Bava Metzia 5
ואיכא למימר כולה למר ואיכא למימר כולה למר אמר סומכוס ממון המוטל בספק חולקין בלא שבועה הכא דליכא דררא דממונא דאיכא למימר דתרוייהו היא לא כ"ש
and where it could be maintained that the whole amount is due solely to that party Symmachus abides by the principle that 'Disputed money of doubtful ownership should be divided without an oath', how much more readily would he abide by that principle in a case where [as in our Mishnah] it can be said that the disputed object belongs to both [and that therefore it should be divided between them without an oath]? It can still be maintained that our Mishnah is in agreement with Symmachus. For the oath imposed upon disputants in our Mishnah is only rabbinical [not Biblical].<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Cf. Shebu. 41a. ');"><sup>1</sup></span>
אפילו תימא סומכוס שבועה זו מדרבנן היא כדרבי יוחנן דאמר ר' יוחנן שבועה זו תקנת חכמים היא שלא יהא כל אחד ואחד הולך ותוקף בטליתו של חבירו ואומר שלי הוא
This is expressly maintained by R. Johanan. For R. Johanan says: This oath is an institution of the Sages, intended to prevent anyone from going out and seizing a neighbour's garment, declaring it to be his own.
לימא מתניתין דלא כרבי יוסי דאי כרבי יוסי הא אמר א"כ מה הפסיד רמאי אלא הכל יהא מונח עד שיבא אליהו
Shall it be assumed that our Mishnah is not in agreement with R. Jose? For does not R. Jose say:<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' In the case where two persons have deposited money with a third person, one a hundred and the other two hundred zuz, and each depositor claims to have deposited the larger amount, v. 37a. ');"><sup>2</sup></span>
אלא מאי רבנן כיון דאמרי רבנן השאר יהא מונח עד שיבא אליהו הא נמי כשאר דמי דספיקא היא
If so, what loss does the fraudulent claimant incur? Therefore let the whole amount be retained [by the Court] until 'the coming of Elijah'?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Elijah the prophet, the herald of the Messianic era who is to make the truth known. The phrase is a technical term meaning 'indefinitely'. ');"><sup>3</sup></span>
האי מאי אי אמרת בשלמא רבנן התם דודאי האי מנה דחד מינייהו הוא אמרי רבנן יהא מונח עד שיבא אליהו הכא דאיכא למימר דתרוייהו הוא אמרי רבנן פלגי בשבועה
But [as a counter-question] would not the same difficulty arise in regard to the Rabbis [who are opposed to R. Jose]? For seeing that these Rabbis maintain that the balance<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The disputed hundred. ');"><sup>4</sup></span>
אלא אי אמרת ר' יוסי היא השתא ומה התם דבודאי איכא מנה למר ואיכא מנה למר אמר ר' יוסי יהא מונח עד שיבא אליהו הכא דאיכא למימר דחד מינייהו הוא לא כ"ש
should be retained [by the Court] until 'the coming of Elijah'. would they not accordingly give the same decision concerning the disputed garment [in our case], which is like the disputed balance [in the other case]? — What a comparison! In the other case, where it is certain that the disputed balance belongs to one of the claimants only, those Rabbis rightly decided that the amount in question should be retained till 'the coming of Elijah'; whereas here [in our Mishnah], where it can be assumed that the garment belongs to both,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' As they may have picked it up simultaneously. ');"><sup>5</sup></span>
אפי' תימא ר' יוסי התם ודאי איכא רמאי הכא מי יימר דאיכא רמאי אימא תרוייהו בהדי הדדי אגבהוה
the [same] Rabbis would agree that it should be divided among the two claimants when they have taken the oath. But in regard to R. Jose the argument is the other way. If R. Jose decided in his case, where each claimant is undoubtedly entitled to one hundred [<i>zuz</i>],<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. n. 1 supra. ');"><sup>6</sup></span>
אי נמי התם קניס ליה רבי יוסי לרמאי כי היכי דלודי הכא מאי פסידא אית ליה דלודי
that the money should be retained till 'the coming of Elijah', how much more readily would he decide so in our case [where it can be assumed that only one of the disputants is entitled to have the garment]? — The Mishnah can still be in agreement with R. Jose. For in his case one of the disputants is bound to be a fraud,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' As they both claim to have deposited the 200 zuz, and it is only right to make the fraudulent person suffer. ');"><sup>7</sup></span>
תינח מציאה מקח וממכר מאי איכא למימר אלא מחוורתא כדשנין מעיקרא
whilst in our case no one can say for sure that one of the disputants is a fraud,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Therefore R. Jose would agree that the garment should be divided in accordance with the decision of the Mishnah. ');"><sup>8</sup></span>
בין לרבנן ובין לר' יוסי התם גבי חנוני על פנקסו דקתני זה נשבע ונוטל וזה נשבע ונוטל
as it is possible that both picked up the garment simultaneously. If you wish it, I could argue thus: In his case, R. Jose penalised the fraudulent claimant [in making him forfeit his hundred] so that he may confess the truth, but in our case [where the dispute is about a found article] what real loss would the fraudulent incur [on the garment being forfeited] that could induce him to confess the truth?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' And since the forfeiture of the garment would serve no purpose, R. Jose would agree with our Mishnah. ');"><sup>9</sup></span>
מ"ש דלא אמרינן נפקיה לממונא מבעה"ב ויהא מונח עד שיבא אליהו דהא בודאי איכא רמאי
[But the question arises:] Assuming this argument is right with regard to a found article, how can it apply to a bought article?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Where even the person that has no right to the garment would incur a real loss by its forfeiture (because, as explained above, he too had paid for it) and the fear of the loss would induce him to admit the truth (that the seller had taken the money from him unwillingly). ');"><sup>10</sup></span>
אמרי התם היינו טעמא דאמר ליה חנוני לבעה"ב אנא שליחותא דידך קא עבדינא מאי אית לי גבי שכיר אע"ג דקא משתבע לי לא מהימן לי בשבועה את האמנתיה דלא אמרת לי בסהדי הב ליה
The first answer is hence the best.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Viz., that in the other case one claimant is certainly fraudulent, while in our case both may be honest. ');"><sup>11</sup></span>
ושכיר נמי א"ל לבעה"ב אנא עבדי עבידתא גבך מאי אית לי גבי חנוני אע"ג דמשתבע לי לא מהימן לי הלכך תרוייהו משתבעי ושקלי מבעל הבית:
[Now the question arises:] According to the views of either the Sages or R. Jose [who agree that the fraudulent person should not be allowed to benefit by his fraud] how is it that in the case of the shopkeeper and his credit-book<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. p. 4, n. 1. ');"><sup>12</sup></span>
תני רבי חייא מנה לי בידך והלה אומר אין לך בידי כלום והעדים מעידים אותו שיש לו חמשים זוז נותן לו חמשים זוז וישבע על השאר
the decision is that both take the oath and receive payment [from the householder] and we do not say that the money should be taken from the householder and retained [by the Court] until 'the coming of Elijah', since it is certain that one of the parties<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Either the shopkeeper or the employees. ');"><sup>13</sup></span>
שלא תהא הודאת פיו גדולה מהעדאת עדים מק"ו
is guilty of fraud? — In this case there is a special reason for the decision given. The shopkeeper can say to the householder: 'I carried out your instructions — what have I to do with your employee? Even if the employee swears — I do not believe his oath. You trusted him, in that you did not tell me to give him the goods in the presence of witnesses.' The employee, on the other hand, can say [to the householder]: 'I have done the work for you — what have I to do with the shopkeeper? Even if he swears — I do not believe him.'<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' It would thus be wrong to make either party forfeit the amount claimed. As the shopkeeper and the employees have had no direct dealings with each other, and have entered into no mutual obligations, they may regard each other as entirely untrustworthy and refuse to believe each other even on oath. ');"><sup>14</sup></span>
מאי שלא תהא הודאת פיו גדולה מהעדאת עדי' מק"ו שלא תאמר הודאת פיו הוא דרמיא רחמנא שבועה עליה כדרבה
R. Hiyya taught: [If one says to another,] 'You have in your possession<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., on loan. ');"><sup>15</sup></span>
דאמר רבה מפני מה אמרה תורה מודה מקצת הטענה ישבע חזקה אין אדם מעיז פניו בפני בע"ח והאי בכוליה בעי דנכפריה והא דלא כפריה משום דאין אדם מעיז פניו
a hundred <i>zuz</i> belonging to me', and the other replies, 'I have nothing belonging to you', while witnesses testify that the defendant has fifty <i>zuz</i> belonging to the plaintiff; the defendant pays the plaintiff fifty <i>zuz</i>, and takes an oath regarding the remainder,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' He swears that he does not owe the other fifty zuz. The evidence of the witness places the defendant in the same position as his own admission of part of the claim would have done. Shebu. 39b. ');"><sup>16</sup></span> for the admission of a defendant ought not to be more effective than the evidence of witnesses,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' If therefore the defendant's partial admission necessitates his taking an oath on the rest, the evidence of the witnesses regarding the partial debt should at least have a similar effect. ');"><sup>17</sup></span> a rule which could be proved by a <i>Kal wa-homer</i>.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' v. Glos. ');"><sup>18</sup></span> And our Tanna teaches this: WHEN TWO HOLD A GARMENT AND ONE OF THEM SAYS 'I FOUND IT' ETC. … [BOTH HAVE TO SWEAR]. Now this is just the same [as the case where there are witnesses], for when we see a person holding a garment we presume that it is his, and we are in the position of witnesses who can testify that each claimant is entitled to the half he is holding. And yet each claimant has to swear. Now why is it necessary to prove by means of a <i>Kal wa-homer</i> that the admission of a defendant ought not to be more effective [in imposing an oath on the defendant] than the testimony of witnesses? — [It is necessary for this reason:] In the case of a [partial] admission [of a claim] you might say that the Divine Law<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lit., 'The All- Merciful One', i.e. God, whose word Scripture reveals. ');"><sup>19</sup></span> has imposed an oath upon him for the reason indicated by Rabbah.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' B.K. 107a. ');"><sup>20</sup></span> For Rabbah said: The reason the Torah has declared that he who admits part of his opponent's claim must take an oath<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' While in the case of one who restores a lost article to its owner he is believed without an oath, even if the owner maintains that only part of the loss has been returned to him by the finder. ');"><sup>21</sup></span> is the presumption that nobody would take up such an impertinent attitude towards his creditor [as to give a complete denial to his claim]. The defendant [in this case] would have liked to give a complete denial, but he has not done so because he has not been able to take up such an impertinent attitude.