Keritot 32

Chapter 32

א מסתברא שגגת שבת וזדון מלאכות פשיטא ליה דימים שבינתיים הויין ידיעה לחלק וזדון שבת ושגגת מלאכות הוא דבעי מיניה כגופין דמיין או לאו

1 It is reasonable to assume that in the case of the act being performed in ignorance of the Sabbaths and with knowledge of its prohibition he had no doubt at all that the intervening week-days effected separateness, and that his question was only when the act was performed with the knowledge of the Sabbaths but in ignorance of its prohibition, [the point in doubt being] whether different Sabbaths are like different objects or not.

ב ופשיט ליה דזדון שבת ושגגת מלאכות כגופין דמיין ולא קביל מיניה ופשט ליה דולדי מלאכות כמלאכות דמיין ולא קביל מיניה

2 His1 reply was that in the case of the act being done with knowledge of the Sabbaths but in ignorance of its prohibition the different Sabbaths were like different objects.

ג אמר רבה מנא אמינא לה דתנן כלל גדול אמרו בשבת כל השוכח עיקר שבת ועשה מלאכות הרבה בשבתות הרבה אינו חייב אלא אחת

3 This reply, however, he [R'Akiba] did not accept. He then proved that secondary acts of work were on a par with principal acts of work, but this too he rejected. Said Rabbah: Whence do I derive this?2 From that which we have learnt:3

ד היודע עיקר שבת ועשה מלאכות הרבה בשבתות הרבה חייב על כל שבת ושבת היודע שהוא שבת ועשה מלאכות הרבה בשבתות הרבה חייב על כל אב מלאכה ומלאכה

4 'A great general rule has been laid down with regard to Sabbath: He who was altogether oblivious of the principle of Sabbath and performed many acts of work on many Sabbaths, is liable to one offering only. If he knew the principle of Sabbath4

ה ואילו חייב על כל אב מלאכה של כל שבת ושבת לא קתני

5 and did many acts of work on many Sabbaths, he is liable for each Sabbath.

ו מני הא אילימא ר"א אימא סיפא העושה מלאכות הרבה מעין מלאכה אחת אין חייב אלא אחת ואי ר"א חייב על כל ולדי מלאכות כמלאכות

6 If he knew each time that the day was Sabbath,5 and did many acts of work on many Sabbaths, he is liable for each principal act of work'. Now, it does not say,6 'he is liable for each principal act of work and for each Sabbath'.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The fact that he is not declared liable in this instance for each Sabbath separately proves that this Mishnah, which, it is argued, follows R. Akiba's view, maintains either that work repeatedly performed on different Sabbaths in uninterrupted unawareness is not to be regarded as if several acts of work of different classes were performed, and therefore involving several offerings; or at least that there is doubt on this point. The second alternative is assumed by Rabbah to be the case; this being the very point of R. Akiba's query. The second clause of the quoted Mishnah, on the other hand, unmistakably states that if the error has been caused by the ignorance of the Sabbath, he is liable for each Sabbath, presumably because the intervening week-days effect a division. We thus see that Rabbah's interpretation of R. Akiba's query is borne out by that MISHNAH:');">7

ז אלא פשיטא ר"ע היא וש"מ שגגת שבת וזדון מלאכות פשיטא ליה דימים שבינתיים הויין ידיעה לחלק

7 Whom does [the Mishnah] follow? Shall I say R'Eliezer?

ח זדון שבת ושגגת מלאכות הוא דבעי אי כגופין דמיין ופשט ליה דכגופין דמיין ולדי מלאכות כמלאכות דמיין ותרוייהו לא קביל מיניה

8 Read then the latter clause:8

ט אמר ליה אביי לעולם אימא לך זדון שבת ושגגת מלאכות פשיטא ליה לר"ע דשבתות לאו כגופין דמיין ושגגת שבת וזדון מלאכות הוא דבעי מיניה דימים שבינתיים מי הויין ידיעה לחלק או לא

9 'If he did many [secondary] acts of work of the same [principal] class, he is liable only to one offering'; but according to R'Eliezer he should be liable for each of the secondary acts of work as if they were principal acts of work! Hence it is clear [that th Mishnah, then, represents] R'Akiba's view, and it is hereby proved that he had no doubt at all that in the case of an act being done in ignorance of the Sabbath and with knowledge of its prohibition the intervening week-days effected separateness, and that his question was only when the act was performed with knowledge of the Sabbath but in ignorance of its prohibition, the point being whether different Sabbaths are like different objects or not. The other's solution9

י ופשיט ליה דימים שבינתיים לחלק וקביל מיניה ופשט ליה ולדי מלאכות כמלאכות דמיין ולא קביל מיניה

10 was that they were like different objects, and that secondary acts were on a par with principal acts of work; but both answers were rejected by him.

יא רב חסדא אמר זדון שבת ושגגת מלאכות אפילו ר"ע ס"ל דכגופין דמיין וכי בעי מיניה שגגת שבת וזדון מלאכות הוא דבעי מיניה דימים שבינתיים אי הויין ידיעה לחלק

11 Said Abaye to him:10 Indeed I maintain that R'Akiba had no doubt that different Sabbaths were not comparable to different objects in the case where an act was done with knowledge of the Sabbath but in ignorance of its prohibition;<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' As is indeed proved by the third clause of the Mishnah, where he is not liable for each Sabbath, which Abaye considers an absolute statement and not one about which there is doubt.');">11

יב ופשיט ליה ימים שבינתיים הויין ידיעה לחלק וקביל מיניה

12 and his question was only in the case where an act was done in ignorance of the Sabbath but with knowledge of its prohibition, [the query being] whether the intervening week-days effected separateness or not. The solution offered was that the intervening week-days effected separateness, and this was accepted by him;12

יג ופשט ליה דולדי מלאכות כמלאכות דמיין ולא קביל מיניה

13 he also ruled that secondary acts of work were on a par with principal acts of work, but this was rejected by him.

יד אמר רב חסדא מנא אמינא לה דתניא הכותב שתי אותיות בהעלם אחת חייב בב' העלמות רבן גמליאל מחייב וחכמים פוטרין ומודה רבן גמליאל שאם כתב אות אחת בשבת זו ואות אחת בשבת אחרת פטור

14 Rab Hisda said:<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Rab Hisda differs from Abaye and Rabbah in that he maintains that in the end R. Akiba decided that different Sabbath days were comparable to different objects. The third clause of the quoted Mishnah, which seemingly contradicts him in that it does not state that the transgressor is also liable for each Sabbath, is indeed interpreted by him as implying that there is liability for each Sabbath.');">13 In the case of an act being done with knowledge of the Sabbath but in ignorance of its prohibition even R'Akiba agrees that the different Sabbath days are like different objects; but his query was whether the intervening week-days effected separateness in the case where an act was done in ignorance of the Sabbath but with knowledge of its prohibition. The other's solution was that the intervening week-days effected separateness; and this was accepted by him. He also ruled that secondary acts of work were on a par with principal acts of work, but this was rejected by him. Said Rab Hisda: Whence do I derive this?

טו ותניא אחריתי הכותב שתי אותיות בשתי שבתות אחד בשבת זו ואחד בשבת זו ר"ג מחייב וחכמים פוטרין קא סלקא דעתך דר"ג כר"ע סבירא ליה

15 From that which has been taught:14 'If one wrote [on Sabbath] two letters15 in one spell of unawareness, he is liable [to an offering]; if in separate spells of unawareness,16

טז בשלמא לדידי דאמינא זדון שבת ושגגת מלאכות אפילו ר"ע אומר דשבתות כגופין דמיין הא דתניא פטור בזדון שבת ושגגת מלאכות דשבתות כגופין דמיין

16 Rabban Gamaliel says: He is liable; and the Sages say: He is not. Rabban Gamaliel, however, admits that if he wrote one letter on one Sabbath and the other on another, he is exempt'.17 Whereas in another [Baraitha] it has been taught: 'If one wrote two letters on two different Sabbaths, one on one Sabbath and the other on another, Rabban Gamaliel declares him liable, and the Sages declare him not liable'.18 On the assumption that Rabban Gamaliel followed R'Akiba's opinion, [Rab Hisda argued thus:] According to me, who hold that in the case of an act being performed with knowledge of the Sabbath but in ignorance of its prohibition even R'Akiba agrees that the different Sabbath days are like different objects, there is no contradiction, for that which taught that he is exempt19 refers to a case where the letters were written with knowledge of the Sabbath but in ignorance of the prohibition,20 in which case the different Sabbaths are like different objects21

Previous Chapter Next Chapter