Responsa על בבא בתרא 143:11
Teshuvot Maharam
Q. A's estate was not sufficient for the purpose of paying his wife's ketubah. The widow, however, improved the estate. Is she entitled to collect her ketubah, from the increase in value that resulted from her efforts? I believe that such increase belongs to the orphans.
A. Your decision is correct. Since the widow derived her sustenance from the property of the orphans*As long as the widow did not take the required oath regarding her ketubah, the estate belonged to the orphans., the fruit of her labor belonged to them.
SOURCES: Am II, 15.
A. Your decision is correct. Since the widow derived her sustenance from the property of the orphans*As long as the widow did not take the required oath regarding her ketubah, the estate belonged to the orphans., the fruit of her labor belonged to them.
SOURCES: Am II, 15.
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Teshuvot Maharam
Q. A married a widow, B, and lived with her for eight years till her death. B had not taken the customary widow's oath regarding her ketubah due her from her former husband. When she married A she was not considered very rich and no one suspected that she owned more than the value of her ketubah. But, after her death, when A declared, under oath, to the community (leaders, probably for purposes of taxation) the value of his assets, it was discovered that he had inherited from B more than the value of her ketubah from her former husband. The heirs of the latter, therefore, demand that A return the excess to them.
A. If the valuables B brought to A were undistinguishable and no one recognized them as having belonged to B's former husband, A is free from obligation for five reasons. a) Even if the valuables B brought to A were worth more than the value of her ketubah, such valuables may not all necessarily have come from the estate of her former husband, for she might have received some gifts or found a treasure. b) Were B still alive she would have been obliged to take an oath [to the effect that she did not take from her former husband more than the value of her ketubah], but now that she is dead, A is free from the obligation of taking an oath, since he is not supposed to know his wife's affairs. c) A is not even required to take the oath of an heir — that B never told him, and that he did not know that she had received from the estate of her former husband more than the value of her ketubah — since the heirs of B's former husband are not positive in their claim. The heirs, however, may pronounce the ban (herem) in the synagogue against anyone who does possess such knowledge and does not reveal it. Such ban would include A. d) Whatever a person would have retained, had he taken an oath, his heirs may retain without the necessity of taking an oath. e) Some authorities require A to take the oath of an heir; but since many great authorities absolve him from such oath, and since A is in possession of the aforesaid valuables, the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff. For similar reasons A would be free from the obligation of taking an oath, even if some of the valuables brought to him by B were distinguishable and were recognized as having belonged to B's former husband, if the valuables thus recognized were in themselves not worth more than the value of B's ketubah. But, if the distinguishable valuables are in themselves worth more than the value of B's ketubah, A must return the difference to the heirs of B's first husband.
Q. Witnesses have testified to the effect that B and her former husband, C, had made a binding agreement that in the event of the death of one party, the surviving party would share the property with the heirs. After C's death, B settled with all of C's heirs, except the youngest, D, who was born after the drawing up of the agreement. D, therefore, is now pressing his claim.
A. D was entitled to his share even though he was born after the agreement was made, for in it B did not bestow benefits on anybody; she merely relinquished her rights to C's property up to a certain extent, and D later became heir to the relinquished property. However, A may claim that B brought him nothing from C's estate, or he may contend that B had already settled with D, and be free from obligation for the reasons enumerated above.
SOURCES: Am II, 17; cf. Hayyim Or Zarua, Responsa 86; ibid. 165; ibid. 191.
A. If the valuables B brought to A were undistinguishable and no one recognized them as having belonged to B's former husband, A is free from obligation for five reasons. a) Even if the valuables B brought to A were worth more than the value of her ketubah, such valuables may not all necessarily have come from the estate of her former husband, for she might have received some gifts or found a treasure. b) Were B still alive she would have been obliged to take an oath [to the effect that she did not take from her former husband more than the value of her ketubah], but now that she is dead, A is free from the obligation of taking an oath, since he is not supposed to know his wife's affairs. c) A is not even required to take the oath of an heir — that B never told him, and that he did not know that she had received from the estate of her former husband more than the value of her ketubah — since the heirs of B's former husband are not positive in their claim. The heirs, however, may pronounce the ban (herem) in the synagogue against anyone who does possess such knowledge and does not reveal it. Such ban would include A. d) Whatever a person would have retained, had he taken an oath, his heirs may retain without the necessity of taking an oath. e) Some authorities require A to take the oath of an heir; but since many great authorities absolve him from such oath, and since A is in possession of the aforesaid valuables, the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff. For similar reasons A would be free from the obligation of taking an oath, even if some of the valuables brought to him by B were distinguishable and were recognized as having belonged to B's former husband, if the valuables thus recognized were in themselves not worth more than the value of B's ketubah. But, if the distinguishable valuables are in themselves worth more than the value of B's ketubah, A must return the difference to the heirs of B's first husband.
Q. Witnesses have testified to the effect that B and her former husband, C, had made a binding agreement that in the event of the death of one party, the surviving party would share the property with the heirs. After C's death, B settled with all of C's heirs, except the youngest, D, who was born after the drawing up of the agreement. D, therefore, is now pressing his claim.
A. D was entitled to his share even though he was born after the agreement was made, for in it B did not bestow benefits on anybody; she merely relinquished her rights to C's property up to a certain extent, and D later became heir to the relinquished property. However, A may claim that B brought him nothing from C's estate, or he may contend that B had already settled with D, and be free from obligation for the reasons enumerated above.
SOURCES: Am II, 17; cf. Hayyim Or Zarua, Responsa 86; ibid. 165; ibid. 191.
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Teshuvot Maharam
Q. For many years the Jews of the entire kingdom paid their taxes to the king collectively. Then the king gave part of his kingdom to his son, and stated that henceforth the taxes of the Jews in that territory should be paid to his son. But the communities of the rest of the kingdom still demand the regular taxes from the Jews of the territory presented to the king's son.
A. The Jews of the entire kingdom became partners in the collective payment of their taxes for the reason that they were all the king's subjects and under obligation to pay their taxes to him. But, as soon as the Jews of the ceded territory ceased to be under the obligation of paying taxes to the king, the condition for the forming of the partnership no longer existed for them, and they could withdraw from the partnership (without the consent of the Jews of the rest of the kingdom). Therefore, if the king has given the entire income of the territory to his son, the Jews of that territory are under no obligation to their former associates. If, however, the king gave the territory itself to his son, but reserved the income to himself for a certain period of time, those Jews should continue to pay the taxes together with the Jews of the rest of the kingdom for that period of time.
This Responsum is addressed to R. Abraham.
SOURCES: Pr. 131; Mord. B. K. 183. Cf. Weil, Responsa 81; Moses Minz, Responsa 1; ibid. 22.
A. The Jews of the entire kingdom became partners in the collective payment of their taxes for the reason that they were all the king's subjects and under obligation to pay their taxes to him. But, as soon as the Jews of the ceded territory ceased to be under the obligation of paying taxes to the king, the condition for the forming of the partnership no longer existed for them, and they could withdraw from the partnership (without the consent of the Jews of the rest of the kingdom). Therefore, if the king has given the entire income of the territory to his son, the Jews of that territory are under no obligation to their former associates. If, however, the king gave the territory itself to his son, but reserved the income to himself for a certain period of time, those Jews should continue to pay the taxes together with the Jews of the rest of the kingdom for that period of time.
This Responsum is addressed to R. Abraham.
SOURCES: Pr. 131; Mord. B. K. 183. Cf. Weil, Responsa 81; Moses Minz, Responsa 1; ibid. 22.
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Teshuvot Maharam
Q. A left his possessions to his sons on condition that they give a certain amount to his four daughters, and if they have no cash that they should pay the daughters with real property. One of the daughters died before A.
A. A's sons must pay their three sisters three quarters of the designated sum, and may keep the other quarter for themselves, even if the deceased daughter left heirs. The death of one daughter does not annul the gift to the other three.
SOURCES: Cr. 189; Pr. 136; L. 387; Mord. Git. 431.
A. A's sons must pay their three sisters three quarters of the designated sum, and may keep the other quarter for themselves, even if the deceased daughter left heirs. The death of one daughter does not annul the gift to the other three.
SOURCES: Cr. 189; Pr. 136; L. 387; Mord. Git. 431.
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Teshuvot Maharam
Q. A left his possessions to his sons on condition that they give a certain amount to his four daughters, and if they have no cash that they should pay the daughters with real property. One of the daughters died before A.
A. A's sons must pay their three sisters three quarters of the designated sum, and may keep the other quarter for themselves, even if the deceased daughter left heirs. The death of one daughter does not annul the gift to the other three.
SOURCES: Cr. 189; Pr. 136; L. 387; Mord. Git. 431.
A. A's sons must pay their three sisters three quarters of the designated sum, and may keep the other quarter for themselves, even if the deceased daughter left heirs. The death of one daughter does not annul the gift to the other three.
SOURCES: Cr. 189; Pr. 136; L. 387; Mord. Git. 431.
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Teshuvot Maharam
Q. A is heavily encumbered by his overlord with taxes and forced loans. He originally came to settle in T because he had made a settlement with the overlord to pay a certain amount of taxes directly to the latter, and not in partnership with the rest of the community. The community, however, demands that A pay his share of the tax on the community.
A. If A had originally separated himself from the community with the latter's full knowledge and consent, he need not cooperate with the community in the payment of its taxes; but, if he did not obtain the consent of the community, he had no right to make a separate agreement with the overlord since the custom of the community provides that all Jews be partners in the payment of the taxes. A community has a right to force a rebellious minority in its midst, to obey its customs. Furthermore, the overlord had no right to make a separate agreement with A in violation of the custom he himself had established among the Jews of his town. Such an act on the part of the overlord is not considered "law of the land", but rather constitutes downright robbery. Although according to the Talmud a king may change the customary taxation arrangements of his subjects (B. B. 143a), he is permitted to do so only when he is acting of his own accord, but not when he is urged to do so by some of his subjects. A's objection that it will be prohibitive for him to pay taxes both to the overlord and to the community, is not very serious, for he may explain to the overlord that separating oneself from the community in the payment of taxes is prohibited by our laws, that on this account one becomes involved in quarrels with the Jews of the kingdom, and that henceforth he will refuse to pay his taxes independently of the community. In such matters we are permitted to act with severity even when not directly empowered by the Talmud, as long as we conform to the spirit of the Talmud; for, were a Jew permitted to separate himself from his community, great calamities would often ensue.
SOURCES: Cr. 222; Am II, 122; Rashba I, 841; Tesh. Maim. to Kinyan, 29b. Cf. Agudah B. K. 144; Maharil, Responsa 71; Weil, Responsa 38; Menahem of Merseburg, Nimmukim (25); Moses Minz, Responsa 61d; Terumat Hadeshen 341, Isserlein, Pesakim 144.
A. If A had originally separated himself from the community with the latter's full knowledge and consent, he need not cooperate with the community in the payment of its taxes; but, if he did not obtain the consent of the community, he had no right to make a separate agreement with the overlord since the custom of the community provides that all Jews be partners in the payment of the taxes. A community has a right to force a rebellious minority in its midst, to obey its customs. Furthermore, the overlord had no right to make a separate agreement with A in violation of the custom he himself had established among the Jews of his town. Such an act on the part of the overlord is not considered "law of the land", but rather constitutes downright robbery. Although according to the Talmud a king may change the customary taxation arrangements of his subjects (B. B. 143a), he is permitted to do so only when he is acting of his own accord, but not when he is urged to do so by some of his subjects. A's objection that it will be prohibitive for him to pay taxes both to the overlord and to the community, is not very serious, for he may explain to the overlord that separating oneself from the community in the payment of taxes is prohibited by our laws, that on this account one becomes involved in quarrels with the Jews of the kingdom, and that henceforth he will refuse to pay his taxes independently of the community. In such matters we are permitted to act with severity even when not directly empowered by the Talmud, as long as we conform to the spirit of the Talmud; for, were a Jew permitted to separate himself from his community, great calamities would often ensue.
SOURCES: Cr. 222; Am II, 122; Rashba I, 841; Tesh. Maim. to Kinyan, 29b. Cf. Agudah B. K. 144; Maharil, Responsa 71; Weil, Responsa 38; Menahem of Merseburg, Nimmukim (25); Moses Minz, Responsa 61d; Terumat Hadeshen 341, Isserlein, Pesakim 144.
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Teshuvot Maharam
Q. A left his possessions to his sons on condition that they give a certain amount to his four daughters, and if they have no cash that they should pay the daughters with real property. One of the daughters died before A.
A. A's sons must pay their three sisters three quarters of the designated sum, and may keep the other quarter for themselves, even if the deceased daughter left heirs. The death of one daughter does not annul the gift to the other three.
SOURCES: Cr. 189; Pr. 136; L. 387; Mord. Git. 431.
A. A's sons must pay their three sisters three quarters of the designated sum, and may keep the other quarter for themselves, even if the deceased daughter left heirs. The death of one daughter does not annul the gift to the other three.
SOURCES: Cr. 189; Pr. 136; L. 387; Mord. Git. 431.
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