Zevachim 8
אלא אמר רב אשי אמר קרא (ויקרא א, ד) ונרצה לו לכפר עליו ולא על חבירו
Then change in respect of sanctity too is a mere intention! But what you must say is that since he intended it [for a wrongful purpose], he disqualified it; then here too,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Viz., in respect of wrongful ownership.');"><sup>3</sup></span>
והאי להכי הוא דאתא האי מיבעי ליה לכדתניא ונרצה לו לכפר עליו רבי שמעון אומר את שעליו חייב באחריותו ואת שאינו עליו אינו חייב באחריותו
since he intended it [for a different owner], he disqualified it.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Thus both can be regarded as intrinsic or non-intrinsic disqualifications.');"><sup>4</sup></span>
ואמר רב יצחק בר אבדימי מאי טעמא כיון דאמר עלי כמאן דטעון ליה אכתפיה דמי
Furthermore, according to R'Phinehas the son of R'Mari who maintained: Change in respect of owner does operate after death,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' As a disqualification. The bracketed passage explains the two points in which they are not really different.');"><sup>5</sup></span>
וכי תימא לילף מזביחה וזריקה מה לזביחה וזריקה שכן עבודה שחייבין עליה בחוץ
[implying,] but not for his fellow.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' This proves that the 'sprinkling' which effects the atonement must be performed in the name of its owner.');"><sup>7</sup></span>
אמר ליה רב אחא בר אבא לרבא אימא יעשה כלל זבח פרט כלל ופרט אין בכלל אלא מה שבפרט זביחה אין מידי אחרינא לא
Surely it is required for what was taught: And it shall be accepted for him to make atonement for him: R'Simeon said: Where [the sacrifice] is [a liability] upon him, he is responsible for its loss; where it is not [a liability] upon, him, he is not responsible for its loss,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' If a man declares, 'I vow an animal for a sacrifice,' he thereby undertakes a liability. If he subsequently sets aside an animal and it dies or is lost before it is sacrificed, he must replace it. But if he declared, 'I vow this animal for a sacrifice,' he accepted no liability beyond that animal, and if it dies his obligations ceases. R. Simeon deduces it from the verse quoted, which he renders and interprets thus: And it shall be accepted for him. When is it accepted for him? When its effect is to make atonement in which case he does not bring another. Hence if it did not make atonement, he must bring another. And when must he bring another in order to make atonement (i.e. to be quit of his obligation) ? When he declared it a liability upon him' (E.V. for him) . Sh. M.');"><sup>8</sup></span>
רבינא אמר לעולם דנין ולה חזר וכלל
Since he declared, '[I take] upon myself to bring an offering],' it is as though he carried it on his shoulder!<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' As though he had it in his care all the time, and until it is actually sacrificed his vow is not fulfilled. Thus the verse is required for a different purpose.');"><sup>9</sup></span>
אמר ליה רב אחא מדיפתי לרבינא והא לא דמי כללא קמא לכללא בתרא כללא קמא מרבה עשיות ותו לא כללא בתרא כל לה' ואפילו שפיכת שיריים והקטרת אימורין הא תנא דבי רבי ישמעאל בכללי ופרטי דריש כי האי גוונא
- R'Ashi makes his deduction from 'and it shall be accepted for him to make atonement,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Which implies: it must be 'for him to make atonement 'but not for another to make atonement. Whereas R. Simeon's deduction is from 'upon him' as stated in end of n. 9, p. 14.');"><sup>10</sup></span>
אי מה הפרט מפורש עבודה וחייבין עליה בחוץ אף כל עבודה וחייבין עליה בחוץ שחיטה וזריקה אין קבלה והולכה לא
And if you say, let us learn it from slaughtering and sprinkling, [it can be objected]: as for slaughtering and sprinkling, the reason is because [each is] a service which involves culpability [if performed] without [the Temple court]!<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' But there is no culpability if the other two services (receiving and carrying of the blood) are done outside their legitimate boundaries.');"><sup>11</sup></span>
איכא למימר הכי ואיכא למימר הכי שקולין הן ויבאו שניהן לישנא אחרינא וחדא חדא תיקו במילתא
For it is written, And he shall offer the ram for a slaughtering of peace-offerings,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Num. VI, 17.');"><sup>12</sup></span>
וכי תימא נילף מאיל נזיר מה לאיל נזיר שכן יש עמהן דמים אחרים
R'Aha B'Abba said to Raba: Let us say, 'he shall offer' is a general proposition:<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' 'He shall offer (lit. 'do') ' is a term embracing all services, while 'slaughtering' is a particular one.');"><sup>13</sup></span>
א"כ נכתוב שלמי מאי שלמים לרבות כל שלמים
'slaughtering' is a particularization now [where we have] a general proposition followed by a particularization, [the rule is] the general proposition includes only what is contained in the particularization; hence slaughtering is so,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e. , the deduction made regarding change in respect of owner applies to slaughtering.');"><sup>14</sup></span>
וכי תימא נילף משלמים מה לשלמים שכן טעונין סמיכה ונסכים ותנופת חזה ושוק
Since however it writes, 'he shall offer for a slaughtering of peace offerings,' It is an incomplete general proposition,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' 'He shall offer' obviously requires the completion of 'peace-offerings' before we know to what it refers at all; 'slaughtering' however interposes, and therefore it is only an incomplete generalization.');"><sup>15</sup></span>
אלא אמר קרא (ויקרא ז, לז) זאת התורה לעולה ולמנחה ולחטאת ולאשם ולמילואים ולזבח השלמים היקישן הכתוב לשלמים מה שלמים בין שינוי קודש בין שינוי בעלים בעינן לשמה אף כל בין שינוי קודש בין שינוי בעלים בעינן לשמה
and an incomplete general proposition is not treated as a case of a general proposition followed by a particularization.
אמר קרא (דברים כג, כד) מוצא שפתיך תשמור ועשית כאשר נדרת וגו' האי נדבה נדר הוא [אלא] אם כמה שנדרת עשית יהא נדר ואם לאו יהא נדבה
is another general proposition.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For it implies any service performed 'unto the Lord.' Thus we have a general proposition followed by a particularization and followed again by a general proposition. The exegetical rule then is that the general proposition includes all things similar to the particularization, and thus the other services are included.');"><sup>17</sup></span>
ואיצטריך מוצא שפתיך ואיצטריך זאת התורה דאי כתב רחמנא מוצא (הוה אמינא)
R'Aha of Difti said to Rabina: But the first generalization is dissimilar fr the last generalization, for the first includes [sacrificial] acts but nothing more, whereas the last one implie everything that is 'unto the Lord', even the pouring out of the residue [of the blood] and the burning of the emurim?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Whereas only the four services under discussion are sacrificial acts.');"><sup>18</sup></span> Behold the Tanna of the School of R'Ishmael<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Who formulated thirteen rules of exegesis, including this one.');"><sup>19</sup></span> [even] in the case of a general proposition and particularization of this nature applies the rule that in a general proposition followed by a particularization and followed again by a general proposition you must be guided by the particularization: just as that is explicitly a [sacrificial] service,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Sc. slaughtering.');"><sup>20</sup></span> and we require rightful intention, so in the case of every [sacrificial] serv we require rightful intention. If so, [you may argue:] just as the particularization is explicitly a service whi involves culpability [if it is performed] without [its legitimate boundaries], so is every service [included] which involves culpability [if performed] without; hence slaughtering and sprinkling are indeed included, but not receiving and carrying? or [you may argue]: as the particularization is explicitly something that must be done at the north [side of the altar] and is operative in the case of the inner sin-offerings, so all [servic which must be done at the north and are operative in the case of the inner sin-offerings [are included]; hence slaughtering and receiving are indeed included, but not sprinkling? - You can argue in this way or in that way; they are equally balanced, and so both [arguments] are admissible.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Since one approach includes slaughtering and sprinkling, and the other includes slaughtering and receiving, you must admit both, since neither is stronger than the other. Carrying too is then included, for it is really 'a part of the act of receiving.');"><sup>21</sup></span> Alternatively, I can say, sprinkling follows from R'Ashi's deduction.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Supra, from the verse 'and it shall be accepted for him etc.; hence the present deduction must be in respect of receiving.');"><sup>22</sup></span> We have thus found [it true of] the nazirite's ram; how do we know [it of] the other peace-offerings? And if you say, Let us learn them from the nazirite's ram, [it can be argued:] As for the nazirite's ram, the reason is because other sacrifices<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lit., 'blood',');"><sup>23</sup></span> accompany it.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' And it is natural that one cannot be sacrificed in the name of one person and a second in the name of another, when all are for the same person. The other sacrifices are the sin-offering and the burnt-offering.');"><sup>24</sup></span> - If so,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' If the deduction of the verse were intended to be confined to this particular sacrifice.');"><sup>25</sup></span> Scripture should write, [And he shall offer the ram for.'] his peace-offerings;<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. marginal gloss.');"><sup>26</sup></span> why state, [for] peace-offerings? - In order to include all peace-offerings. We have thus found [it true of] peace-offerings; how do we know [it of] other sacrifices? And if you say, Let us learn them from peace-offerings, [it can be argued:] As for peace-offerings, the reason is because they require laying [of hands], libations, and the waving of the breast and shoulder!<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' But no other sacrifices require all these, and consequently they may be offered under another designation either in respect of sanctity or of ownership.');"><sup>27</sup></span> Rather, Scripture says, This is the law of the burnt-offering, of the meal-offering, and of the sin-offering, and of the guilt-offering, and the consecration-offering, and of the sacrifice of peace-offerings;<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lev. VII, 37.');"><sup>28</sup></span> thus Scripture assimilates them to peace-offerings. Just as we require peace-offerings [to be offered] for their own sake, [thus forbidding] both change in respect of sanctity and change in respect of owner, so do we require all [sacrifices to be offered] fo their own sake, [thus forbidding] both change in respect of sanctity and change in respect of owner. Let us say that if one slaughtered them in a different name they are invalid? - Scripture says, That which is gone out of thy lips thou shalt observe and do,' as thou has vowed a nedabah [freewill-offering] etc. :<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Deut. XXIII, 24.');"><sup>29</sup></span> is this a freewill-offering - surely it is a vow? The meaning however is this: if you acted in accordance with your vow, let it be [the fulfilment of your] vow; but if not, let it count as a freewill-offering.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. supra. Since it counts as a freewill-offering, it is obviously valid.');"><sup>30</sup></span> Now [both texts viz.] 'that which is gone out of thy lips' and 'this is the law' etc. , are required.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' One might argue that the text, 'that which . . lips' etc., itself proves that a sacrifice must in the first place at least be offered for its own sake. Hence the Talmud proceeds to shew that that is not so.');"><sup>31</sup></span> For if the Divine Law wrote, 'that which is gone out of thy lips' [only], I would say,