Gittin 166

Chapter 166

א הרי גרושה אצלו בזנות אלא בחוץ
1 In that case she is for purposes of fornication a divorcee in respect of him?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' As in respect of all other men, and therefore the a fortiori argument adduced above does not apply. ');"><sup>1</sup></span>
ב ור"ע אי חוץ סבירא ליה לותיב חוץ ואי על מנת ס"ל לותיב על מנת
2 — It must be therefore where he says 'except'. Now if R. Akiba [thought that the difference is where he says] 'except', why did he not bring [merely] the objection which applied to that case,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Viz., the first of his objections. ');"><sup>2</sup></span>
ג ר"ע שמיע ליה דאיכא דאמר חוץ ואיכא דאמר על מנת מ"ד חוץ האי פירכא ומ"ד על מנת האי פירכא
3 and if [he thought that it was where he says] 'on condition', why does he not bring [merely] the objection applying to that case?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Viz., the second of his objections. ');"><sup>3</sup></span>
ד ומאי פירכא אי נימא איסור כהונה שאני הא ר"א נמי מאיסור כהונה קא מייתי ליה
4 — R. Akiba had heard one report according to which R. Eliezer said 'except', and another according to which he said 'on condition'. For the version which gave 'except' he had one objection, and for the version which gave 'on condition' he had another objection. And what is the flaw [in the second objection of R. Akiba]? We cannot say it is that the prohibition of her marrying a priest is on a special footing,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' And therefore we cannot argue from the case where the man to whom she is forbidden is a priest to cases in general. ');"><sup>4</sup></span>
ה רבא כרבי ינאי משום זקן אחד קא מתני:
5 because R. Eliezer also bases his ruling<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' In our Mishnah that the Get is valid as it stands. ');"><sup>5</sup></span>
ו אמר להן ר' יהושע אין משיבין את הארי לאחר מיתה למימרא דר' יהושע כוותיה סבירא ליה והא איהו נמי מיפרך קפריך
6 on the priestly prohibition?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. supra, 82b. ');"><sup>6</sup></span>
ז ה"ק להו לדידי נמי אית לי פירכא מיהו בין לדידי בין לדידכו אין משיבין את הארי לאחר מיתה
7 — Raba follows the version which R. Jannai gave in the name of a certain elder.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' That R. Eliezer bases his ruling on the text 'and she marry another man', v. supra. ');"><sup>7</sup></span>
ח ומאי פירכא דר' יהושע דתניא א"ר יהושע מקיש קודמי הויה שניה לקודמי הויה ראשונה מה קודמי הויה ראשונה דלא אגידא באיניש אחרינא אף קודמי הויה שניה דלא אגידא באיניש אחרינא
8 'R. Joshua said to them, You should not seek to confute the lion after he is dead.' This would imply that R. Joshua concurred with him. But how can this be, seeing that he himself also brought an objection against him?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. infra. ');"><sup>8</sup></span>
ט גופא מודה ר"א במגרש אשתו ואמר לה הרי את מותרת לכל אדם חוץ מפלוני והלכה ונישאת לאחד מן השוק ונתארמלה או נתגרשה שמותרת לזה שנאסרה עליו
9 — What he meant was this: I also have objections to bring, but whether for me or for you, it is not fitting to seek to confute the lion after he is dead. What was the objection of R. Joshua? — As it has been taught: R. Joshua said: Scripture compares her status before the second marriage to the one before the first marriage.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Because it is written, When a man taketh a wife (Deut. XXIV, 1), referring to the first marriage, and afterwards, and she be another man's wife (ibid. 2), referring to the second marriage. ');"><sup>9</sup></span>
י השיב ר"ש בר אלעזר תשובה לדברי ר"א היכן מצינו שזה אוסר וזה מתיר
10 Just as before the first marriage she must not be tied to any other man, so before the second marriage she must not be tied to any other man.
יא ולא והרי יבמה דבעל אוסר ויבם מתיר
11 [To revert to] the above text: 'R. Eliezer agreed that if a man divorced his wife saying to her, You are permitted any man except So-and-so, and she went and married some other man and became widowed or divorced, she is then permitted to marry the man to whom she was at first forbidden.' R. Simeon b. Eleazar argued against R. Eliezer's view, saying, Where do we find that what one man renders forbidden can be made permissible by another?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' As here, where the first man makes her forbidden to a certain man, and the second renders her permissible, v. Tosef. Git. VII. ');"><sup>10</sup></span>
יב התם יבם הוא קא אסר לה דאי מבעל הא שריא וקיימא
12 But are there no such cases? Is there not that of the sister-in-law who is rendered forbidden<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' To all other men. ');"><sup>11</sup></span>
יג הרי נדרים דנודר אוסר וחכם מתיר הא א"ר יוחנן אין חכם מתיר כלום אלא בחרטה
13 by the husband and permissible by the brother-in-law?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' By means of halizah (v. Glos.). ');"><sup>12</sup></span>
יד הרי הפרת הבעל דאשה נודרת ובעל מיפר התם כדרב פנחס משמיה דרבא דאמר רב פנחס משמיה דרבא כל הנודרת על דעת בעלה היא נודרת
14 — In that case it is really the brother-in-law who makes her forbidden, since as far as the husband is concerned she is permitted.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' As soon as he is dead. ');"><sup>13</sup></span>
טו נענה רבי אלעזר בן עזריה ואמר כריתות דבר הכורת בינו לבינה הא למדת שאין זה כריתות
15 But what of vows, where the one who makes the vow forbids and the wise man permits?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' By remitting the vow, v. supra 36b. ');"><sup>14</sup></span>
טז ורבנן האי כריתות מאי עבדי ליה מיבעי להו לכדתניא ה"ז גיטך ע"מ שלא תשתי יין ע"מ שלא תלכי לבית אביך לעולם אין זה כריתות שלשים יום ה"ז כריתות
16 — [This is not really so], as R. Johanan has said that the wise man does not release except where there is a change of mind.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' By pointing out the consequences of the vow, so that the one who made it can say, Had I known this I would not have vowed, and the revision renders the vow void retrospectively. ');"><sup>15</sup></span>
יז ואידך מכרת כריתות נפקא ואידך כרת כריתות לא דרשי
17 But there is the husband's power of disallowing, since the wife vows but the husband disallows?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The vow, that is to say, is not rendered void, only the husband disallows her observing it; v. Ned, 68a. ');"><sup>16</sup></span>
יח אמר רבא ה"ז גיטך ע"מ שלא תשתי יין כל ימי חיי אין זה כריתות כל ימי חיי פלוני ה"ז כריתות
18 — The answer to that is provided by what R. Phineas said in the name of Raba; for R. Phineas said in the name of Raba: A woman who makes a vow always does so subject to the consent of her husband.
יט מאי שנא חיי פלוני דדלמא מאית ומקיימא ליה לתנאיה חיי דידיה נמי דלמא מאית ומקיימא ליה לתנאיה
19 'R. Eleazar b. Azariah argued as follows: "Cutting off"17 means something that cuts him off from her. From this we conclude that this is not "cutting off".' What do the [other] Rabbis<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Viz., R. Tarfon, R. Jose the Galilean and R. Akiba. ');"><sup>18</sup></span>
כ אלא אימא כל ימי חייכי אין זה כריתות כל ימי חיי או חיי פלוני ה"ז כריתות:
20 make of this 'cutting off'? — They require it for the ruling contained in the following, as had been taught: '[If a man says], This is your Get on condition that you never drink wine, on condition that you never go to your father's house, this is not "cutting off".<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Because she is tied to him till her death. ');"><sup>19</sup></span>
כא בעא מיניה רבא מרב נחמן היום אי את אשתי ולמחר את אשתי מהו תיבעי לר' אליעזר תיבעי לרבנן
21 [If he says], For thirty days, this is "cutting off".' And the other [R. Eleazar]? — We can learn this, [he says,] from the use of the form kerithuth in place of <i>kareth</i>.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., the use of the double form where the single would have sufficed implies that another lesson may be learnt in addition to this. ');"><sup>20</sup></span>
כב תיבעי לרבי אליעזר עד כאן לא קאמר רבי אליעזר התם אלא דלמאן דקא שרי קא שרי לעולם אבל הכא לא או דלמא לא שנא
22 And the Rabbis? — They do not stress the difference between <i>kareth</i> and kerithuth.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. supra p. 83. ');"><sup>21</sup></span>
כג תיבעי לרבנן עד כאן לא קאמרי רבנן התם אלא דלא פסקה מיניה לגמרי אבל הכא כיון דפסקה פסקה
23 Raba said: [If a man said,] This is your Get on condition that you do not drink wine all the days of my life, this is no 'cutting off', but if he said, All the days of So-and-so's life, this is 'cutting off'. Why this difference? [If you say that where he says] 'the life of So-and-so', it is possible that he may die and she may fulfil the condition, [I may rejoin that where he says] 'my life', there is also a possibility that he may die and she may fulfil the condition? — We should read therefore, [If he says,] All the days of your life,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. note 10. ');"><sup>22</sup></span>
כד בתר דבעיא הדר פשטה
24 this is no 'cutting off', but if he says, All the days of my life or of So-and-so's life, this is cutting off'. Raba put the following question to R. Nahman: [If he says], To-day you are not my wife, but to-morrow you will be my wife, what is to be done? The answer is not clear whether we accept the view of R. Eliezer<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Who says in our Mishnah that a substantive reservation in the Get does not necessarily invalidate it. ');"><sup>23</sup></span> or that of the Rabbis. We ask: If we adopt the view of R. Eliezer, are we to say that in that case R. Eliezer ruled as he did, because as he permitted her she is permitted in perpetuity, but here<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Where the divorce is only for one day. ');"><sup>24</sup></span> he would not do so, or are we to say that he makes no difference? And we ask, if we adopt the view of the Rabbis, are we to say that in that case the Rabbis ruled as they did because she is not entirely separated from him, but here they would say that once she is separated she is separated?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' And the condition is worthless. ');"><sup>25</sup></span> Having asked the question he himself answered it: