Pesachim 143
במאי עסקינן אילימא בטועה שמעת מינה עקירה בטעות הויא עקירה אלא בעוקר
<br> GEMARA. What are we discussing? Shall we say, where he erred? then you may infer from this that abrogation in error constitutes abrogation? Hence it means that he [intentionally] abrogates [its status]. Then consider the sequel: WHILE ALL OTHER SACRIFICES WHICH HE SLAUGHTERED AS A PASSOVER, IF THEY ARE NOT ELIGIBLE, HE IS CULPABLE; WHILE IF THEY ARE ELIGIBLE,- R. ELIEZER RULES HIM LIABLE To A SIN-OFFERING, WHILE R. JOSHUA RULES HIM NOT CULPABLE. But if he abrogates [their status], what does it matter whether they are eligible or they are not eligible? Hence it obviously refers to a man who errs; [then] the first clause refers to a man who abrogates [its status], whereas the second clause refers to him who errs? - Said R. Abin: Yes the first clause refers to a man who abrogates, whereas the second clause refers to him who errs. R. Isaac b. Joseph found R. Abbahu standing in a large concourse of people. Said he to him, How is our Mishnah meant? - The first clause refers to a man who abrogates, whereas the second clause refers to him who errs, he answered him. He learnt it from him forty times, and it seemed to him as though it were lying in his wallet. <br>
אימא סיפא ושאר כל הזבחים ששחטן לשום הפסח אם אינן ראויין חייב אם ראויין הן ר' אליעזר מחייב חטאת ור' יהושע פוטר ואי בעוקר מה לי ראויין מה לי שאינן ראויין
We learned: SAID R. ELIEZER: IF THE PASSOVER, WHICH IS PERMITTED FOR ITS OWN PURPOSE, YET WHEN HE CHANGES ITS PURPOSE, HE IS CULPABLE; THEN [OTHER] SACRIFICES, WHICH ARE FORBIDDEN FOR THEIR OWN PURPOSE, IF HE CHANGES THEIR PURPOSE IS IT NOT LOGICAL THAT HE IS CULPABLE. But if this [interpretation] is so, surely they are dissimilar, since the first clause refers to a man who abrogates, whereas the second clause refers to him who errs? - In R. Eliezer's view there is no difference. But according to R. Joshua, who holds that there is a difference, let him answer him thus? - He says thus to him: According to my view, they are dissimilar, [for] the first clause refers to a man who abrogates, whereas the second clause refers to him who errs. [But even] according to you, it is NOT SO. IF YOU SAY [THUS] OF THE PASSOVER, [HE IS CULPABLE] BECAUSE HE CHANGED IT FOR SOMETHING THAT IS FORBIDDEN; WILL YOU SAY [THE SAME] OF [OTHER] SACRIFICES, WHERE HE CHANGED THEM FOR SOMETHING THAT IS PERMITTED?
אלא פשיטא בטועה רישא בעוקר וסיפא בטועה א"ר אבין אין רישא בעוקר וסיפא בטועה
SAID R. ELIEZER TO HIM: LET THE PUBLIC SACRIFICES PROVE IT, WHICH ARE PERMITTED FOR THEIR OWN SAKE, YET HE WHO SLAUGHTERS [OTHER SACRIFICES] IN THEIR NAME IS CULPABLE. R. JOSHUA ANSWERED HIM: NOT SO: IF YOU SAY [THUS] OF PUBLIC SACRIFICES, [THAT IS] BECAUSE THEY HAVE A LIMIT; WILL YOU SAY [THE SAME] OF THE PASSOVER, WHICH HAS NO LIMIT? Are we to say that wherever there is a limit R. Joshua holds him culpable? Yet surely infants have a limit yet we learned: He who had two infants for circumcision, one for circumcision after the Sabbath and the other for circumcision on the Sabbath, and he erred and circumcised the one belonging to after the Sabbath on the Sabbath, he is culpable. [If he had] one for circumcision on the eve of the Sabbath and another for circumcision on the Sabbath, and he erred and circumcised the one belonging to the eve of the Sabbath on the Sabbath, - R. Eliezer holds him liable to a sin-offering. but R. Joshua exempts him, - Said R. Ammi: The circumstances here are e.g., that he first circumcised [the infant] of the eve of the Sabbath on the Sabbath, so that there is this [infant] of the Sabbath with whom he is pre-occupied; here e.g.. it means that he first slaughtered the public sacrifices at the beginning. <br>
אשכחיה רב יצחק בר יוסף לר' אבהו דהוה קאי באוכלוסא דאינשי א"ל מתניתין מאי א"ל רישא בעוקר וסיפא בטועה תנא מיניה ארבעין זימנין ודמי ליה כמאן דמנחא בכיסיה
If so, [when] 'R. MEIR SAID: HE TOO WHO SLAUGHTERS [OTHER SACRIFICES] IN THE NAME OF PUBLIC SACRIFICES IS NOT LIABLE' - [he meant] even if he had first slaughtered the public sacrifices at the beginning? Surely it was taught. R. Hiyya of Ebel 'Arab said in R. Meir's name: R. Eliezer and R. Joshua did not differ concerning him who had two infants, one for circumcision on the eve of the Sabbath and one for circumcision on the Sabbath, and he erred and circumcised the one belonging to the eve of the Sabbath on the Sabbath [both agreeing] that he is culpable. About what do they disagree? About a man who had two infants, one for circumcision after the Sabbath and another for circumcision on the Sabbath, and he erred and circumcised the one belonging to after the Sabbath on the Sabbath, R. Eliezer ruling him liable to a sin-offering, while R. Joshua exempts [him]. Now is that logical? If there [in the second clause], where he did not perform a religious duty. R. Joshua exempts him; then where he did perform a religious duty, he rules him liable! Said the School of R. Jannai: The first clause means e.g., that he previously circumcised [the infant] belonging to the Sabbath on the eve of the Sabbath,<br>