ו והא מדקתני סיפא רבי נחמיה ורבי אליעזר בן יעקב אומרים לעולם אסורין עד שיחזרו למקומן שוגגין שוגג אין במזיד לא מכלל דת"ק סבר במזיד נמי שרי שמע מינה:
6 forbidden unless they are unintentionally returned to their original place' [from which it follows that only if they' are returned [unintentionally is this law applicable<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lit., 'yes', that they are permitted.');"><sup>12</sup></span> but not [if they are returned] intentionally, it may be concluded that the first Tanna is of the opinion that [the fruits] are permitted even [if they are returned] intentionally.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' To their original place. Had he agreed with R. Nehemiah that intentional carriage renders the fruits forbidden even where they are thereby returned to their original place, and had he differed from him and R. Eliezer b. Jacob on one point only (that of unintentional carriage where the fruits are not in their original place) , there would have been no point in the expression of 'always' in the latter's statement of disagreement. Hence the conclusion that the first Tanna differed from the others on two points, (a) on unintentional carriage even when the fruits are not in their original place and (b) intentional carriage where they are in their original place, his view being that the fruits are permitted even where there is only one point in favour of their permissibility, viz., either (a) unintentional carriage or (b) return to their original place. R. Nehemiah and his colleague who maintain that permissibility is invariably dependent on both (a) and (b) were, therefore, justified, when expressing their disagreement, in emphasizing that the fruits are forbidden always sc. in the absence of either (a) or (b) . The objection against R. Papa whose view it has now been shown coincides with that of the first Tanna, is consequently removed.');"><sup>13</sup></span> This is conclusive.