Keritot 32
מסתברא שגגת שבת וזדון מלאכות פשיטא ליה דימים שבינתיים הויין ידיעה לחלק וזדון שבת ושגגת מלאכות הוא דבעי מיניה כגופין דמיין או לאו
It is reasonable to assume that in the case of the act being performed in ignorance of the Sabbaths and with knowledge of its prohibition he had no doubt at all that the intervening week-days effected separateness, and that his question was only when the act was performed with the knowledge of the Sabbaths but in ignorance of its prohibition, [the point in doubt being] whether different Sabbaths are like different objects or not.
היודע עיקר שבת ועשה מלאכות הרבה בשבתות הרבה חייב על כל שבת ושבת
'A great general rule has been laid down with regard to Sabbath: He who was altogether oblivious of the principle of Sabbath and performed many acts of work on many Sabbaths, is liable to one offering only.
ואי ר"א חייב על כל ולדי מלאכות כמלאכות
'he is liable for each principal act of work and for each Sabbath'.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The fact that he is not declared liable in this instance for each Sabbath separately proves that this Mishnah, which, it is argued, follows R. Akiba's view, maintains either that work repeatedly performed on different Sabbaths in uninterrupted unawareness is not to be regarded as if several acts of work of different classes were performed, and therefore involving several offerings; or at least that there is doubt on this point. The second alternative is assumed by Rabbah to be the case; this being the very point of R. Akiba's query. The second clause of the quoted Mishnah, on the other hand, unmistakably states that if the error has been caused by the ignorance of the Sabbath, he is liable for each Sabbath, presumably because the intervening week-days effect a division. We thus see that Rabbah's interpretation of R. Akiba's query is borne out by that MISHNAH:');"><sup>7</sup></span>
אמר ליה אביי לעולם אימא לך
'If he did many [secondary] acts of work of the same [principal] class, he is liable only to one offering'; but according to R'Eliezer he should be liable for each of the secondary acts of work as if they were principal acts of work! Hence it is clear [that th Mishnah, then, represents] R'Akiba's view, and it is hereby proved that he had no doubt at all that in the case of an act being done in ignorance of the Sabbath and with knowledge of its prohibition the intervening week-days effected separateness, and that his question was only when the act was performed with knowledge of the Sabbath but in ignorance of its prohibition, the point being whether different Sabbaths are like different objects or not.
זדון שבת ושגגת מלאכות פשיטא ליה לר"ע דשבתות לאו כגופין דמיין ושגגת שבת וזדון מלאכות הוא דבעי מיניה דימים שבינתיים מי הויין ידיעה לחלק או לא
The other's solution<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., R. Eliezer's answer.');"><sup>9</sup></span>
זדון שבת ושגגת מלאכות אפילו ר"ע ס"ל דכגופין דמיין וכי בעי מיניה שגגת שבת וזדון מלאכות הוא דבעי מיניה דימים שבינתיים אי הויין ידיעה לחלק
Indeed I maintain that R'Akiba had no doubt that different Sabbaths were not comparable to different objects in the case where an act was done with knowledge of the Sabbath but in ignorance of its prohibition;<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' As is indeed proved by the third clause of the Mishnah, where he is not liable for each Sabbath, which Abaye considers an absolute statement and not one about which there is doubt.');"><sup>11</sup></span>
ימים שבינתיים הויין ידיעה לחלק וקביל מיניה
The solution offered was that the intervening week-days effected separateness, and this was accepted by him;<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The second clause of that Mishnah from Sabbath indicates the acceptance by R. Akiba of R. Eliezer's reply.');"><sup>12</sup></span>
אמר רב חסדא
Rab Hisda said:<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Rab Hisda differs from Abaye and Rabbah in that he maintains that in the end R. Akiba decided that different Sabbath days were comparable to different objects. The third clause of the quoted Mishnah, which seemingly contradicts him in that it does not state that the transgressor is also liable for each Sabbath, is indeed interpreted by him as implying that there is liability for each Sabbath.');"><sup>13</sup></span>
מנא אמינא לה
In the case of an act being done with knowledge of the Sabbath but in ignorance of its prohibition even R'Akiba agrees that the different Sabbath days are like different objects; but his query was whether the intervening week-days effected separateness in the case where an act was done in ignorance of the Sabbath but with knowledge of its prohibition.
הכותב שתי אותיות בשתי שבתות אחד בשבת זו ואחד בשבת זו ר"ג מחייב וחכמים פוטרין
'If one wrote [on Sabbath] two letters<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The writing of a word of two characters is one of the principal labours.');"><sup>15</sup></span>
קא סלקא דעתך דר"ג כר"ע סבירא ליה
in one spell of unawareness, he is liable [to an offering]; if in separate spells of unawareness,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' E.g., one character in the morning, the other in the afternoon of the same Sabbath day.');"><sup>16</sup></span>
זדון שבת ושגגת מלאכות אפילו ר"ע אומר דשבתות כגופין דמיין הא דתניא פטור בזדון שבת ושגגת מלאכות דשבתות כגופין דמיין
Rabban Gamaliel, however, admits that if he wrote one letter on one Sabbath and the other on another, he is exempt'.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The latter sentence seems to be an inference rather than a quotation, for it is not found in connection with the quoted Mishnahs.');"><sup>17</sup></span> Whereas in another [Baraitha] it has been taught: 'If one wrote two letters on two different Sabbaths, one on one Sabbath and the other on another, Rabban Gamaliel declares him liable, and the Sages declare him not liable'.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' There is thus a seeming contradiction in the two Baraithas with regard to R. Gamaliel's opinion.');"><sup>18</sup></span> On the assumption that Rabban Gamaliel followed R'Akiba's opinion, [Rab Hisda argued thus:] According to me, who hold that in the case of an act being performed with knowledge of the Sabbath but in ignorance of its prohibition even R'Akiba agrees that the different Sabbath days are like different objects, there is no contradiction, for that which taught that he is exempt<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' According to R. Gamaliel.');"><sup>19</sup></span> refers to a case where the letters were written with knowledge of the Sabbath but in ignorance of the prohibition,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' That writing is forbidden on the Sabbath.');"><sup>20</sup></span> in which case the different Sabbaths are like different objects<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., the two letters can therefore not combine. It is as if one did on two different Sabbaths each time a portion of a different act.');"><sup>21</sup></span>