Sanhedrin 121

אסורה וריש לקיש אמר מותרת

the animal is forbidden for any use;<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Although it was not slaughtered with idolatrous intent, and even if subsequently the blood was not sprinkled idolatrously, the unlawful intention at the time of slaughtering, though in respect of a different service, renders the animal unfit for use. R. Johanan deduces this by drawing an analogy from piggul (v. Glos.). ');">¹</span>

הניחא לר' יוחנן אלא לריש לקיש בעי קרא

but Resh Lakish ruled that it is permitted.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Resh Lakish does not accept the analogy of piggul. ');">²</span>

מתקיף לה רב פפא ולרבי יוחנן לא בעי קרא עד כאן לא קא אסר רבי יוחנן אלא בהמה אבל גברא לא בר קטלא הוא ואתא קרא לחיובי גברא לקטלא

Now this difficulty is disposed of on R. Johanan's view;<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Since R. Johanan draws an analogy in respect of the animal itself, he can apply the same analogy to the offender-viz., that an idolatrous intention in respect of one service is punishable, even though made in another act. Consequently, if prostration was singled out in order to illumine the entire law, the special statement of sacrificing is superfluous. Hence we are forced to the conclusion that prostration was singled out only for itself. ');">³</span>

מתקיף לה רב אחא בריה דרב איקא ולר"ל מי בעי קרא עד כאן לא קא שרי ר"ל אלא בהמה אבל גברא בר קטלא הוא מידי דהוה אמשתחוה להר דהר מותר ועובדה בסייף

but on the view of Resh Lakish,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For since he does not accept the analogy, we can argue thus. Prostration was singled out to illumine the whole, and sacrificing was singled out to teach that though an unlawful intention in respect of one act of service made in the course of another does not affect the animal's fitness for use, it is nevertheless punishable. ');">⁴</span>

א"ל רב אחא מדפתי לרבינא למאי דקאמר ליה רבא בר רב חנן לאביי אימא יצאה השתחואה ללמד על הכלל כולו (דברים יב, ל) איכה יעבדו למעוטי מאי

[why not say that] the verse is required [for this purpose]?

וכי תימא למעוטי הפוער עצמו לזובחים מהשתחואה נפקא מה השתחואה דרך כיבוד אף כל דרך כיבוד

R. Papa demurred: Would the verse singling out sacrificing be superfluous on R. Johanan's view? Surely he merely rules that the animal is forbidden [as a result of the analogy from piggul], but the person may not be liable to death. Hence the verse teaches [by singling out sacrificing] that he is so liable!

אלא למעוטי הפוער עצמו למרקוליס ס"ד אמינא הואיל ועבודתו בזיון הוא אף כל בזיון קמ"ל

R. Aha the son of R. Ika demurred: Would the verse singling out sacrificing not be superfluous on the view of Resh Lakish? Surely he merely rules that the animal is permitted, yet the person may be punishable by death, just as in the case of one who prostrates himself before a mountain, the mountain remaining free for use though the person thereby renders himself liable to decapitation!<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., though Resh Lakish rejects the analogy of piggul, he might accept that of mountain worship. For he rejects the former because piggul is in the course of service within the Temple, whilst ordinary slaughter is without. But mountain service, being also without, may provide the basis of an analogy. ');">⁵</span>

אלא הא דאמר רבי אליעזר מנין לזובח בהמה למרקוליס שהוא חייב שנאמר (ויקרא יז, ז) ולא יזבחו עוד את זבחיהם לשעירים

R. Aha of Difti said to Rabina: According to Raba son of R. Hanan's question to Abaye, vi., 'let us say that prostration was singled out in order to throw light upon the general law,' what is excluded by the verse, [Take heed to thyself&nbsp;… that thou enquire not after their gods, saying,] How did these nations serve their gods<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Since R. Johanan draws an analogy in respect of the animal itself, he can apply the same analogy to the offender-viz., that an idolatrous intention in respect of one service is punishable, even though made in another act. Consequently, if prostration was singled out in order to illumine the entire law, the special statement of sacrificing is superfluous. Hence we are forced to the conclusion that prostration was singled out only for itself. ');">³</span>

אם אינו ענין לכדרכה דכתיב איכה יעבדו תניהו ענין לשלא כדרכה

even so will I do likewise]?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Deut. XII, 30. This implies that only the normal mode of serving the deities is forbidden. But, as shewn above, the light thrown upon the general statement of Deut. XVII, 3, whether by prostration or by sacrificing, is in respect of abnormal acts of worship. Now, if prostration teaches that even extra-Temple acts are punished, what is excluded by this verse? ');">⁶</span>

שלא כדרכה מהשתחואה נפקא

Should you say, it excludes the act of uncovering oneself before deities whose normal mode of worship is sacrifice — but that is derived from prostration: just as prostration is an act of honour, so every act [to be punishable] must be one of honour! — But it excludes the act of uncovering oneself before merculis: for I would think, since its normal mode of worship is a contemptuous act [viz. — casting stones thereon], therefore any other degrading action [incurs guilt]; hence the verse excludes it. But what of R. Eleazar's dictum: Whence do we know that, if one sacrificed an animal to merculis, he is liable to punishment? — From the verse, And they shall no more offer their sacrifices unto demons.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lev. XVII, 7. ');">⁷</span>

התם בזובח להכעיס

Since this is redundant in respect of normal worship, being derived from, How did these nations serve their gods,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Deut. XII, 30. ');">⁸</span>

רב המנונא אירכסו ליה תורי פגע ביה רבה רמא ליה מתני' אהדדי תנן העובד עבודת כוכבים עובד אין אומר לא והאנן תנן האומר אעבוד אלך ואעבוד נלך ונעבוד

apply it to abnormal worship [as being punishable].<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Hence sacrificing to merculis, though not its normal mode of worship, incurs guilt. ');">⁹</span>

א"ל באומר איני מקבלו עלי אלא בעבודה

Now, [on Raba son of R. Hanan's hypothesis that prostration throws light on the general statement] is not abnormal worship derived from prostration? — That verse teaches that even if he sacrificed to merculis merely as an act of provocation<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., to God. ');">¹⁰</span>

רב יוסף אמר תנאי שקלת מעלמא תנאי היא דתניא האומר בואו ועבדוני רבי מאיר מחייב ור' יהודה פוטר

[but without thereby accepting it as a divinity], he is punished.

היכא דפלחו כולי עלמא לא פליגי דכתיב (שמות כ, ג) לא תעשה לך פסל כי פליגי בדיבורא בעלמא רבי מאיר סבר דיבורא מילתא היא ורבי יהודה סבר דיבורא לאו מילתא היא

R. Hamnuna lost his oxen. [On going to seek them] he was met by Rabbah, Who showed a contradiction in two Mishnahs. We have learnt: He WHO ENGAGES IN IDOL-WORSHIP [ IS EXECUTED]; implying, only if he actually worshipped it, but if he merely said that he would serve it, he is not punished. But we have learnt: If he [the seduced person] says — 'I will worship.' or 'I will go and worship'. or we will go and worship' [the seducer is executed].<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Infra 67a. ');">¹¹</span>

הדר אמר רב יוסף לאו מילתא היא דאמרי דאפילו לר' יהודה בדיבורא נמי חיובי מחייב (דתנן) רבי יהודה אומר לעולם אינו חייב עד שיאמר אעבוד אלך ואעבוד נלך ונעבוד

— He replied, The first Mishnah refers to one who said, 'I will not accept it as a god before I serve it.' R. Joseph said: You have chosen Tannaim at random!<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e.. there is no warrant for assuming both Mishnahs to be of the same Tanna. ');">¹²</span>

במאי קמיפלגי במסית לעצמו ואמרי ליה אין קמפלגי מר סבר מסית לעצמו שמעי ליה ואין דקאמרי ליה קושטא הוא ומ"ס מסית לעצמו לא שמעי ליה מימר אמרי

This is a conflict of Tannaim. For it has been taught: If a man said, 'Come and worship me,' R. Meir declared him liable to death [as any other seducer], but R. Judah ruled that he is not. Now if they [his listeners] did actually worship him, all agree that he is executed, for it is written, Thou shalt not make unto thee any idol.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Ex. XX, 4. Hence, since they worshipped him, he is guilty as a seducer. ');">¹³</span> Their dispute is only if they merely affirmed that they would worship him: R. Meir maintaining that a mere affirmation is of consequence,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' And renders the seducer liable. ');">¹⁴</span> whilst R. Judah holds that a mere affirmation is of no consequence.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Hence the first Mishnah is taught in accordance with R. Judah; the second agrees with R. Meir. ');">¹⁵</span> Subsequently R. Joseph said: My answer is groundless for even R. Judah maintains that guilt is incurred for a mere assertion, as it has been taught: R. Judah said: He [the seducer] is not liable to execution unless the seduced person declares, 'I will worship it,' or 'I will go and worship,' or 'Let us go and worship.'<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Thus though he did not actually worship it, even R. Judah maintains that he is executed. ');">¹⁶</span> But the dispute of R. Meir and R. Judah applies to a case where he incited others to worship him, and they replied. 'Yes!', R. Meir maintaining that when a man incites others to worship him, he is paid heed to, and the 'yes' was said in earnest; whilst R. Judah holds that no heed is paid to him, for they say,