Sanhedrin 11

Chapter 11

א וכי תימא פליגי רבנן עליה דרשב"ג והאמר רבי אבהו שנים שדנו לדברי הכל אין דיניהם דין גברא אגברא קא רמית
1 <a rel="footnote" href="sanhedrin_5.html">Previous Daf</a>
ב גופא א"ר אבהו שנים שדנו דיני ממונות לדברי הכל אין דיניהם דין איתיביה רבי אבא לרבי אבהו דן את הדין וזיכה את החייב וחייב את הזכאי טימא את הטהור טיהר את הטמא מה שעשה עשוי ומשלם מביתו
2 The text [above states]: 'R. Abbahu says all agree that a judgment given by two in monetary cases is not valid.' R. Abba objected and asked R. Abbahu [from the following]: If one has judged a case by himself and pronounced the guilty 'guiltless' and the guiltless 'guilty', or the clean 'unclean' and the unclean 'clean', his act cannot be undone, but he has to pay indemnity from his own pocket?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' B. K. 100a. It is thus seen that the decision of even one is valid. ');"><sup>3</sup></span>
ג הכא במאי עסקינן דקיבלוהו עלייהו אי הכי אמאי משלם מביתו דאמרו ליה דיינת לן דין תורה
3 — Here we are dealing with a case where the parties accepted the judge. If so, why make him pay indemnity? — Because they had said to him: We agree to abide by your award on condition that you give a decision in accordance with the Torah.
ד א"ל רב ספרא לרבי אבא דטעה במאי אילימא דטעה בדבר משנה והאמר רב ששת א"ר (אמי) טעה בדבר משנה חוזר אלא דטעה בשיקול הדעת
4 R. Safra asked R. Abba: What did the judge overlook in giving this erroneous decision? Was it a law cited in the Mishnah? But did not R. Shesheth say in the name of R. Ashi: 'If one overlooks a law cited in the Mishnah, he may revoke his decision'? — Hence it must be he erred in deciding against common practice. How can we conceive that? R. Papa said: If, for example, two Tannaim or Amoraim opposed each other's views in a certain matter and it was not clear with whom the true decision lay, but the general trend of practice followed the opinion of one of them, and yet he decided according to the opinion of the other, that is termed 'an error of judgment against common practice'.
ה היכי דמי בשיקול הדעת אמר רב פפא כגון תרי תנאי ותרי אמוראי דפליגי אהדדי ולא איתמר הלכתא לא כמר ולא כמר וסוגיין דעלמא אליבא דחד מינייהו ואזל איהו ועבד כאידך היינו שיקול הדעת
5 Is it true to say that the point of difference [between Samuel and R. Abbahu] had been anticipated by Tannaim in the following controversy? Arbitration is by three, so says R. Meir. The Sages say that one is sufficient. Now the Schoolmen presumed that all agree that the force of arbitration is equal to that of legal decision; their point of difference would accordingly resolve itself into one holding that three are required for legal decision and the other holding that two are enough.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e. their point of difference is thus the same as that between R. Abbahu and Samuel. ');"><sup>4</sup></span>
ו לימא כתנאי ביצוע בשלשה דברי ר"מ וחכ"א פשרה ביחיד סברוה לכ"ע מקשינן פשרה לדין
6 — No, all [both R. Meir and the Sages] agree that legal decision is by three, and the point in which they differ is this: One [R. Meir] holds that the force of arbitration should be regarded as equal to that of legal decision, while the other disputes it.
ז מאי לאו בהא קמיפלגי דמר סבר דין בשלשה ומר סבר דין בשנים לא דכ"ע דין בשלשה והכא בהא קמיפלגי דמר סבר מקשינן פשרה לדין ומר סבר לא מקשינן פשרה לדין
7 May it be assumed then that there are three views held by the Tannaim with regard to arbitration, viz., one [R. Meir] holds that three are needed; another [R. Simeon b. Gamaliel] holds that two are sufficient,<a rel="footnote" href="#6a_5"><sup>5</sup></a>
ח לימא תלתא תנאי בפשרה דמר סבר בשלשה ומר סבר בשנים ומר סבר ביחיד אמר רב אחא בריה דרב איקא ואיתימא רבי יימר בר שלמיא מאן דאמר תרי אפילו חד נמי והאי דקאמר תרי כי היכי דליהוו עליה סהדי
8 while the Sages hold that one is enough? — R. Aha the son of R. Ika, or according to others R. Yemar b. Salomi, said: The Tanna who says two are necessary is really of the opinion that a single one is sufficient. And the reason he requires two is that they might act as witnesses in the case, if required.
ט אמר רב אשי ש"מ פשרה אינה צריכה קנין דאי סלקא דעתך צריכה קנין למ"ד צריכה תלתא ל"ל תסגי בתרי וליקני מיניה והלכתא פשרה צריכה קנין
9 R. Ashi said: We may infer from this that no <i>Kinyan</i><span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' A formal act of acquisition effected when two enter into mutual obligation. ');"><sup>6</sup></span>
י תנו רבנן כשם שהדין בשלשה כך ביצוע בשלשה
10 is needed for arbitration, for if it be thought necessary, why does the Tanna in question require three? Surely two should suffice, the two parties being bound by <i>Kinyan</i>!<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Pledging themselves to adhere to the award. ');"><sup>7</sup></span> The adopted law however, is that arbitration requires <i>Kinyan</i> [even when made by three].<a rel="footnote" href="#6a_8"><sup>8</sup></a> Our Rabbis taught: Just as for legal judgment three are required, so are three required for settlement by arbitration. After a case has been decided by legal judgment, thou must not attempt a settlement.
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