Nedarim 170

הרי זו עושה ואוכלת והמותר רבי מאיר אומר הקדש רבי יוחנן הסנדלר אומר חולין ואמר שמואל הלכה כר' יוחנן הסנדלר אלמא אין אדם מקדיש דבר שלא בא לעולם

she may work and provide for herself, and as for the surplus, R. Meir<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Var. lec.: Tarfon. ');">¹</span>

וכי תימא כי קאמר הלכה כר' יוחנן בן נורי על העדפה הוא דקאמר

rules that it is hekdesh.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Because one can consecrate the non-existent. ');">²</span>

לימא הלכה כרבי יוחנן בן נורי בהעדפה אי נמי הלכה כת"ק א"נ (אין) הלכה כרבי עקיבא

R. Johanan the sandal-maker ruled that it is hullin.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' He holds that one cannot consecrate the non-existent. ');">³</span>

אלא אמר רב יוסף שאני קונמות הואיל ואדם אוסר פירות חבירו עליו אוסר נמי דבר שלא בא לעולם עליו

Whereon Samuel said: The <i>halachah</i> is as R. Johanan the sandal-maker, thus proving that a man cannot consecrate the non-existent. And should you reply that he ruled that the <i>halachah</i> is as R. Johanan b. Nuri only in respect of the excess;<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For since R. Johanan b. Nuri rejects R. Akiba's reason, it follows that in his opinion the surplus belongs to the husband, not to the wife. ');">⁴</span>

אמר ליה אביי בשלמא אדם אוסר פירות חבירו עליו שהרי אדם אוסר פירותיו על חבירו אלא יאסור דבר שלא בא לעולם על חבירו שהרי אין אדם אוסר פירות חבירו על חבירו

then he should have said, The <i>halachah</i> is as R. Johanan b. Nuri in respect of the excess, or, the <i>halachah</i> is as the first Tanna,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Who also holds that the excess belongs to the husband, since he maintains he need not annul. ');">⁵</span>

אלא אמר רב הונא בריה דרב יהושע באומרת יקדשו ידי לעושיהן דידים הא איתנהו בעולם

or, the <i>halachah</i> is not as R. Akiba? — But, said R. Joseph, konamoth<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., prohibitions, arising as a result of vows, v. supra p. 105, n. 8. ');">⁶</span>

וכי אמרה הכי קדשה והא משעבדן ידיה לבעל דאמרה לכי מגרשה השתא מיהת לא מגרשה וממאי דכי אמרה הכי מהניא

are different: since a man can interdict his neighbour's fruit to himself, he can prohibit to himself the non-existent.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For in real consecration one cannot consecrate his neighbour's property. ');">⁷</span> Said Abaye to him: It is proper that one may prohibit his neighbour's fruit to himself, since he can forbid his own fruit to his neighbour: but shall he forbid the non-existent to his neighbour, seeing that he cannot interdict his neighbour's fruit to his neighbour!<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Abaye objects that the analogy is defective. For in both cases cited by R. Joseph. viz., prohibiting his neighbour's produce and prohibiting the non-existent to himself, there is when vowing one element of the vow under his control — himself. But if a woman interdicts her earnings to her husband, neither her husband nor her future earnings are in her control when she vows. ');">⁸</span> — But, said R. Huna the son of R. Joshua, it means that she vowed, 'My hands be consecrated in respect of what they may produce';<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' So that whatever my hands produce shall be forbidden. ');">⁹</span> [the vow is valid even after divorce,] because her hands are already in existence. But if she vowed thus, would they be consecrated [and forbidden]? surely her hands are pledged to her husband.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' And since the vow cannot take immediate effect, it cannot become effective after divorce. ');">¹⁰</span> She vowed, 'When he divorces me.' But now at least she is not divorced: how then do you know that such a declaration is valid?