Shevuot 67
כל אחת ואחת בפני ב"ד ושלא בפני ב"ד אינו מדבר אלא בתביעת ממון עדות שלא עשה בה נשים כאנשים קרובים כרחוקים פסולין ככשרים ואינו חייב אלא אחת בפני ב"ד אינו דין שלא יהא מדבר אלא בתביעת ממון
each [oath], whether [uttered] before the Beth Din or not before the Beth Din,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Infra 36b.');"><sup>1</sup></span> yet deals only with a money claim; testimony, where the law does not make women equal to men, relatives equal to non-relatives, those ineligible [to bear testimony] equal to those eligible, and where he is liable only once [if adjured] before the Beth Din, how much more that it should deal only with a money claim!<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' If the law concerning the oath of deposit, which has a more universal application, is yet restricted to money claims only, the law concerning the oath of testimony, which is restricted in many points, should the more so be restricted to money claims.');"><sup>2</sup></span>
מה לפקדון שכן לא עשה בו מושבע כנשבע ומזיד כשוגג תאמר בעדות שכן עשה בה מושבע כנשבע ומזיד כשוגג
- [No! We may argue:] Deposit [is restricted to money claims] because the law does not make him who is adjured [by others] equal to him who swears [of his own accord], or him who swears wilfully like him who swears unwittingly; but how can you say in [the case of] testimony [that it should be restricted to money claims], since the law makes him who is adjured [by others] equal to him who swears [of his own accord], and him who swears wilfully equal to him who swears unwittingly? - It is said: sin, sin, for deduction by analogy;<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' A Gezerah shawah, v. Glos.');"><sup>3</sup></span> here<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' In the case of oath of testimony.');"><sup>4</sup></span>
ת"ל תחטא תחטא לגזירה שוה נאמר כאן (ויקרא ה, כא) תחטא ונאמר להלן תחטא מה להלן אינו מדבר אלא בתביעת ממון אף כאן אינו מדבר אלא בתביעת ממון
it is said: [If any one] sin,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lev. V. 1.');"><sup>5</sup></span> and there<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' In the case of oath of deposit.');"><sup>6</sup></span>
מתקיף לה רבה בר עולא (ויקרא ה, ד) או או ביטוי יוכיחו שהן אואין ויש עמהן שבועה ואין עמהן כהן ומדברים שלא בתביעת ממון
it is said: [If any one] sin;<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lev. V, 21.');"><sup>7</sup></span> just as there it deals only with a money claim, so here it deals only with a money claim.
אדרבה מביטוי ה"ל למילף שכן חטאת מחטאת
or of [the oath of] utterance<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lev. V, 4: Or if any one swear . . to do evil, or to do good.');"><sup>9</sup></span> will prove [that a money claim is not intended], for they are or.
אלא מסתברא מפקדון ה"ל למילף שכן חטא במזיד תבעיה וכפריה ועבריה
or, and are concerned with an oath, and not concerned with a priest, and ye deal not with a money claim!<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Therefore let us say that the oath of testimony also does not deal with a money claim.');"><sup>10</sup></span> - It is more reasonable to deduce it from deposit, because [we may deduce] 'sin'<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lev. V. 1: if any one sin (referring to oath of testimony) .');"><sup>11</sup></span>
אדרבה מביטוי הוה ליה למילף שכן חטאת שירדה לחומש הנך נפישן:
from 'sin'.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Ibid. 21: if any one sin (referring to oath of deposit) .');"><sup>12</sup></span> - On the contrary, we should deduce it from [the oath of] utterance, for [we may deduce] sin offering from sin offering!<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For transgression of oath of testimony, or oath of utterance, a sin offering (sliding scale sacrifice) is brought, whereas for transgression of oath of deposit a guilt offering is brought.');"><sup>13</sup></span>
ר"ע אומר (ויקרא ה, ה) והיה כי יאשם לאחת מאלה יש מאלה שהוא חייב ויש מאלה שהוא פטור הא כיצד תבעו ממון חייב תבעו ד"א פטור
- Well, it is more reasonable to deduce it from deposit, because [they are both equal in respect of] sin,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' In both testimony and deposit the phrase if any one sin occurs.');"><sup>14</sup></span> wilful,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' In both an offering is brought for wilful transgression, whereas in the case of oath of utterance an offering is brought only for unwitting transgression.');"><sup>15</sup></span>
איפוך אנא
claim and denial,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' In both the oath is the result of a claim and a denial.');"><sup>16</sup></span> past.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' In both the oath is in the past ('We did not see you lend money to So-and-so' - testimony. 'You did not deposit anything with me' - deposit) ; but the oath of utterance is mainly concerned with the future ('I swear I shall eat') , for Scripture clearly implies the future: to do evil, or to do good (though according to R. Akiba it is possible to deduce the past also; supra 25a) .');"><sup>17</sup></span>
ר"ע אאואין דר"א סמיך
On the contrary, we should deduce it from [oath of] utterance, because [they are both equal in respect of] sin offering, sliding scale, fifth!<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Testimony and utterance entail liability for a sin offering, which is a sliding scale sacrifice, and no fine of a fifth of the principal is imposed, whereas in the case of deposit, the liability is for a guilt offering, which is a fixed sacrifice, and a fine of a fifth of the principal is imposed.');"><sup>18</sup></span> - The others are more.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Testimony is equal to deposit in four things, and equal to utterance only in three things, hence it is more reasonable to deduce testimony from deposit (and infer that it deals only with money claims) rather than deduce it from utterance (and infer that it is not restricted to money claims) .');"><sup>19</sup></span>
מאי בינייהו בין ר"א ובין ר"ע
R'Akiba said: And it shall be, when he shall be guilty in one of these things - in some of these things he is liable, and in some of these things he is exempt; how is this? If he claimed from him money, he is liable; if he claimed from him something else, he is exempt.'<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. supra 33b.');"><sup>20</sup></span>
איכא בינייהו משביע עדי קרקע לר"א חייבין לר"ע פטורין
Let me reverse it!<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Why deduce that if the claim is for money the witnesses are liable, and if not, they are exempt? The verse does not mention money claims.');"><sup>21</sup></span> - R'Akiba relies on the or.
ולר' יוחנן דאמר התם משביע עדי קרקע אפי' לר"א פטורין הכא מאי איכא בין ר"א לר"ע
o of R'Eliezer.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Supra 33b; R. Eliezer deduces from or . . or that the oath of testimony refers to money claims only; and on this R. Akiba says that in some cases (of money claims) the witnesses are liable, and in some they are exempt.');"><sup>22</sup></span> - [If so,] what is the difference between R'Eliezer and R'Akiba?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' What sort of money claims does R. Akiba exempt?');"><sup>23</sup></span>
איכא בינייהו עדי קנס
- The difference between them is, if he adjures witnesses for land: according to R'Eliezer<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Cf. infra 37b.');"><sup>24</sup></span> they are liable, according to R'Akiba they are exempt.
ר' יוסי הגלילי אומר והוא עד או ראה או ידע בעדות המתקיימת בראיה בלא ידיעה ובידיעה בלא ראיה הכתוב מדבר
- But according to R'Johanan who says there<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Loc. cit.');"><sup>25</sup></span> that if he adjures witnesses for land, they are exempt even according to R'Eliezer, what will be the difference here between R'Eliezer and R'Akiba? - The difference between them will be witnesses for a fine.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' According to R. Eliezer who expounds the Torah on the principle of amplification and limitation (v. infra 37b) , if he adjures witnesses in a case where only a fine would be imposed, they are liable if they withhold their testimony; according to R. Akiba they are exempt.');"><sup>26</sup></span>
א"ל רב פפא לאביי לימא ר' יוסי הגלילי לית ליה דר' אחא דתניא ר' אחא אומר גמל האוחר בין הגמלים ונמצא גמל הרוג בצידו בידוע שזה הרגו דאי אית ליה דר' אחא בדיני נפשות נמי משכחת לה כר"ש בן שטח
R'Jose the Galilean said: He being a witness, whether he hath seen or known - of such testimony as may be established by seeing without knowing, and by knowing without seeing, the verse deals.'<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Supra 33b.');"><sup>27</sup></span> R'Papa said to Abaye: Shall we say that R'Jose the Galilean<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Who holds that only in money matters can there be testimony based on seeing without knowing, and knowing without seeing; but in other matters both seeing and knowing are necessary.');"><sup>28</sup></span>
דתניא אר"ש בן שטח אראה בנחמה אם לא ראיתי אחד שרץ אחר חבירו לחורבה ורצתי אחריו ומצאתי סייף בידו ודם מטפטף והרוג מפרפר אמרתי לו רשע מי הרגו לזה או אני או אתה
does not agree with R'Aha? For it was taught: R'Aha said; If a camel copulates among other camels, and one camel is found killed at his side, it is known that he killed him.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' It is assumed that this camel kicked the other males away, and the owner of this camel must pay for the dead camel. R Aha thus holds that circumstantial evidence is equivalent to definite knowledge, v. B.B. 93a; Sanh. 37b.');"><sup>29</sup></span>
אבל מה אעשה שאין דמך מסור בידי שהרי אמרה תורה (דברים יז, ו) על פי שנים עדים או שלשה עדים יומת המת אלא המקום יפרע ממך אמרו לא זזו משם עד שנשכו נחש ומת
Now, if he would agree with R'Aha, it is possible also in capital cases, as [in the incident related by R'Simeon B'Shetah, for we learnt, R'Simeon B'Shetah said; May I not see the consolation [of Zion] if I did not see a man running after his neighbour into a ruin, and I ran after him, and found him with a sword in his hand with the blood dripping, and the victim writhing in agony. I said to him: 'Wicked one! Who killed this man?
אפי' תימא אית ליה דרבי אחא בשלמא ידיעה בלא ראיה משכחת לה אלא ראיה בלא ידיעה היכי משכחת לה מי לא בעי מידע אם עובד כוכבים הרג או ישראל הרג אם אדם טרפה הרג או שלם הרג
I or you? But what can I do, since your blood is not given into my hand, for Scripture says: At the mouth of two witnesses, or three witnesses, shall he that is to die be put to death.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Deut. XVI, 6.');"><sup>30</sup></span>
ש"מ קסבר רבי יוסי הגלילי משביע עדי קנס פטור דאי ס"ד חייב נהי דידיעה בלא ראיה אשכחן לה ראיה בלא ידיעה מי לא בעי מידע נכרית בעל בת ישראל בעל בתולה בעל בעולה בעל
But the Omnipresent will exact retribution from you!' It is said, they had not yet moved from there, when a serpent bit him, and he died!<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. Sanh. (Sonc. ed.) p. 235. If R. Jose the Galilean agrees with R. Aha that circumstantial evidence is as good as definite knowledge, why does he say that only in money matters is it possible to have testimony based on knowing without seeing? Hence, he does not agree with R. Aha.');"><sup>31</sup></span> - You may say, he does agree with R'Aha.
יתיב רב המנונא קמיה דרב יהודה ויתיב רב יהודה וקא מיבעיא ליה מנה מניתיך בפני פלוני ופלוני
Granted, knowing without seeing is possible,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' As in the case of R. Simeon b. Shetah.');"><sup>32</sup></span> but seeing without knowing how is that possible?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' If he sees one person killing another, would that be sufficient to condemn him? Would it not be necessary to know whether or not the victim e.g., suffered from a fatal disease (in which case the murderer does not pay the extreme penalty;) ? Sanh. 78a? R. Jose therefore rightly says that only in money matters is it possible to have evidence based on seeing without knowing.');"><sup>33</sup></span> Does he not need to know if he killed a heathen or a Jew,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. B.K. (Sonc. ed.) p. 253, n. 4.');"><sup>34</sup></span> if he killed a man suffering from a fatal disease or a healthy man? We may deduce that R'Jose the Galilean holds that if he adjures witnesses for a fine,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' E.g., to testify that a man had seduced his daughter, for which a fine of 50 shekels is imposed; Deut. XX, 29.');"><sup>35</sup></span> they are exempt, for if you will say they are liable, granted that knowing without seeing is possible,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' By circumstantial evidence.');"><sup>36</sup></span> but seeing without knowing - [how is that possible]? Does he not need to know if he cohabited with a heathen woman or a Jewish woman, with a virgin or with a woman who is not a virgin?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Since testimony cannot be established by seeing without knowing, R. Jose must hold that when witnesses are adjured in the case of a fine, and they withhold testimony, they are exempt; for he holds that the oath of testimony is applicable only in such a case where testimony may be established by seeing without knowing, and by knowing without seeing.');"><sup>37</sup></span> R'Hamnuna sat before Rab Judah, and Rab Judah sat and enquired; [If one said;] 'A hundred zuz I counted out to you before So-and-So and So-and-So';