Kiddushin 126
על מנת שישתוק אבא אימא סיפא מת הבן מלמדין את האב לומר שאינו רוצה אמאי והא שתיק אלא אמר לה על מנת שלא ימחה אבא
'on condition that my father is silent.'Then consider the last clause: IF THE SON DIES. THE FATHER IS INSTRUCTED TO SAY THAT HE DOES NOT CONSENT: yet why, seeing that he was silent?Hence [it must mean that] he said to her, on condition that my father does not [explicitly] object': thus the first clause has one meaning, while the middle and the last clauses have a different meaning? - Said R. Jannai. Even so, Resh Lakish observed: This proves that in R. Jannai's opinion we strain the Mishnah by giving two different connotations [to the same phrase], so that it agrees with one Tanna, rather than give it one connotation by making it reflect [the views of] two Tannaim.R. Joseph b. Ammi said: After all, it has one connotation, and what is meant by 'ON CONDITION THAT [MY] FATHER CONSENTS'? On condition that he does not protest within thirty days from now. <br> <br> MISHNAH. [IF A MAN DECLARES,] T HAVE GIVEN MY DAUGHTER IN BETROTHAL, BUT DO NOT KNOW TO WHOM I HAVE BETROTHED HER,' AND THEN ONE COMES AND STATES, I BETROTHED HER, HE IS BELIEVED. IF ONE SAYS, I HAVE BETROTHED HER,' AND ANOTHER [ALSO] SAYS, T BETROTHED HER,' BOTH MUST GIVE A DIVORCE;BUT IF THEY WISH, ONE GIVES A DIVORCE AND THE OTHER MARRIES HER.<br> <br> GEMARA. Rab said: HE IS BELIEVED to give her a divorce, but he is not believed to take her. He is believed to give her a divorce: no man sins without profit.But he is not believed to take her: passion may have mastered him. R. Assi said: He is even believed to take her. Yet R. Assi admits that if she declares, T have been betrothed, but do not know to whom,' and one comes and says: T betrothed her,' he is not believed to take her.We learnt: BUT IF THEY WISH, ONE GIVES A DIVORCE AND THE OTHER TAKES HER: this refutes Rab! - Rab can answer you. There it is different: since another is with him, he is indeed afraid.It was taught as R. Assi: T have given my daughter in betrothal, but do not know to whom I betrothed her,' and one comes and says: T betrothed her,' he is believed, even to take her. If he takes her and [then] another comes and says: T betrothed her,' it does not rest with the latter to forbid her to him [the first]. [But] if a woman says: 'I have been betrothed, but do not know to whom,' and one comes and declares, T betrothed her,' he is not trusted to take her, because she will shield him. <br> <br> The Scholars propounded: Can we stone [her] on his statement? - Rab said: We do not stone [her]; R. Assi said: We stone [her]. Rab said: We do not stone [her]: the Divine Law gave credence to the father in respect of an interdict but not of execution. R. Assi maintained, We stone [her]: The Divine Law gave credence to the father in the whole matter. R. Assi said: Yet I admit that if she herself says: T was betrothed,' we do not stone [her]. R. Assi said further: These rulings of mine break roofs! [For one may argue:] If you say that we stone her where one who comes to take her may take her, how much the more should she be stoned where one who comes to take her may not take her! Yet it is not so. The Divine Law gave credence to the father, but it gave no credence to her. But R. Hisda ruled: In both cases we do not stone. Now, R. Hisda follows his opinion [elsewhere]. For R. Hisda said: [If a man declares,] 'This my son is nine years and a day.' [or] 'this<br> <br> my daughter is three years and a day,' he is believed in respect of sacrifice, but not in respect of flagellation or [other] punishment. It was taught as R. Hisda: [If a man declares,] 'This my son is thirteen years and a day,' [or] this my daughter is twelve years and a day,' <br>