Bava Kamma 88

ואכתי צרורות נינהו אמר רב מרי בריה דרב כהנא דקאזיל מיניה מיניה

But granted all this, is this manner of damage<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Being done not by the body of the ox but by something set in motion by it. ');">¹</span>

תניא כוותיה דשמואל ותיובתא דרב יש חייב במיתה ובכופר ויש חייב בכופר ופטור ממיתה ויש חייב במיתה ופטור מן הכופר ויש פטור מזה ומזה

not on a par with that done by Pebbles<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Dealt with supra p. 79. ');">²</span>

הא כיצד מועד בכוונה חייב במיתה ובכופר מועד שלא בכוונה חייב בכופר ופטור ממיתה תם בכוונה חייב במיתה ופטור מכופר תם שלא בכוונה פטור מזה ומזה

[where there would be no liability for <i>kofer</i>]?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' [Kofer is imposed only where death was caused by the body of the ox even as is the case with 'goring'.] ');">³</span>

והנזקין שלא בכוונה ר' יהודה מחייב ור' שמעון פוטר

— R. Mari the son of R. Kahana thereupon said: [We speak of] a wall gradually brought down by the constant pushing of the ox.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' And was thus the whole time as it were a part of the body of the ox. ');">⁴</span>

מאי טעמא דרבי יהודה יליף מכופרו מה כופרו שלא בכוונה חייב אף הנזקין נמי שלא בכוונה חייב

It has been taught in accordance with Samuel and in refutation of Rab: There are cases where the liability is both for [stoning to] death and <i>kofer</i>: there are other cases, where there is liability for <i>kofer</i> but exemption from [stoning to] death; there are again [other] cases where there is liability [for stoning to] death but exemption from <i>kofer</i>; and there are still other cases where there is exemption both from [stoning to] death and from <i>kofer</i>. How so? In the case of <i>Mu'ad</i> [killing a person] intentionally, there is liability both for [stoning to] death and for <i>kofer</i>.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Ex. XXI, 29-30. ');">⁵</span>

ורבי שמעון יליף מקטליה דשור מה קטליה שלא בכוונה פטור אף נזקין שלא בכוונה פטור

In the case of <i>Mu'ad</i> [killing a person] unintentionally there is liability for <i>kofer</i> but exemption from [stoning to] death. In the case of <i>Tam</i> [killing a person] intentionally there is liability [for stoning to] death but exemption from <i>kofer</i>. In the case of <i>Tam</i> [killing a person] unintentionally, there is exemption from both penalties. Whereas in case of injury [caused by the ox] unintentionally, R. Judah says there is liability to pay [damages], but R. Simeon says there is no liability to pay.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Cf. Tosef. B.K. IV. ');">⁶</span>

ור' יהודה נמי נילף מקטליה דנין תשלומין מתשלומין ואין דנין תשלומין ממיתה

What is the reason of R. Judah? — He derives [the law of damages from] that of <i>kofer</i>: just as for <i>kofer</i> there is liability even where there was no intention [to kill], so also for damages for injuries there is liability even where there was no intention [to injure]. R. Simeon, on the other hand, derived [the law of damages] from that of the killing of the ox: just as the stoning of the ox is not required where there was no intention [to kill], so also damages are not required where there was no intention [to injure]. But why should R. Judah also not derive [the ruling in this case] from [the law applying to the] killing [of the ox]? It is proper to derive [a ruling regarding] payment from [another ruling regarding] payment, but it is not proper to derive [a ruling regarding] payment from [a ruling regarding] killing. Why then should R. Simeon also not derive [the ruling in this case] from [the law applying to] <i>kofer</i>? — It is proper to derive a liability regarding the ox<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e. a liability to make good the damage done by the ox. ');">⁷</span>

ור' שמעון נמי נילף מכופרו דנין חיוביה דשור מחיוביה דשור לאפוקי כופר דחיוביה דבעלים הוא

from another liability that similarly concerns the ox,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Such as the death of the ox for the manslaughter it committed. ');">⁸</span>

נתכוין להרוג את הבהמה והרג את האדם [וכו'] פטור הא נתכוין להרוג את זה והרג את זה חייב מתניתין דלא כר' שמעון דתניא ר' שמעון אומר אפילו נתכוין להרוג את זה והרג את זה פטור

thus excluding <i>kofer</i> which is a liability that concerns only the owner.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' As kofer is the ransom of his life. ');">⁹</span>

מ"ט דרבי שמעון דאמר קרא (שמות כא, כט) השור יסקל וגם בעליו יומת כמיתת בעלים כך מיתת השור מה בעלים עד דמיכוין ליה אף שור נמי עד דמיכוין ליה

OR IF THE OX WHILE TRYING TO KILL A BEAST [BY ACCIDENT] KILLED A HUMAN BEING&nbsp;… THERE IS NO LIABILITY. Where, however, the ox had aimed at killing one human being and [by accident] killed another human being, there would be liability. [This implication of] the Mishnah is not in accordance with R. Simeon. For it has been taught: R. Simeon says: Even where [the ox] aimed at killing one person and [by accident] killed another person there would be no liability. What was the reason of R. Simeon? — Scripture states: The ox shall be stoned and its owner also shall be put to death,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Ex. XXI, 29. ');">¹⁰</span>

ובעלים גופייהו מנלן דאמר קרא (דברים יט, יא) וארב לו וקם עליו עד שיתכוין לו

[implying that only] in those cases in which the owner would be subject to be put to death [were he to have committed murder], the ox also would be subject to be put to death. Just as therefore in the case of the owner the liability arises only where he was aiming at the particular person [who was actually killed], so also in the case of the ox the liability will arise only where it was aiming at the particular person [who was actually killed]. But whence do we know that this is so even in the case of the owner himself?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Committing murder. ');">¹¹</span>

ורבנן האי וארב לו מאי עבדי ליה אמרי דבי רבי ינאי פרט לזורק אבן לגו

— Scripture States: And lie in wait for him and rise up against him<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Deut. XIX, II. ');">¹²</span>

היכי דמי אילימא דאיכא תשעה כנענים ואחד ישראל ביניהם תיפוק ליה דרובא כנענים נינהו אי נמי פלגא ופלגא ספק נפשות להקל

[which indicates that he is not liable] unless he bad been aiming at the particular person [whom he killed]. What then do the Rabbis<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Who differ from R. Simeon on this point. v. Sanh. 79a. ');">¹³</span>

לא צריכא דאיכא תשעה ישראלים ואחד כנעני דאע"ג דרובא ישראלים נינהו כיון דאיכא חדא כנעני בינייהו הוי ליה קבוע וכל קבוע כמחצה על מחצה דמי וספק נפשות להקל

make of [the words,] 'And lie in wait'? — It was said at the School of R. Jannai: They except [on the strength of them a manslaughter committed by] a stone being thrown into a crowd.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' And a person was killed. ');">¹⁴</span>

<big><strong>מתני׳</strong></big> שור האשה ושור היתומים שור האפוטרופוס שור המדבר שור ההקדש שור הגר שמת ואין לו יורשין הרי אלו חייבין מיתה ר' יהודה אומר שור המדבר שור ההקדש שור הגר שמת פטורין מן המיתה לפי שאין להם בעלים

How is this to be understood? If you say that there were [in the crowd] nine heathens and one Israelite, why not except the case on the ground that the majority [in the crowd] were persons who were heathens?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For in matters of judgment the principle of 'majority' is as a rule the deciding factor. [That does not mean to imply that the killing of a heathen was no murder. The Mekilta in Ex. XXI, 12 states explicitly that the crime is equally condemnable irrespective of the religion and nationality of the victim. But what it does mean is that the Biblical legislation in regard to crime did not apply to heathens. As foreigners they fully enjoyed their own autonomous right of self-help, i.e., blood feuds or ransom, prohibited by the Law to the Jews, and accordingly were not governed by the provisions made in the Bible relating to murder, v. Guttmann, loc. cit. p. 16 ff and supra p. 211, n. 6.] ');">¹⁵</span>

<big><strong>גמ׳</strong></big> ת"ר שור שור שבעה להביא שור האשה שור היתומים שור האפוטרופוס שור המדבר שור ההקדש שור הגר שמת ואין לו יורשין ר' יהודה אומר שור המדבר שור ההקדש שור הגר שמת ואין לו יורשין פטורין מן המיתה לפי שאין להם בעלים

And even where they were half and half, does not an accused in a criminal charge have the benefit of the doubt? — The case is one where there were nine Israelites and one heathen. For though in this case the majority [in the crowd] consisted of Israelites, still since there was among them one heathen he was an essential part [of the group], and essential part<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lit., 'fixed'. For a full discussion of this passage, v. Sanh. (Sonc. ed.) p. 531 and notes a.l. ');">¹⁶</span>

אמר רב הונא פוטר היה רבי יהודה אפילו נגח ולבסוף הקדיש נגח ולבסוף הפקיר

is reckoned as equivalent to half, and where there is a doubt in a criminal charge the accused has the benefit.

ממאי מדקתני תרתי שור המדבר ושור הגר שמת ואין לו יורשין שור הגר שמת מאי ניהו דכיון דאין לו יורשין הוה ליה שור הפקר היינו שור המדבר היינו שור הגר שמת ואין לו יורשין אלא לאו הא קמשמע לן דאפילו נגח ולבסוף הקדיש נגח ולבסוף הפקיר שמע מינה

<b><i>MISHNAH</i></b>. WHERE AN OX OF A WOMAN, OR AN OX OF [MINOR] ORPHANS, OR AN OX OF A GUARDIAN, OR AN OX OF THE WILDERNESS, OR AN OX OF THE SANCTUARY, OR AN OX OF A PROSELYTE WHO DIED WITHOUT [LEGAL] HEIRS,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The ox thus becoming ownerless. ');">¹⁷</span>

תניא נמי הכי יתר על כן אמר ר' יהודה אפילו נגח ולבסוף הקדיש נגח ולבסוף הפקיר פטור שנאמר (שמות כא, כט) והועד בבעליו והמית וגו' עד שתהא מיתה והעמדה בדין שוין כאחד

[HAS KILLED A PERSON], IT IS LIABLE TO [BE STONED TO] DEATH. R. JUDAH SAYS: IN THE CASE OF AN OX OF THE WILDERNESS, AN OX OF THE SANCTUARY AND AN OX OF A PROSELYTE WHO DIED [WITHOUT HEIRS] THERE WOULD BE EXEMPTION FROM [STONING TO] DEATH SINCE THESE HAVE NO [PRIVATE] OWNERS.

וגמר דין לא בעינן והא השור יסקל גמר דין הוא אלא אימא עד שתהא מיתה והעמדה בדין וגמר דין שוין כאחד:

<b><i>GEMARA</i></b>. Our Rabbis taught: [The word] ox occurs seven times [in the section dealing with Cattle killing man]<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Ex. XXI, 28-32. ');">¹⁸</span>

<big><strong>מתני׳</strong></big> שור שהוא יוצא ליסקל והקדישו בעליו אינו מוקדש שחטו בשרו אסור ואם עד שלא נגמר דינו הקדישו בעליו מוקדש ואם שחטו בשרו מותר

to include the ox of a woman, the ox of [minor] orphans, the ox of a guardian, the ox of the wilderness, the ox of the Sanctuary and the ox of a proselyte who died without [legal] heirs. R. Judah, however, says: An ox of the wilderness, an ox of the Sanctuary and an ox of a proselyte who died without heirs are exempt from [stoning to] death since these have no [private] owners.

מסרו לשומר חנם ולשואל לנושא שכר ולשוכר נכנסו תחת הבעלים מועד משלם נזק שלם ותם משלם חצי נזק:

R. Huna said: The exemption laid down By R. Judah extends even to the case where the ox gored and was only subsequently consecrated to the Temple, or where the ox gored and was only subsequently abandoned. Whence do we know this? — From the fact that R. Judah specified both an ox of the wilderness and an ox of a proselyte who died without heirs. Now what actually is 'an ox of a proselyte who died'? Surely since he left no heirs the ox remained ownerless, and this [category] would include equally an ox of the wilderness and an ox of the proselyte who died without heirs? We must suppose then that what he intended to tell us [in mentioning both] was that even where the ox gored but was subsequently consecrated, or where the ox gored but was subsequently abandoned, [the exemption would still apply] and this may be taken as proved. It has also been taught to the same effect:<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Supra p. 55. ');">¹⁹</span>

<big><strong>גמ׳</strong></big> תנו רבנן שור שהמית עד שלא נגמר דינו מכרו

R. Judah went even further, saying: Even if after having gored, the ox was consecrated or after having gored it became ownerless, there is exemption, as it has been said, <i>And it hath been testified to his owner and he hath not kept him in, but that he hath killed a man or a woman, the ox shall be stoned</i>.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Ex. XXI, 29. ');">²⁰</span> This applies only when no change of status has taken place between the manslaughter and the appearance before the Court.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Supra p. 56. ');">²¹</span> Does not the final verdict also need to comply with this same condition? Does not the same text, The ox shall be stoned,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Ex. XXI, 29. ');">²²</span> [apply also to] the final verdict? — Read therefore: That is so only when no change in status has taken place between the manslaughter, the appearance before the Court, and the final verdict. <b><i>MISHNAH</i></b>. IF WHILE AN OX [SENTENCED TO DEATH] IS BEING TAKEN OUT TO BE STONED ITS OWNER DECLARES IT SACRED, IT DOES NOT BECOME SACRED;<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Cf. supra p. 234. ');">²³</span> IF HE SLAUGHTERS IT, ITS FLESH IS FORBIDDEN [FOR ANY USE].<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Cf. supra p. 234. ');">²³</span> IF, HOWEVER. BEFORE THE SENTENCE HAS BEEN PRONOUNCED THE OWNER CONSECRATES IT, IT IS CONSECRATED, AND IF HE SLAUGHTERS IT, ITS FLESH IS PERMITTED [FOR FOOD]. IF THE OWNER HANDS OVER HIS CATTLE TO AN UNPAID BAILEE OR TO A BORROWER, TO A PAID BAILEE OR TO A HIRER, THEY ENTER INTO ALL LIABILITIES IN LIEU OF THE OWNER: IN THE CASE OF <i>MU'AD</i> THE PAYMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE IN FULL, WHEREAS IN THE CASE OF <i>TAM</i> HALF DAMAGES WOULD BE PAID. <b><i>GEMARA</i></b>. Our Rabbis taught: If an ox has killed [a person], and before its judgment is pronounced its owner sells it,