i>kofer</i>? But one <i>kofer</i> is mentioned by Divine Law and not two kofers! Shall this one [pay] half of the <i>kofer</i> and the other one half of the <i>kofer</i>? A full <i>kofer</i> is commanded by Divine Law and not half of a <i>kofer</i>!' While he<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. p. 225, n. 6. ');"><sup>20</sup></span>
ונימא ליה
'In the case of debtors for valuations<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e. vows of value dealt with in Lev. XXVII, 2-8. ');"><sup>23</sup></span> the Sanctuary treasury may demand a pledge, whereas in the case of those who are liable to sin-offerings or for trespass-offerings<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Which are intended to procure atonement and which will consequently not be put off. ');"><sup>24</sup></span> no pledge can be enforced.' Now, what would be the law in the case of those liable to <i>kofer</i>? [Shall it be said that] since <i>kofer</i> is a kind of propitiation it should be subject to the same ruling as sin-offerings and trespass-offerings,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Which are intended to procure atonement and which will consequently not be put off. ');"><sup>24</sup></span> the matter being of serious moment to the defendant so that there is no necessity of enforcing a pledge from him; or [shall it] perhaps [be argued that] since it has to be given to a fellow man it is [considered] a civil liability, and as it does not go to the Temple treasury,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' [Lit., 'To the (Most) High.' Read with MS.M. 'Since it has to be given to a fellow man and not to the Treasury, it is a civil liability.'] ');"><sup>25</sup></span> it is consequently not taken too seriously by the defendant, for which [reason there may appear to be some] necessity for requiring a pledge? Or, again, since the defendant did not [in this case] himself commit the wrong, for it was his chattel that did the wrong [and committed manslaughter], the whole matter might be considered by him as of no serious moment, and a pledge should therefore be enforced? — He<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' R. Nahman. ');"><sup>26</sup></span> said to him: 'Leave me alone; I am still held prisoner by your first problem [that has not yet been answered by me].' Our Rabbis taught: If a man borrowed an ox on the assumption that it is in the state of <i>Tam</i> but is subsequently discovered to have already been declared <i>Mu'ad</i>, [if goring is repeated while still with the borrower] the owner will pay one half of the damages and the borrower will pay [the other] half of the damages. But if it was declared <i>Mu'ad</i> while in the possession of the borrower, and [after it] was returned to the owner [it gored again], the owner will pay half the damages while the borrower is exempt from any liability whatsoever. The Master stated: 'If a man borrowed an ox on the assumption that it is in the state of <i>Tam</i> but was subsequently discovered to have already been declared <i>Mu'ad</i>, [if goring is repeated] the owner will pay one half of the damages and the borrower will pay [the other] half of the damages.' But why should the borrower not plead against the owner, 'I wanted to borrow an ox, I did not want to borrow a lion?' — Rab said: we are dealing here with a case where the borrower knew the ox to be a gorer.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Though he did not know that the ox had been declared Mu'ad. ');"><sup>27</sup></span> Still why can he not plead against him: 'I wanted to borrow an ox in the state of <i>Tam</i> but I did not want to borrow an ox that had already been declared Mu'ad'? — [This could not be pleaded] because the owner might argue against him: 'In any case, even had the ox been still <i>Tam</i>, would you not have to pay half-damages? Now, also, you have to pay one half of the damages.' But still why can he not plead against him: 'Had the ox been <i>Tam</i>, damages would have been paid out of its body'?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' And not from my own estate. ');"><sup>28</sup></span> — [This could similarly not be pleaded] because the owner might contend: 'In any case would you not have had to reimburse me [to the full extent of] the value of the ox?'<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' In payment of the ox you borrowed from me. ');"><sup>29</sup></span> Why can he still not plead against him: