פירוש על עבודה זרה 12:29

Before the idols of idolaters three days it is forbidden to negotiate with them to lend them and ask them. And after the time Rabbi Ishmael says that three before them and three after them are forbidden, and the Ecclesiastes before their idols are forbidden after their idols are permitted. It is forbidden to negotiate with them. In the negotiations of bargaining and selling, this is proven from the interpretation that Kaman interpreted in Pirkin, because he is a dazil and a mummy for idolatry, and it is forbidden because he will not hear from you. But rather in the case of a middy dhazi, for the sacrifice of your words, it is written, Because he says that helping him with his idolatry according to his needs and the more difficult is that he does not have to deal with them because of the welfare or because before the skin it will not give an obstacle and interpret it because the welfare is drowsy and woeful and moody, and it is not difficult to say, A beast for its children, etc. And Amai did not command an antiaircraft in the hands of a man who is not worthy of sacrifice. And that he should be asked to accompany them, and to accompany them from them. He asked him, "What is the thing of Israel?" He needs him and Zil and Moody, but in the negotiations of bargaining and selling, he did not think that he was profitable. Like his smell and even when he buys, he still does not know if he will profit from it and when he is familiar, he is worried that he will take out the money before he finds another commodity and not Azil and Moody and the late Rambam writes that D'Isor took from them everything that the coins are held in his hand, To sell them something worthy of the "star worship" and to take money from them and give them their alternates and make them to them The island of Dasro to sell them from Hadzi to the starry work because of the welfare that he has a lot to sacrifice for idolatry he sacrifices in profit and from the best and praises his idolatrous work, which is invited to sacrifice with distinction and from the finest and that he has properly sacrificed it is forbidden to sell him or Dalma precisely because before and after skin A woman who is a member of the rabbinical court in the baritah of דרב זביד is required to do something that does not exist but does not take them from them לאו במקח אירי only with the receipt of דורון דומיא דימוא הטם משנא דינה קיסרינא to רב יהודה נשיאה and to פשישי "שפי ' To sell him and Azil and Modi is difficult Negotiate because welfare is Dltama Dlfni skin Emei no Lokhin them and YL fraiche Dlsat and give Dmtni not only the sale and remnants of best means to carry them coins and let them bargain but not taking banned "Give Dstm is familiar sadness. And in the case of the "פרישי" דכ"ל when they said that it is forbidden to negotiate with them, they did not say anything but In the matter that takes place but something that does not exist is permissible, and in each one of them there is one side permit and one side prohibition of anything that exists is forbidden to know and it is permissible to take and something that is not fulfilled is forbidden to be taken and permitted to sell. According to the fact that there is also the taking of the other side and the prohibition aspect, the baraita does not invalidate the law for taking, and in the beritha of a raven zevi דיפור דין לקניה ושתיה לפרשת Rashi In the negotiations of bargaining and selling, there is in the sale a prohibition and a permit side, as well as a trick and a parakeet. There is no difference between these two דיכיון דמתאוו to the מוכר שמח and זעיל and מודי even though he explained that דמקמח and ממכר does not belong אזיל and מודי does not belong to אזיל ומודי It is actually without interest, but in the interest it is permitted to do so, and not to eat it, and to recite it, In this case it is not possible to say that it is necessary for the נעות ממעות to be ממעו קט a little "Samuel said in the Diaspora is not forbidden, but only the day of idols. And the day that he sees who is forbidden and the Rabbi who is related to Rav Nachman to the zavoni of Hamra and to the rabbi raised to the zivoni of Hitta in Haggata Dtei'i that I am a חגתא דטייי דביא קביעה and was amazed at our custom that we do not refrain from marrying and lending with them and accompanying them. Rashi: "Now the nations among us are idolaters, not Azali and Moody, as in the Book of David." Daha from the island of Tama Sheri Lakman in Pb (p. 64): Dkamer Rav Yehuda Shadar Korbana Lavodarina said Yudna Beha Dallah Falah for the work of the stars and Rava "And the Lord of the heavens is not forbidden, but rather the day of idem alone. On the day of their idols, it is permissible to allow them, and Aviel, because our most precious livelihood is from them, and we bear and enjoy with them all the year of the year, so that we will not be separated from them on the day of their idyll. Lachish Kammiah said, "Let us make it into its hands, and we shall not consider it." Before him

The implication above was that if the idolater has another animal to sacrifice, the Jew who sells him an animal does not transgress the prohibition of placing a stumbling block before the blind. But this contradicts a baraita stated by R. Natan. If one makes forbidden substances available to those to whom they are prohibited, he transgresses, even if the person could have consumed the substance in any case.

The prohibition of placing a stumbling block before the blind applies only if the person could not have otherwise gotten hold of the forbidden substance, such as he was on the other side of the river. Thus if the idolater has another animal to sacrifice, the Jew does not transgress placing a stumbling block before the blind.
Note that the Talmud never got back to answering the original question—what is the reasoning for the prohibition of engaging in business with idolaters before their festival.

This is the amoraic dispute on which the sugya is based.

Yohanan cites a baraita that seems to directly oppose Resh Lakish. But Resh Lakish solves it by saying it refers only to transactions that took place on the festival itself. If a Jew engaged in a transaction before the festival, the proceeds are permitted. Note that this is a limitation on Resh Lakish’s permission to use the proceeds.

In this version Resh Lakish tries to use the baraita as a difficulty on R. Yohanan. The baraita prohibits the proceeds only if they engaged in business on the festival itself. But R. Yohanan resolves the difficulty by saying that both before and on the festival can be called “festivals.”

This baraita teaches two things. First of all, the prohibition extends only to unperishable items. One can engage in transactions involving perishable items. Rashi explains that if one sells a perishable item, such as a vegetable, a few days before the festival, the item will not be there on the festival such that the idolater could thank his god for it.
Second, the proceeds of forbidden sales are permitted. This accords with Resh Lakish.

According to this source, one may sell them perishable items, because they will be used before the holiday. But one may not buy perishable items because this causes them a profit.
There are a various ways of understanding the relationship between this source and the previous one. According to one opinion, it is a stringency. The previous baraita seemed to say that one could engage in business with perishables. Here we learn that this is limited to selling them.

Judah Nesi’a, a rabbinic political leader, is presented with a dilemma. He is sent a gift by an idolater (again, the word “min” is used). If he accepts the gift, the idolater will go thank his gods for having the privilege to send a gift to a prominent rabbi (I know, this seems like a stretch). If he doesn’t accept it, the idolater will be angry and the rabbi does not want to increase the enmity between him and the Roman authorities. Resh Lakish’s solution is for R. Judah Hanesia to “accidentally” throw the money down the well.
This is a very “forced” story, especially the ending. The parallel in the Yerushalmi tells the story differently. I analyze the difference in my forthcoming book. So stay tuned!

The pattern of this section will be repeated twice below, so I will explain it only here. Giving anything to the idolater close to his holiday will cause them a profit, and thus it makes sense why it should be prohibited. But why should it be prohibited to take things from them? This only diminishes their property?
Abaye says that in essence, it is not prohibited to borrow things from them. But borrowing might lead to lending and therefore it too is prohibited.
Rava says that borrowing itself might lead to the idolater thanking his god. He will be so delighted that the Jew borrowed from him, that on his festival he will thank his god. [Yes, this seems to be a stretch].

In tomorrow’s section we will learn why the mishnah needed to repeat the same rule three times.

If the mishnah had taught only that business was prohibited, I might have thought that it is permitted to borrow from them. Business causes both sides to profit. But borrowing items does not give the lender a profit. Therefore, the mishnah had to teach that it too is prohibited.

To borrow an item from someone is to acknowledge their importance. Therefore, the idolater might go thank his god. But borrowing money is just a business transaction and might cause the idolater to worry that he will not recover his money. Therefore, we might think it is permitted. The mishnah teaches that it is not.

We might have thought that since he can get his money back when he lends, the idolater would still go and thank his god. But why would he thank his god for repaying a debt. That is simply losing money and causes pain to the one repaying the debt. Therefore, the mishnah needed to teach that even this type of economic interaction is prohibited. In essence, all economic interaction is prohibited.

Judah in our mishnah seems to contradict R. Judah’s opinion in another mishnah. This mishnah is about what one is allowed to do during the intermediate days of the festival (hol hamoed). The issue here is whether a woman can put a lime cream on her face (probably a whitening agent, women back then wanted to look whiter, not tanner). R. Judah allows this only if the positive results will occur during the festival. Although she will be disfigured temporarily, she will be happy during the festival. So here we see that R. Judah accepts the notion that we consider something to be joyous even if it causes temporary pain as long as the final result is joyful.

There are two answers here. R. Nahman b. Yitzchak says that everything that a person is allowed to do on the festival is currently a trouble but brings about pleasant results later. For instance, slaughtering an animal is difficult, but will bring about the pleasant result of having meat to eat. Thus there is nothing unusual here.
Ravina answers from a different angle altogether. R. Judah disagrees on the facts—he believes that idolaters will always be upset that they had to pay back the money. Thus this is not a case of something being troublesome now and pleasant later on.

Joshua b. Korha allows one to recover a debt made orally because such debts are generally hard to recover. We can see here that preventing the idolater from celebrating on his festival is not the primary consideration for R. Joshua b. Korha.

Here we can see some live action in the amoraic academy. Note the precision of the seating arrangements. R. Abba sits in front of R. Huna, the master, and recites traditions in front of him. R. Joseph is also present, and from what we can see below, is also in a position of authority. R. Abba, the student, recites two pithy halakhic rulings that seem to have nothing to do with one another. The Talmud is now left to figure out the meaning of these two rulings.
The ruling according to R. Joshua b. Korha is with regard to the matter at hand.

Joseph is angry at R. Abba, not because he said something wrong, but because he said something overly obvious. It was not obvious that the halakhah follows R. Joshua b. Korha, because his was a minority opinion. But it should be obvious that the halakhah follows R. Judah because of a different principle. If the mishnah quotes a dispute and then later quotes one of those opinions anonymously, the halakhah follows the anonymous opinion. The idea is that when composing the Mishnah, R. Judah Hanasi hinted at his own opinion by citing the anonymous voice, with which he agreed, last. As we shall see, this is one of those cases.