Bava Metzia 22

and the place [where it lies] is leased to him [by me].<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' This enabled Joshua to acquire the tithe without actually taking possession of it, as movable property may be acquired either by pulling it or having it placed within one's premises (v. supra 9b). According to Ma'as. Sh. V, 9 the leasing of the premises was confirmed by the immediate payment of a nominal rental by Joshua to R. Gamaliel. ');">¹</span> And the other tithe<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The tithe which had to be given to the poor in the third and sixth year after the Sabbatical year. ');">²</span>

which I shall measure off is given [by me] to Akiba b. Joseph<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Who held the office of almoner. ');">³</span> that he may acquire possession of it for the poor, and the place [where it lies] is leased to him [by me].<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Ma'as. Sh. V, 9. ');">⁴</span>

Now, were R. Joshua and R. Akiba standing by the side of the field of Rabban Gamaliel [when the latter made that declaration]?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' It is obvious that in this case the condition laid down by 'Ulla and the other Rabbis could not have been fulfilled. The conclusion must therefore be drawn that a person's premises may acquire for him the objects placed therein even if he is not standing by the side of the premises. ');">⁵</span> — He ['Ulla] then said to him [R. Abba]: This student seems to imagine that people do not study the law.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' B.B. 84b. ');">⁶</span>

When he [R. Abba] came to Sura<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Cf. supra 6b. ');">⁷</span> he related to those [at the College]: This is what 'Ulla said, and this is the objection that I placed before him. One of the Rabbis then answered him: Rabban Gamaliel made them acquire the movable property through the immovable property.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The leasing of the ground on which the tithes were lying enabled Joshua and Akiba to acquire the tithes, not because the ground acted for them as their 'hand' or 'agent', but because of the principle that 'movable property, which cannot be pledged as security to a lender, may be acquired together with immovable property, which can be pledged as security to a lender,' by means of the payment of the purchase price of the immovable property (v. Kid 26a). Rabban Gamaliel could therefore have leased to Joshua and Akiba any other piece of ground, with the same effect so far as the acquisition of the tithes is concerned. Even movable property which is received as a gift can be acquired in the same way. (Cf. loc. cit.) ');">⁸</span>

R. Zera accepted it. R. Abba did not accept it. Said Raba: He [R. Abba] did right in not accepting it: for had they not a 'cloth' by which to acquire from him [the tithes] as 'exchange'?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Heb. [H] halipin; cf. Ruth. IV, 7. What need was there then for Joshua and Akiba to pay R. Gamaliel for the lease of the ground? Cf. supra p. 30. n. 3. ');">⁹</span> [It must] therefore [be said that] the enjoyment of the right [to give the tithes to whom one likes]<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The tithe offered by R. Gamaliel to Joshua and Akiba was not really the former's property as it belonged by law to the Levite poor. R. Gamaliel's right was limited to the choice of the person to whom the tithe was to be handed over. This right has no money value in the sense indicated to enable the recipient of the tithe to acquire it in association with a transaction of 'exchange'. ');">¹⁰</span>

is not [regarded as something that has a] money [value] by which one could acquire [goods] as 'exchange'. In the same way [it must be said that] the enjoyment of this right is not [regarded as something that has a] money [value] for the purpose of being acquired through immovable property.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' In the same way, and for the same reason, the tithe could not be acquired by means of the payment of the purchase price for immovable property. But it could be acquired in the way in which an ownerless object is acquired by one in whose premises it is placed, and for this reason the method employed by R. Gamaliel, as originally interpreted (by leasing his ground on which the tithe was lying), was correct. ');">¹¹</span> But this is not so: In regard to the priestly perquisites<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Including the portions due to the Levites and to the poor. ');">¹²</span>

[the term] 'giving' is used in Scripture:<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Deut. XXVI, 12. ');">¹³</span> 'Exchange' is a commercial transaction; [whereas the acquisition of] movable property through immovable property is [a transaction to which] 'giving' [may be] legitimately [applied].<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' 'Giving' precludes selling, and 'exchange' is a method of sale. But the acquisition of movable property, even when it is received as a gift in association with immovable property is legally valid, and it is not regarded as a sale. This method may therefore be employed in reference to tithes. ');">¹⁴</span>

R. Papa says:<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' R. Papa upholds the original version regarding R. Gamaliel's method of distributing the tithes by means of his 'ground'. ');">¹⁵</span> [In a case where there is] a person bestowing [upon the recipient] the right [to the property] it is different.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Literally: 'Where another mind causes one to acquire them,' i.e., where the recipient does not acquire (ownerless) goods by his own action, but has them conferred upon him by the owner, as in the case of R. Gamaliel. In such a case there is no need for the recipient to 'be standing by the side of the field,' as laid down by 'Ulla and others in regard to the case in our Mishnah. ');">¹⁶</span>

And whence do you derive this? From what we have learned [in our Mishnah]: 'IF A MAN SEES PEOPLE RUNNING AFTER A LOST OBJECT' etc. And [in regard to this] R. Jeremiah said in the name of R. Johanan: 'This is, provided that [if] he runs after them and can overtake them.'<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The injured animal and immature birds are assumed to be able to move along slowly through the field, where they can be overtaken by the owner. ');">¹⁷</span> R. Jeremiah then asked: What is the law regarding a gift?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' If someone's animals or birds have landed in a strange field and their owner gives them to the owner of the field as a present, Must the owner be able to overtake them in order to be able to acquire them, or not? ');">¹⁸</span>

R. Abba b. Kahana approved [of the distinction implied in] this question, [and he answered: If the objects are given to the owner of the field, they become his] even if he runs after them, and cannot overtake them. For what reason? Is it not because [where there is] a person bestowing [upon the recipient] the right [to the property] it is different! Said R. Shimi to R. Papa: Behold there is [the case of] a bill of divorcement [thrown by the husband into the wife's house or court-yard],<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. Git. 77b; and supra 10b. ');">¹⁹</span>

where there is a person bestowing upon the recipient the right to its possession<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' It is the husband's intention that the wife should take possession of the document, so that she may be divorced by it. ');">²⁰</span> — and yet 'Ulla said: 'That is, provided that she is present in the vicinity of her house or her court-yard'! — [The case of] a bill of divorcement is different, as it may be given even against her will. But can it not be concluded [the other way] by means of a Kal wa-homer: If [in the case of] a bill of divorcement, which may be given against [the wife's] will, it is valid if she is standing by the side of her house or her court-yard, but not otherwise, how much more should this be so in the case of a gift, for which [the recipient's] consent [is necessary]? — Therefore R. Ashi said:<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' R. Ashi acknowledges the validity of the arguments advanced by R. Shimi and R. Shesheth, and he gives a new reason for the distinction between a bill of divorcement and a gift. In both cases the ground on which the object is placed acts as the recipient's agent, whether the recipient is present or not. Where the recipient has no knowledge of the action, the agency is valid only if the action yields an advantage or benefit to the recipient. Where the action results in a disadvantage (loss or injury) to the recipient, it has no validity. Therefore, in the case of a gift, the recipient's ground acquires it for him, whether he is aware of it or not. But in the case of the bill of divorcement thrown into the wife's house or court-yard (against her will) the agency of the premises is not effective because the result would be a disadvantage to her, and in such a case the premises could only act for her if she is present and aware of what is happening, for then the premises would be regarded as 'her hand' (cf. supra 10b) and not merely as her agent. Therefore the divorce is not valid unless the woman was beside her premises when the bill was thrown. ');">²¹</span>