Shevuot 38

ואפילו בקמייתא ממה נפשך טמא הוא אמר רבא הכא במאי עסקינן כגון שהלך בראשון ובשעה שהלך בשני שכח שהלך בראשון דהויא ליה מקצת ידיעה

even in the first case? At all events he is unclean?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' After walking through both paths (without purification in the interval) he has the definite knowledge of uncleanness, and when he enters the Temple later, being unaware of his uncleanness, he should bring a sacrifice.');">¹</span>

ובהא קא מיפלגי תנא קמא סבר אמרינן מקצת ידיעה ככל ידיעה ורבי שמעון סבר לא אמרינן מקצת ידיעה ככל ידיעה

- Said Raba: Here we are discussing the case of one who walked along the first [path]; and when he walked along the second [path], forgot that he had already walked along the first, so that he has only an incomplete knowledge [of uncleanness];<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Having forgotten that he had walked along the first path, and remembering only the second, he has not the complete knowledge of definite uncleanness.');">²</span> and this is in what they differ:<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The first Tanna and R. Simeon b. Judah disagree as to the view of R. Simeon b. Yohai.');">³</span>

הלך בראשון ונכנס הזה ושנה וטבל חזר והלך בשני ונכנס חייב ורבי שמעון פוטר ואמאי חייב ספק ידיעה הוא

The first Tanna holds that we say, an incomplete knowledge is like a complete knowledge;<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The first Tanna who states that R. Simeon b. Yohai exempts him only in the case, where there was purification between the two entries, but not in the first case, holds that in the first case he is liable, because, when entering the Temple after having walked along both paths, he is definitely unclean, and though his knowledge is incomplete, for, when walking in the second path, he had forgotten about the first, nevertheless he is liable, for incomplete knowledge of definite uncleanness is counted as complete knowledge, since he is definitely unclean, and, if he had the complete knowledge, he would have known that he was definitely unclean, whereas in the case where there was purification between, the knowledge he had, though complete, was of doubtful uncleanness. He knew, that is to say, that he had walked in both paths, and yet, despite this knowledge, he is still doubtful, after walking in the second path, whether he is now unclean (for this path may be clean; and if the first was unclean he has already purified himself in any case) and is therefore exempt.');">⁴</span> and R'Simeon [b.

אמר רבי יוחנן כאן עשו ספק ידיעה כידיעה וריש לקיש אמר הא מני רבי ישמעאל היא דאמר לא בעינן ידיעה בתחלה:

Judah] holds that we do not say, an incomplete knowledge is like a complete knowledge.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' And he is, therefore, exempt even in the first case, where there was no purification between the two entries.');">⁵</span> 'If he walked along the first [path], and entered [the Temple], and was sprinkled upon [on the third day], and again [on the seventh day], and bathed himself; and then he walked along the second [path], and entered [the Temple], he is liable; and R'Simeon [b.

ורמי דרבי יוחנן אדרבי יוחנן ורמי דריש לקיש אדריש לקיש דתניא אכל ספק חלב ונודע ספק חלב ונודע רבי אומר כשם שמביא חטאת על כל אחד ואחד כך מביא אשם תלוי על כל אחד ואחד

Yohai] exempts him.' Why is he liable,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' He questions the view of the Tanna who disagrees with R. Simeon b. Yohai.');">⁶</span>

ר"ש בן יהודה ורבי אלעזר ברבי שמעון אמרו משום רבי שמעון אינו מביא אלא אשם תלוי אחד שנאמר (ויקרא ה, יח) על שגגתו אשר שגג התורה ריבתה שגגות הרבה ואשם תלוי אחד

since it is a doubtful knowledge?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For when entering the Temple after walking along the first path he did not have the knowledge of definite uncleanness (for this path may have been clean) ; and when entering the Temple after walking along the second path, he also did not have the knowledge of definite uncleanness (for he had purified himself from the first path, and the second may be clean) .');">⁷</span> - R'Johanan said: Here they made doubtful knowledge like definite knowledge.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Though his knowledge, in the case of each entry, was doubtful, yet, since he had certainly entered the Temple once while definitely unclean, and he had knowledge at the beginning (though of a doubtful nature) , he brings an offering. ckj inua');">⁸</span>

ואמר ריש לקיש כאן שנה רבי ידיעות ספיקות מתחלקות לחטאות

And Resh Lakish said: This is in accordance with the view of R'Ishmael, who holds that we do not require knowledge at the beginning. We may point out an incongruity between the words of R'Johanan [here] and the words of R'Johanan [elsewhere]; and we may point out an incongruity between the words of Resh Lakish [here] and the words of Resh Lakish [elsewhere]; for it has been taught: If he ate doubtful prohibited fat, and became aware of it [later; and he ate again] doubtful prohibited fat, and became aware of it [later]; Rabbi said: Just as he would bring a sin offering for each one, so he brings a guilt offering for doubtful sin for each one.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' He ate a piece of fat about which there was a doubt whether it was prohibited fat () or permitted () ; at the time of eating he thought it was permitted fat, but later became aware that there was a doubt about it. In such a case he brings a suspensive guilt offering, (Lev. V. 17; Rashi) . If, after becoming aware of this, he commits this doubtful sin again, he must bring a guilt offering for each separate act, since there was awareness between each act; just as, if he had unwittingly eaten actual (not doubtful) prohibited fat on a number of occasions (with awareness between each act) he would have had to bring a sin offering for each separate act.');">⁹</span>

ורבי יוחנן אמר כשם שידיעות ודאי בעלמא מתחלקות לחטאות כך ידיעות ספק מתחלקות לאשמות

R'Simeon B'Judah and R'Eleazar son of R'Simeon said in the name of R'Simeon [b. Yohai]: He brings only one guilt offering for doubtful sin;<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For all the acts together.');">¹⁰</span>

בשלמא דרבי יוחנן אדרבי יוחנן לא קשיא כאן עשו ולא בכל התורה כולה עשו הכא הוא דלא כתיבא ידיעה בהדיא מונעלם הוא דקא אתי ולא בכל התורה כולה עשו דכתיב (ויקרא ד, כג) או הודע אליו ידיעה מעלייתא בעינן

for it is said: [And he shall bring a ram. for a guilt offering.] for his wherein he erred<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lev. V, 18. u,dda kg dda rat');">¹¹</span>

אלא לריש לקיש אדמוקים ליה כר' ישמעאל נוקמה כרבי הא קא משמע לן דרבי ישמעאל לא בעי ידיעה בתחלה

- the Torah includes many errors for one guilt offering.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Because Scripture could have written simply, , for his error; but it adds the words, , wherein he erred, implying that, however many times he erred, he brings only one suspensive guilt offering.');">¹²</span> And Resh Lakish said: Here Rabbi taught that the awareness of the doubt separates [the acts] for sin offerings.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' He takes Rabbi's statement to mean this: If, after a time, he became aware that it was definitely prohibited fat, he would have to bring a sin offering for each act, although the awareness between the acts was only the awareness of doubtful prohibited fat, because such awareness is also sufficient to separate the acts. If there were no awareness at all between the acts, he would bring only one sin offering.');">¹³</span>

פשיטא דלא בעי מדלא מייתרי ליה קראי (ויקרא ה, ב) ונעלם דמיחייב על העלם מקדש מהו דתימא כי לית ליה מקראי אבל מגמרא אית ליה קמ"ל:

And R'Johanan said: [Rabbi meant:] Just as, the awareness of definite sin elsewhere separates [the acts] for sin offerings, so the awareness of doubtful sin [here] separates [the acts] for guilt offerings.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' If, after unwittingly committing a definite sin, he became aware of it, and later again unwittingly committed the same definite sin, the awareness of the definite sin between the two acts makes a division between the acts, and he brings a sin offering for each act; so here, the awareness of the doubtful sin between the acts makes a division between the acts, and he brings a guilt offering for each act. But if the awareness between the acts was only the awareness of the doubtful sin, he does not later bring a sin offering for each act when the knowledge comes to him that he has committed a definite sin.');">¹⁴</span> [Hence, there is incongruity between R'Johanan's statements,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For R. Johanan said, with reference to entering the Temple after walking along two paths, one of which was unclean (with purification between the two walks) , that doubtful knowledge is counted as definite knowledge; yet here he says that doubtful knowledge is not the same as definite knowledge in making a division between acts for sin offerings.');">¹⁵</span>

<br><br><big><strong>הדרן עלך ידועות הטומאה</strong></big><br><br>

and between Resh Lakish's statements.]<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For Resh Lakish said above that the Tanna who says he is liable (in the ease of entering the Temple after walking along two paths etc.) agrees with R. Ishmael that there is no need for knowledge at the beginning; Resh Lakish could have said that he agrees with Rabbi (according to Resh Lakish's exposition of his view) that doubtful knowledge is counted as definite knowledge.');">¹⁶</span> - Granted that there is no contradiction between one statement of R'Johanan and the other statement of R'Johanan, [for he said:] 'Here they made [doubtful knowledge like definite knowledge]', and not everywhere in the whole Torah did they do so; for [only] here, because knowledge [at the beginning] is not explicitly written, but is deduced from and it be hidden,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lev. V, 3; v. supra 4a.');">¹⁷</span>

מתני׳ <big><strong>שבועות</strong></big> שתים שהן ארבע שבועה שאוכל ושלא אוכל שאכלתי ושלא אכלתי

[therefore they made doubtful knowledge like definite knowledge;] 'but not everywhere in the whole Torah did they do so', for it is written: [If his sin] be known to him<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lev. IV, 28.');">¹⁸</span> - a definite knowledge we require.

שבועה שלא אוכל ואכל כל שהוא חייב דברי רבי עקיבא אמרו לו לר"ע היכן מצינו באוכל כל שהוא שהוא חייב שזה חייב אמר להם ר' עקיבא וכי היכן מצינו במדבר ומביא קרבן שזה מדבר ומביא קרבן:

But Resh Lakish - why does he establish it as being in accordance with R'Ishmael's view? Let him establish it as being in accordance with Rabbi's view!<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Why does he say that the Tanna who makes him liable in the case of walking along the two paths agrees with R. Ishmael that we do not require knowledge at the beginning? Let him rather say that he does require knowledge at the beginning, but he makes him liable because he holds with Rabbi that doubtful knowledge is like definite knowledge (in accordance with Resh Lakish's own interpretation of Rabbi's view) .');">¹⁹</span>

<big><strong>גמ׳</strong></big> למימרא דשאוכל דאכילנא משמע ורמינהי שבועה לא אוכל לך שבועה שאוכל לך לא שבועה שלא אוכל לך אסור

- This he teaches us: that R'Ishmael does not require knowledge at the beginning. [But] it is obvious that he does not require [knowledge at the beginning], for he has no extra verse [from which to deduce it, since he requires] and it be hidden to make him liable for unawareness of Temple?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Supra 14b.');">²⁰</span>

אמר אביי לעולם דאכילנא משמע לא קשיא כאן במסרבין בו לאכול כאן בשאין

- Perhaps you might think that he does not infer [that we require knowledge at the beginning] from the verse, but he has it from a tradition; therefore [Resh Lakish] teaches us [that R'Ishmael definitely does not require knowledge at the beginning]. <big><b>MISHNAH: </b></big>OATHS ARE TWO, SUBDIVIDED INTO FOUR: 'I SWEAR I SHALL EAT', AND '[I SWEAR] I SHALL NOT EAT';<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lev. V, 4: If any one swears, pronouncing with his lips, or to do evil, or to do good. These are the two oaths, positive and negative, in the future. 'To eat' and 'not to eat' are merely examples of doing good and doing evil.');">²¹</span> '[I SWEAR] I HAVE EATEN', AND '[I SWEAR] I HAVE NOT EATEN'.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' These are the two additional oaths, positive and negative, in the past; v. infra 25a.');">²²</span> - 'I SWEAR I SHALL NOT EAT', AND HE ATE A MINUTE QUANTITY, HE IS LIABLE: THIS IS THE OPINION OF R'AKIBA. THEY [THE SAGES] SAID TO R'AKIBA: WHERE DO WE FIND THAT HE WHO EATS A MINUTE QUANTITY IS LIABLE, THAT THIS ONE SHOULD BE LIABLE!<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' On eating prohibited food there is liability only when a certain minimum (the size of an olive) is consumed; v. Yoma 81a.');">²³</span> - R'AKIBA SAID TO THEM: BUT WHERE DO WE FIND THAT HE WHO SPEAKS BRINGS AN OFFERING, THAT THIS ONE SHOULD BRING AN OFFERING?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' An oath is merely the utterance of the lips; yet he brings an offering for transgressing his utterance; therefore he brings an offering also even if he eats a minute quantity, since thereby he has also transgressed his utterance.');">²⁴</span> <big><b>GEMARA: </b></big>Shall We say that okal means 'I shall eat'? We may question this, [for we learnt:] '"I swear I shall not eat of thine", "I swear I shall eat [okal] of thine"; "I do not swear I shall not eat of thine"; he is prohibited [to eat of that man's food]'?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Ned. 16a; If he used any of these three forms of oath, he must not partake of the other's food. Hence, 'I swear that okal (I shall eat) of thine' lk kfuta vguca apparently implies that he takes an oath not to eat; yet in our Mishnah it is taken as a positive oath. The explanation why vguca lk kfuta may be taken negatively is this: - it shall be prohibited to me by oath; - that which I eat of thine; i.e., I swear I shall not eat. vguca tk kfut tk The third form of oath means this: - it shall not be prohibited to me by oath; - that which I shall not eat; the implications being, but that which I shall eat shall be prohibited to me by oath.');">²⁵</span> - Abaye said: Really [okal] means 'I shall eat' [as our Mishnah states], yet there is no difficulty: Here [it is a case where] he is urged to eat; and there [it is a case where is not