Yoma 147

ואליבא דרבי עקיבא דאמר אדם אוסר עצמו בכל שהוא

and in accord with R'Akiba, who said that a man may prohibit to himself anything in any quantity,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' R. Akiba, on the other hand, holds that a legal minimum exists only in the case of foods etc. forbidden by the Torah, whereas a man who forbids himself by oath any kind of permitted food, implies that he would not partake of any quantity, however small, thereof.');">¹</span> however small.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Now, if Resh Lakish held that even less than the legal minimum is forbidden by Rabbinical decree, then how could he endeavour to explain the case of the man taking the oath as applying to one eating less than the legal minimum? For, since he is interdicted to eat by the law of Deut. XVII, 11: According to the law which they shall teach thee ... thou shalt do . . thou shalt not turn aside... to the right hand or to the left, from eating food Rabbinically forbidden, his oath is inoperative, hence does not oblige him to offer a sacrifice for his transgression thereof.');">²</span>

וכי תימא כיון דאית ליה היתר מן התורה קא חייל קרבן שבועה והתנן שבועת העדות אינה נוהגת אלא בראויין להעיד והוינן בה למעוטי מאי רב פפא אמר למעוטי מלך

And if you would say that since it is permitted by the Torah, [the law relating to the] sacrifice for an oath is operative,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Shebu. 30a. The answer of Resh Lakish would endeavour to make a distinction between things forbidden by the Torah, the oath re-forbidding the same to oneself would be considered inoperative and would free the swearer, in the case of transgression, from the obligation to offer up a sacrifice - and things permitted by the Torah, to which the oath could apply, so that if one swore not to eat less than the legal minimum which, because below the legal quantity, would be permitted by the law of the Torah and forbidden only by Rabbinic decree, the oath would operate, and in the case of transgression he would have to bring a sacrifice.');">³</span> surely we learned: An 'oath of testimony'<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lev. V, 1f.');">⁴</span>

רב אחא בר יעקב אמר למעוטי משחק בקוביא והא משחק בקוביא מדאורייתא מיחזי חזי ורבנן הוא דפסלוהו ולא קא חיילא עליה שבועה

applies only to those qualified to bear witness;<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. Shebu. 30a.');">⁵</span> and we raised the point: what does that mean to exclude, whereupon R'Papa said: This excludes a king, and R'Aha B'Jacob said: This excludes a professional dice-gambler.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The king can neither testify, nor be testified against, because of his exalted position; the gambler cannot testify, because his profession renders him, hence his statements or pledges, untrustworthy.');">⁶</span>

שאני התם דאמר קרא (ויקרא ה, א) אם לא יגיד והאי לאו בר הגדה הוא כלל

Now a dice-player, as far as Biblical law is concerned, is qualified to bear witness and only the Rabbis declared him unfit, and yet an oath does not apply to him?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' By Biblical law one is considered a robber only if one actually robs from one's hand, as in II Sam. XXIII, 21 where the technical term 'gazal', rob, is used: He (plucked - lit.,'robbed') the spear out of his hand; v. also B.K. 79b. So that, if the oath does not apply to a gambler, although by Biblical law, he is not prevented from testifying, the proposed distinction is unjustified.');">⁷</span> There it is different, for Scripture said: If he do not utter it,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lev. V, 1.');">⁸</span>

וכל היכא דתני ענוש כרת לא תני אסור והתניא אע"פ שאמרו אסור בכולן לא אמרו ענוש כרת אלא על האוכל ושותה ועושה מלאכה בלבד הכי קאמר כשאמרו אסור לא אמרו אלא בכחצי שיעור אבל כשיעור ענוש כרת ואף על פי שענוש כרת אין ענוש כרת אלא אוכל ושותה ועושה מלאכה בלבד

and this man cannot make a [valid] utterance.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' It means: One whose utterance not merely means speech, but words of meaning, words to be trusted, whereas this gambler's words, since he is untrustworthy, are, legally speaking, no utterance at all.');">⁹</span> Now would you say that wherever the punishment is extirpation the term 'forbidden' is not used?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' As insufficient, hence misleading; this being the reason for the first question here in the GEMARA:');">¹⁰</span>

ואב"א כי קתני אסור אשארא דתנו רבה ורב יוסף בשאר סיפרי דבי רב מניין ליוה"כ שאסור ברחיצה בסיכה ובנעילת הסנדל ובתשמיש המטה ת"ל (ויקרא טז, לא) שבתון שבות

Surely it was taught: Although the term 'forbidden' was used in connection with all of them,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' All the things forbidden, as enumerated in our MISHNAH:');">¹¹</span> the punishment of extirpation applies only to him who eats or drinks, or engages in labour? - This is what is said: When the term 'forbidden' is used, it is applied but to less than the legal minimum, but where the legal minimum has been transgressed the punishment involved is extirpation; and also extirpation is the penalty, that is the case only with him who eats or drinks or engages in labour.

גופא חצי שיעור רבי יוחנן אמר אסור מן התורה ריש לקיש אמר מותר מן התורה רבי יוחנן אמר אסור מן התורה כיון דחזי לאיצטרופי איסורא קא אכיל ריש לקיש אמר מותר מן התורה אכילה אמר רחמנא וליכא

Or, if you like, say: When [the Mishnah] uses the term 'forbidden', it refers to the rest [of the transgressions],<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Not eating and drinking.');">¹²</span> for Rabbah and R'Joseph taught in the other books of the School of Rab:<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' From the School of Rab emanated halachical commentaries not only on Leviticus, but on Numbers and Deuteronomy as well.');">¹³</span>

איתיביה ר' יוחנן לריש לקיש אין לי אלא כל שישנו בעונש ישנו באזהרה כוי וחצי שיעור הואיל ואינו בעונש יכול אינו באזהרה ת"ל (ויקרא ז, ג) כל חלב מדרבנן וקרא אסמכתא בעלמא

Whence do we know that it is forbidden on the Day of Atonement to anoint oneself, to wash, to put on shoes, and to have marital intercourse? Therefore the text reads: [It] is a Sabbath of solemn rest [unto you].<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lev. XVI,31 interpreted here as solemn rest not only from work, but from the usual occupations, such as eating, drinking, washing, anointing and having marital intercourse. Just as the term 'solemn day of rest' in connection with the Sabbath is, by the Sages, interpreted as including all manner of work, even not employed in connection with the building of the Sanctuary, so does that term here imply affliction by rest, as above.');">¹⁴</span>

הכי נמי מסתברא דאי סלקא דעתך דאורייתא כוי ספיקא הוא איצטריך קרא לאתויי ספיקא אי משום הא לא איריא קסברי

[To turn to] the main text: As for the matter of less than the legal minimum, R'Johanan said: It is forbidden by Biblical law, whilst Resh Lakish said: It is permitted by Biblical law. R'Johanan said, It is forbidden by Biblical law; since it could be joined [to form a minimum] it is forbidden food that he is eating. Resh Lakish said: It is permitted by Biblical law, for the Divine Law speaks of eating and this is not [eating].<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Since below the minimum it may be nibbling, but it is eating that is forbidden.');">¹⁵</span> - R'Johanan raised the following objection against Resh Lakish: I know only that whatsoever involves punishment is subject to a prohibition; but in the case of the koy,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' A kind of bearded deer or antelope (Jast.) . It is left undecided as to whether it belongs to the genus of cattle, the tallow of which is forbidden, or to beasts of chase, the tallow of which is permitted.');">¹⁶</span> and what is less than the legal minimum, since they do not involve punishment, I might say that they are not subject to a prohibition either, therefore the text reads: No fat.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lev. VII, 23. This proves that less than a legal minimum is prohibited by the Torah.');">¹⁷</span> - This is only Rabbinical and the text [adduced] is but a mere support. And that is also logical. For if one should assume that the prohibition is Biblical, surely [the status of] the koy is doubtful and no Scriptural text is necessary to cover a doubtful<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Since there is no doubt before the Divine Lawgiver, no Scriptural text would be necessary to cover a doubtful situation.');">¹⁸</span> case! - Were it only for this there would be no argument, they would hold